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Chapter 1
Introduction
”The market mechanism alone cannot perform all
economic functions. Public policy is needed to
guide, correct, and supplement it in certain respects.”
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989, p.5)
Modern economies are characterized by the coexistence of and, more impor-
tantly, the interdependencies between the private and the public sector. On
the one hand, firms’ activities contribute to a country’s economic growth and
development, boost investment and trade, create jobs, and foster technological
progress and innovation, which is essential for an economy’s sustainable compet-
itiveness. On the other hand, firms benefit considerably from a wide range of
public goods and services which are, to the greatest extent, provided by the pub-
lic sector. These include, among others, (i) public infrastructure and a successful
education system as well as (ii) institutional quality, reflected, for example, by a
strong adherence to the rule of law. In his pioneering contribution dating back
to 1959, Richard Musgrave provides a very fundamental rationalization of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy, distinguishing between three branches (or
functions): the allocation, distribution, and stabilization function of government
activity (Musgrave, 1959). While, nowadays, the stabilization function is com-
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monly associated with the field of macroeconomics, the two other functions still
represent the seminal normative principles to guide government activity from a
public finance perspective. As to the allocation function, one can summarize that
if the market mechanism fails to achieve allocative efficiency (as, for example, in
the context of the provision of public goods and services), then there is scope for
an intervention of public policy for efficiency reasons. In the context of allocative
efficiency and the maximization of total surplus, however, no statement is made
about whether the outcome implies a socially desirable distribution of income.
To the extent that a society pursues the objective of a reasonably fair income dis-
tribution, the distribution function implies that fiscal policy should be concerned
with redistribution through some form of a tax and transfer system.
Musgrave’s famous three-branch taxonomy offers a normative framework to
guide the design of public policy. From a descriptive point of view, we can state
that government activities intended to meet both allocation and distribution ob-
jectives of public policy are necessarily associated with public expenditures. This,
in turn, implies that governments face a budget constraint and need to generate
public income to finance expenditures related to, broadly speaking, the provision
of public goods and services as well as a social security system. The major source
of public income is tax revenue: countries levy taxes on personal and corporate
income, goods and services, and other sources. One important feature in this
context is that most taxes are not lump-sum, but imply behavioral responses,
distortions, and efficiency losses. This is probably most intuitive in the case of
corporate income taxation, as taxes bring on behavioral responses of firms. In
general terms, a corporate tax reduces the net return on an investment, induc-
ing firms to invest less. This behavioral response brings along welfare costs (an
excess burden) of taxation (Harberger, 1962). In addition to the setting in this
very fundamental example, Nicodème (2008) argues that the corporate income
tax distorts a wide range of further firm decisions, particularly in an international
context. In this regard, recent decades have witnessed fundamental changes to
corporate sectors around the world, owing to increased international integration
through trade and investment openness in general, and the proliferation of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular
3
(see, e.g., Markusen, 2002; UNCTAD, 2018; Cadestin et al., 2019). Taxing in-
creasingly mobile MNEs on a national level has become more and more difficult
and constitutes a far-reaching concern for policymakers. To the extent that (i)
MNEs’ investment decisions are influenced by tax incentives (see, e.g., De Mooij
and Ederveen, 2003) and (ii) MNEs are able to shift profits to affiliates in low-tax
jurisdictions (see, e.g., Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017), the capability of govern-
ments to raise tax revenue from corporate income generated by MNEs is severely
restricted.
Turning the focus to the tax policy of governments, the latter have recognized
these challenges and, broadly speaking, react in two different ways. On the one
hand, we observe intensified competition for mobile tax bases, as a lot of countries
have reduced their statutory tax rate on corporate income. Moreover, a variety of
policies have been enacted by countries to concede preferential tax treatment for
specific forms of corporate income (for example, income from intellectual prop-
erty, see Griffith et al., 2014). On the other hand, more and more countries also
strive to implement policy instruments to restrict the tax-avoidance activities
of, in particular, MNEs. Anti-tax-avoidance-rules have been introduced to limit
profit shifting and, eventually, an erosion of tax bases. Policy actions taken by
jurisdictions in this context have been largely uncoordinated so far. However, the
recent BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) initiative of the OECD and G20
countries marks an important step towards more coordinated, multilateral efforts
to tackle these concerns. The BEPS report includes specific policy recommenda-
tions and is, indeed, designed to be implemented in a coordinated manner, both
domestically and through multilateral treaty provisions (OECD, 2016). It is,
however, unclear to what extent still tax-sovereign states will comply with these
suggestions and effectively implement and enforce the respective policy measures.
Taken together, these trends exemplify that corporate tax policy takes place
in a highly dynamic and international environment. Current developments and
their implications for firm behavior and strategic tax policies lie at the core of
both academic research and controversial policy debates. The dynamics of on-
going changes to the global business environment and international tax policy
responses to these changes, however, necessarily imply that there remain open
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questions. On a lot of different margins, we still know remarkably little about
the interdependencies between international tax policy and firm behavior, and, on
a broader scale, about the extent to which this impacts the economic development
of countries at a global level.
This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays and contributes to a
better understanding of the corporate tax policies of countries operating under
very different conditions to generate tax revenue, taking into account the behav-
ioral responses of firms to tax incentives in an international context. Moreover, it
also provides novel evidence as to how MNEs’ international investment decisions
are made and how the latter are crucially affected by profit-shifting opportunities
and facilitated access to financial capital.
To learn about these topics, it is of great relevance to rely on a broad data
basis. An integral part of this dissertation is a self-collected dataset on statutory
and effective corporate tax measures around the world. This dataset is unique in
its comprehensiveness, containing data on corporate tax regimes of 193 countries
for the time period from 1996 to 2016. Complemented by further data sources,
we use these data in all chapters of this dissertation, which we briefly demon-
strate in the following, before presenting the main findings and contributions
of each chapter in more detail. Chapter 2 provides an extensive survey on our
self-collected dataset and presents two concise empirical applications for which
the dataset can be used: one at the firm level, where we model a firm’s fixed
assets as a function of the tax measures in our data, and one at the country level,
where we estimate whether tax-avoidance behavior implies an inverse-U-shaped
Laffer-Curve relationship between statutory tax incentives and corporate tax rev-
enue. The third chapter builds on the latter empirical application in the second
chapter. It examines how countries generate corporate tax revenue in an inter-
national context and extends the Laffer-Curve framework by additionally taking
into account the competitive pressure exerted by foreign countries’ tax-setting
behavior on (domestic) tax revenue. In Chapter 4, we first present a theoreti-
cal model to analyze how the threat of tax evasion affects a revenue-maximizing
country’s optimal tax-setting behavior. We evaluate our theoretical findings and
their policy implications using our comprehensive dataset on corporate tax rates,
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complemented by data on tax revenues, the number of Double Taxation Treaties
(DTTs) concluded by a country, and a wide range of additional country-level data.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, where we use a rich micro dataset of German firms,
we exploit our self-collected tax data to show that it is mainly due to reasons
related to tax-planning opportunities and an improved access to financial capital
that we observe a positive relationship between foreign and home investment of
MNEs.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is joint work with Georg U. Thunecke and Georg
Wamser. First, it provides a survey on corporate income taxes around the world,
including statutory and effective marginal and average tax rates as well as mea-
sures of the tax base. To the best of our knowledge, no study has calculated
tax measures for such a large sample of countries as we do. We describe recent
trends in tax policy and highlight salient features of the cross-country distribu-
tions of different tax measures, demonstrating that there is significant variation
in these measures across countries and over time. Providing weights for financial
structure and asset composition, we then augment the country-level information
with firm- and industry-level data. This allows us to contrast statutory measures
at the level of countries with measures accounting for firm- and industry-specific
weights. Second, we use our self-collected data to demonstrate how the latter
can be used for a number of research questions. In particular, we present two
applications, one at the macroeconomic, country level, and one at the microeco-
nomic, firm level. As to the former application, we estimate Laffer-Curves, i.e.,
the relationship between statutory tax rate and tax revenue, and show that this
relationship is inverse-U-shaped. As to the latter application, we analyze how
taxes affect firm-level investment in fixed assets and find very plausible tax and
tax base elasticities, which are comparable to previous studies. While these two
applications serve as examples for the usefulness of our new dataset, we indi-
cate that future research may use our tax data to analyze numerous interesting
research questions, particularly in an international context.
The third chapter draws on the first of the applications presented in Chapter
2. From a more general perspective, it contributes to a better understanding
of how countries generate corporate tax revenue. First, we illustrate that the
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amount of tax revenue countries raise from different sources is substantial and
varies considerably across countries. Taking into account that governments face
a budget constraint, raising adequate tax revenue is essential, as public expen-
ditures are mostly financed with tax revenue. Second, we analyze empirically
how corporate tax revenue is related to international statutory tax incentives.
To this end, we suggest a Laffer-Curve framework, which reflects that statutory
tax rate and revenue in one country show an inverse-U-shaped relationship. We
extend this framework and additionally link a country’s corporate tax revenue to
a weighted average of other countries’ corporate tax rates. This captures the idea
that countries compete for mobile tax bases over statutory tax rates, and corpo-
rate tax revenue in one country may be affected by other countries’ tax-setting
behavior. We find, however, that foreign countries’ statutory tax rates have
no significant effect on (domestic) corporate tax revenue and neither affect the
revenue-maximizing tax rate nor the corresponding maximum tax revenue pre-
dicted by the Laffer-Curve. Moreover, the revenue-maximizing rate lies clearly
above the global average, observed tax rate in our sample. While international
tax competition is likely to be the driving force behind this finding, our predicted
Laffer-Curves controlling for this competitive pressure show that tax revenue is
not maximized at such a low tax rate. Our results imply that tax-avoidance ac-
tivities give rise to a robust inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship which is
insensitive to the inclusion of foreign countries’ tax rates. This suggests that the
responsiveness of firms to foreign statutory tax rates is, on average, rather lim-
ited. We provide a number of stylized facts, descriptive statistics, and references
to previous research to further explain our findings. From a policy perspective,
our findings suggest that international statutory tax competition should not play
a dominating role in a country’s optimal tax-setting behavior. Instead, consid-
erations about marginal statutory tax rate changes should be mainly related to
the respective country’s current rate-revenue combination and, hence, its location
on the Laffer-Curve. Given that statutory corporate tax rates in most countries
already are below the predicted revenue-maximizing rates, further tax cuts would
most likely imply additional adverse revenue effects.
While, in Chapters 2 and 3, we aim at providing a ‘unified’, global view on the
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tax-setting behavior of countries, we change the perspective in Chapter 4, which
is joint work with Thomas Letsche and Georg Wamser. To be more precise, we
explicitly account for the notion that governments and tax authorities around
the world operate under very different conditions. These include a variety of
aspects such as the quality of fiscal institutions and tax enforcement, the level of
corruption, or location-specific rents. We first present a theoretical framework in
which we model the tax-setting behavior of a government, whose objective it is to
raise revenue from taxing firm profits. Firms, however, may attempt to bribe the
tax agent in charge with the aim of avoiding the tax. The extent to which such
behavior is detected and punished by the government depends on several country
characteristics. We show that these characteristics and, as a consequence, the
threat of tax evasion affect optimal tax policy, suggesting that a country belongs
to one of three possible types and either (i) ignores, (ii) combats, or (iii) tolerates
tax evasion. Our findings indicate that countries characterized by widespread
corruption, weak fiscal institutions, and high location-specific rents (e.g., due to
natural resource abundance) are likely to set comparatively high tax rates and to
tolerate tax evasion. Moreover, these countries lack the incentive to increase the
efficiency of tax collection, as small (but costly) improvements on tax enforcement
usually do not translate into higher revenue. We provide evidence for an empirical
pattern strongly reinforcing the predictions of our model and, in particular, their
policy implications. We show that it is only through a big push – substantial
and persistent improvements towards stricter tax enforcement – that a country,
at last, benefits in terms of a considerable increase in tax revenue. We illustrate
that most of the countries which have experienced such a big push in terms of
tax enforcement are newly-industrialized countries. This is consistent with our
theoretical finding that favorable economic development is often accompanied by
improvements on tax enforcement and revenue collection. Hence, overcoming
the problems related to poor tax enforcement and inefficient revenue collection
proves to be an indispensable step on a country’s way towards economic growth
and development.
Finally, Chapter 5, which is joint work with Stefan Goldbach, Arne J. Na-
gengast, and Georg Wamser, presents new empirical results on the relationship
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between foreign and domestic investment of MNEs. Increased international in-
tegration and, in particular, the global expansion strategies of MNEs may raise
the concern that the foreign activities of these firms imply losses for the home
countries due to a shift of production and employment abroad. Previous con-
tributions to the literature provide ambiguous evidence in this regard, implying
that it is not clear whether domestic investment and FDI can be seen as substi-
tutes or complements. Our empirical approach exploits variation at the extensive
and intensive margin of foreign activity. It mainly relies on two comprehensive
micro datasets provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank),
which allow us to observe the operations of German firms at home and abroad,
including yearly balance-sheet information. Our basic results, which prove to be
robust against a large number of sensitivity tests, suggest that FDI complements
domestic investment at the firm level. In this regard, we can distinguish between
an extensive and an intensive margin effect. As to the former, setting up a new
foreign affiliate is associated with an immediate positive effect of about EUR
460,000 additional investment. As to the latter, the investment elasticity at the
intensive margin is estimated to be approximately 0.13. Trying to explain these
results, we investigate three specific channels through which foreign activity may
affect domestic investment: technology upgrading and productivity gains, tax
savings and profit-shifting opportunities, and internal capital markets. We do
not find evidence that foreign activity enhances domestic total factor productiv-
ity (TFP), hence, the positive effect on investment at home does not seem to be
caused by improved production processes and technology upgrading. In contrast,
this positive effect seems to be mainly related to (i) additional opportunities for
tax planning and (ii) an improved access to financial capital. We highlight that
these two channels are closely linked, as internal debt is the common vehicle for
both profit shifting and a more efficient allocation of financing capital.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Income Taxes Around
the World: A Survey on
Forward-looking Tax Measures
and Two Applications1
ABSTRACT
This study provides a survey on corporate taxes around the world. Our analysis has
three main objectives. First, we collect tax data and calculate (forward-looking) ef-
fective tax measures for a large sample of countries and recent years. We particularly
describe how these measures vary over time and across countries. Second, we augment
the country-level information with firm- and industry-level data (providing weights for
financial structure and asset composition) to contrast statutory measures at the level
of countries with measures accounting for firm- and industry-specific weights. Third,
we utilize our new data to (i) estimate Laffer-Curves, i.e., the relationship between
statutory tax rate and tax revenue, based on non-parametric as well as parametric
specifications; (ii) examine how taxes affect investment in fixed assets at the level of
firms. As for the latter, our preferred specification, in which we use a firm-specific
effective marginal tax rate to capture tax incentives, suggests an elasticity of -0.33.
1This paper is joint work with Georg U. Thunecke and Georg Wamser. The corresponding
paper is published in International Tax and Public Finance.
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2.1 Introduction
Corporate tax issues have been at the center of public debate in recent years. Very
often, this debate has been related to the specific policies of countries to grant
preferential tax treatment and tax exemptions for some forms of corporate income
(e.g., income from intellectual property). A number of countries feel pressured
to respond to the far-reaching corporate tax reform recently implemented by the
US government. Most notably, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” involves a massive
cut of the federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and allows for immedi-
ate expensing of some capital investments for a limited period of time.1 Apart
from this ongoing discussion, the last decades have witnessed many governments
pursuing so-called tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policies. Most governments have
significantly reduced their statutory tax rates (STRs) on corporate income, while
broadening the tax base through less attractive depreciation allowances and re-
ducing tax exemptions (see Devereux et al., 2002, for an early survey).
An important objective of our research is to calculate and analyze forward-
looking measures depicting the effective tax burden of a hypothetical investment
project. Thereby, we distinguish between an effective average tax rate (EATR),
which measures the average tax burden of an investment project, and an effective
marginal tax rate (EMTR), which measures the tax burden of a marginal invest-
ment precisely earning the minimum required return on capital. Examining a
time series of EATRs and EMTRs for a large set of countries not only yields
valuable insights about countries’ tax policies over recent years, it also helps us
to better understand the associated incentive effects for firm behavior and the re-
sulting consequences for corporate tax revenue. The analysis of effective tax rates
(ETRs) has been a key point of interest in previous academic literature. King
(1974) and King and Fullerton (1984) have provided a theoretical framework to
investigate the effects of taxation on companies’ investment decisions.2 Devereux
1Additional changes in tax law affect the way how international business income is taxed.
Moreover, some new legislation has been implemented to prevent profit-shifting activities of
multinational enterprises.
2Another early contribution to the literature on ETRs is Boadway et al. (1984). The
approach of the latter paper differs from King and Fullerton (1984) in the sense that it relies on
an open economy model. Recent extensions and applications based on this early contribution
include, e.g., Bazel et al. (2018), and Mintz (2018).
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et al. (2002) have calculated ETRs for 16 countries and 20 years (from 1982 to
2001). While they find that STRs have been cut by most countries, this policy
has usually been accompanied by a broadening of the tax base. The broader tax
base, however, does not fully compensate the reductions in the STRs, so that
EATRs and EMTRs decrease over time as well. Beside the work of Devereux
et al. (2002), our study is most closely related to the work of Loretz (2008).
The latter paper basically confirms previous findings by providing evidence for
26 OECD countries and more recent years. Our paper also relates to the seminal
contributions on EATRs by Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Devereux and Grif-
fith (2003). The studies of Egger et al. (2009b) as well as Egger and Loretz (2010)
draw on these earlier contributions but argue that the focus on country-specific
tax law may lead to wrong conclusions as industry- and firm-specific components
are neglected.
Another strand of the literature on ETRs shows how the forward-looking
measures of the effective tax burden can be refined in order to incorporate specific
details of the tax code: Evers et al. (2015) demonstrate how the formulas for the
effective taxes can be adjusted for the case of income from intellectual property,
concluding that IP box regimes can vastly reduce the effective average tax burden.
Spengel et al. (2016c) study the impact of variations in interest rates and inflation
on ETRs. In another paper, Spengel et al. (2016b) analyze how different tax-
planning strategies affect the effective taxes on cross-border investment. Spengel
et al. (2016a) assess the effect of interest deduction limitation rules on ETRs and
use country-level effective tax data to evaluate fundamental tax reforms.
Apart from these contributions to the academic literature, several groups
of researchers have provided comprehensive data collections in the context of
forward-looking ETRs. Most prominently, researchers from the Centre for Euro-
pean Economic Research (ZEW) have collected detailed information on effective
tax levels for 35 (mainly EU) countries as part of a long-term project for the
EU commission (Spengel et al., 2017). Moreover, researchers from the Oxford
University Center for Business Taxation have calculated effective tax data for 42
countries and used them for various policy reports, where the focus is on OECD
countries (Bilicka and Devereux, 2012).
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The first part of our study provides a survey on corporate income taxes. In
particular, novel data on corporate income taxes and depreciation rules to cal-
culate forward-looking ETRs for 142 countries and the most recent years (2004-
2016) is presented. Formal ETRs are derived from a neoclassical investment
model (Section 2.2), which allows us to distinguish between two effective tax
measures: the EMTR and the EATR. Section 2.3 outlines the process of data
collection, discusses some important data restrictions and necessary assumptions
in order to compute the effective tax measures in the most coherent and compre-
hensive way.
Section 2.4 provides a descriptive analysis of the data, first focusing on tax
measures at the country level (Section 2.4.1). Thereafter, we demonstrate how
the country-level information on taxes can be combined with industry- and firm-
level financial data taken from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database (Section 2.4.2).
In this regard, to begin with, we relax two fundamental assumptions made in the
country-level analysis. First, we employ firm-specific debt and equity financing
shares rather than relying on the assumption of symmetric financing behavior
across firms. Second, we relax the assumption of a symmetric capital stock com-
position and use an industry-specific within-firm asset composition. In both parts
of the descriptive analysis, we particularly focus on the distribution of STRs,
EMTRs, and EATRs across countries. Moreover, we also show how the average
values of these measures have changed over the last 13 years. The data depict a
downward trend in taxes over the period 2004 to 2016. At the same time, about
half of the countries have broadened their tax bases. To be precise, many of the
countries have both decreased the statutory corporate income tax rate (79.2% of
all countries considered), as well as depreciation allowances (49.3%). However,
average EMTRs and EATRs go down, suggesting that cutting statutory taxes
outweighs the on average somewhat broader tax base. Extreme values in the dis-
tribution of all four variables have significantly decreased over time. Since 2011,
it seems that the downward trend has come to an end and average tax measures
have not changed much since then.
The second part of our study (Section 2.5) presents two applications for which
our new dataset can be utilized: one at the macroeconomic, country level, one
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at the microeconomic, firm level. The first subsection (2.5.1) examines whether
tax-avoidance behavior leads to a Laffer-Curve relationship between statutory tax
incentives and data on corporate tax revenue. Our analysis provides conclusive
evidence on an inverse-U-shaped relationship between statutory taxes and tax
revenue, suggesting revenue-maximizing taxes of 31% (STR), 27% (EATR), and
17% (EMTR). Our analysis makes sure that the Laffer-Curve shape is not imposed
on the data by specifying tax revenue as a polynomial function of taxes: additional
results show that higher-order polynomials are inferior to a polynomial of degree
two; non-parametric specifications of the relationship produce very similar results.
In equilibrium, average tax rates are significantly lower than the implied revenue-
maximizing tax rates – possibly a result of strategic tax competition between
countries.
Second, we combine the firm-specific tax rates analyzed above with further
micro-level data and model the fixed assets of a firm as a function of our tax
measures (2.5.2). The empirical results suggest that investment in fixed assets
is negatively related to taxes. The estimated tax elasticities prove to lie in a
range which is comparable to previous studies. To be specific, the semi-elasticity
with respect to the EMTR is about -2.24. Including additional variation by
alternatively using effective tax measures at the firm-industry-level appears to
capture tax incentives even better.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes, presents policy implications, and provides an
outlook for further fields of application.
2.2 Forward-looking effective tax rates
2.2.1 Theoretical framework
The notion of a forward-looking measure of the effective tax burden on a hypo-
thetical investment has been conceptualized by King and Fullerton (1984) and
extensively used thereafter (OECD, 1991; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux
et al., 2002; Loretz, 2008; Egger et al., 2009b; Egger and Loretz, 2010). Follow-
ing Devereux and Griffith (2003) and Fabling et al. (2014), our forward-looking
approach assumes that the firm’s hypothetical, future investment project and
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consequently its financing structure and asset composition are organized in the
same manner as previous investments.3 We derive ETRs from a neoclassical
investment model which is briefly outlined in the following.
Let us define the profit of a firm facing an investment decision as
Π = − (1− τA) · I (2.2.1)
+ 11 + ρ [(1− τ)(1 + π) · (p+ σ) + (1− τA)(1 + π)(1− σ)] · I
where I is the firm’s (real) investment and A represents the net present value
(NPV) of tax depreciation allowances per unit of investment, which may be in-
terpreted as an upfront subsidy provided by the government.4 The statutory tax
rate on business profits is denoted by τ ,5 ρ is the discount rate,6 π represents
the inflation rate, σ the economic rate of depreciation, and p depicts the pre-tax
rate of return. Solving the associated first-order condition with respect to I for
p yields
p̂ = (1− τA) [(1 + ρ)− (1 + π)(1− σ)](1− τ)(1 + π) − σ. (2.2.2)
p̂ can be interpreted as the minimum required pre-tax rate of return, for which the
investment is marginal (Devereux et al., 2002). This means that p̂ is equivalent
to the (post-tax) rate of return on an alternative investment, also known as the
user cost of capital (Auerbach, 1979).7 For this paper, we abstract from inflation
3We are aware of the fact that this is a fairly strong assumption. To capture incentive
effects, however, forward-looking measures are to be preferred to backward-looking measures,
which are based on firms’ operating profits and tax payments stated in the balance sheet. First,
backward-looking rates do not comply with the forward-looking nature of investment decisions
(Egger et al., 2009b). Second, the amount of taxes paid is strongly affected by tax-planning
activities, making backward-looking measures prone to severe endogeneity issues (Fabling et al.,
2014).
4For a detailed overview on how A is calculated, consider the Appendix.
5We abstract from taxation at the shareholder level, and therefore ignore personal income
taxes.
6The discount rate is defined as a weighted average of the rates applicable to equity- and
debt-financed investment, respectively (see below).
7This result, derived from a neoclassical investment model, is equivalent to the results
obtained by Devereux et al. (2002) and Egger et al. (2009b) in a cashflow- focused framework
(see the Appendix).
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(i.e., π = 0) and suggest the following user cost of capital
p̂ = (1− τA) · (ρ+ σ)(1− τ) − σ (2.2.3)
It becomes evident that, in the absence of taxation, the user cost of capital is just
equal to the nominal interest rate. This suggests a tax wedge, i.e., the difference
between the required pre-tax rate of return and the interest rate, equal to p̂− ρ.
The EMTR is then defined as the ratio of this tax wedge and the user cost of
capital:
EMTR = p̂− ρ
p̂
= (1− A) · τ(ρ+ σ)(1− τA) · ρ+ (1− A) · τσ (2.2.4)
Note that in a cash flow tax model, which has partially been realized in the US
tax reform by allowing for immediate deduction of all investment expenses for
some investments, we would have A = 1. As a consequence, the user cost p̂
would be equivalent to the discount rate ρ and the EMTR would be zero.
While the EMTR is the relevant measure when considering marginal invest-
ment projects, an EATR is the essential criterion for an investment decision at
the extensive margin. It serves as a measure of the effective tax burden of all
infra-marginal (average) units of capital invested.8 To be more precise, the EATR
is calculated as the difference between the pre-tax NPV (R∗) and the post-tax
NPV (R) of the investment for a given pre-tax rate of return p (Devereux and
Griffith, 1998):9
EATR = R
∗ −R
p/(1 + ρ) =
τ
(
p+ σ(1 + A)− ρA
)
p
(2.2.5)
In the following, we abstract from economic depreciation and set σ = 0.10 We
are aware that the assumption of no economic depreciation across all countries is
strong. However, being precise on this would require to account for the fact that
8Note that, for a marginal investment, the EATR is equal to the EMTR. The EATR can
hence be interpreted in a way that it summarizes the distribution of tax rates for an investment
as long as the latter is profitable, and the EMTR represents the special case of a marginal
investment (Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
9For more details on R and R∗, see the Appendix.
10ETR measures employing different values for economic depreciation are included in the
Appendix.
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true economic life varies across countries and time. For example, composition of
assets and true economic depreciation rates in developing countries are certainly
different from those in developed countries. We lack this information, and it would
exceed the scope of our paper to calculate acceptable values that are specific to
countries and time. Making assumptions about uniform rates introduces further
restrictions and leads to bias which we believe may outweigh the bias associated
with the assumption of zero economic depreciation.
2.2.2 Parameterization
In order to calculate an EMTR and an EATR for a large number of countries, we
need to make several assumptions with respect to (i) financing options, (ii) the
asset composition within firms, (iii) the discount rate ρ, and (iv) the pre-tax rate
of return.11 While these parameters are assumed to be common across firms in all
countries in the first place, we relax some of these assumptions (financing options
and asset composition) below when constructing firm-industry-level EMTR and
EATR measures.
Table 2.2.1 depicts the parameter values we assume, most of them in line with
previous work (OECD, 1991; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; McKenzie et al., 1998;
Devereux et al., 2002; Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Yoo, 2003; Egger et al., 2009b;
Fabling et al., 2014). With respect to the financing methods, we merely make
the broad distinction between debt and retained earnings, rather than considering
retained earnings and new equity as distinct modes of financing. This is, however,
fully consistent because we ignore shareholder taxation. Egger et al. (2009b) argue
that, in this case, financing via retained earnings is identical to financing via new
equity. Moreover, note that debt financing implies a reduced discount rate, as
to the fact that the cost of debt financing is tax-deductible. The composition
of assets within a firm is crucial when it comes to computing the NPV of tax
depreciation allowances as allowance rates and schedules vary widely, both across
asset types and countries. We follow OECD (1991) in large parts, but adjust their
11We make the assumption of a common ‘market interest rate’ due to (broadly) two reasons.
First, a meaningful measure in this regard is not available, also given the fact that many
(multinational) firms finance investments partly via internal capital markets (Desai et al., 2004),
and it is unclear which interest rates apply to such internal capital. Second, it is not our focus
to analyze the effect of variations in interest rates across countries.
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suggested asset composition to also include the asset types Computers, Vehicles,
and Office equipment.
Table 2.2.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value assigned
ρ Market interest rate 0.05
(for equity)
0.05 · (1− τ)
(for debt)
π Inflation rate 0
σ Economic depreciation rate 0
p Pre-tax rate of return 0.2
debt Debt-financing share 1/3
equity Equity-financing share 2/3
Asset structure:
sb Share of investment in buildings 0.38
sinv Share of investment in inventory 0.26
sm Share of investment in machinery 0.2
sifas Share of investment in intangibles 0.11
sc Share of investment in computer equipment 0.02
sv Share of investment in vehicles 0.02
so Share of investment in office equipment 0.01
Notes: More information on variable definitions and sources is provided in Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix.
2.3 Data collection
For our calculation of effective tax measures, we have compiled data on corporate
tax regimes of 193 countries for the time period from 1996 to 2016. This section
provides an overview on the data and their sources, obstacles and problems, as
well as important assumptions made to warrant a comprehensive and reliable
database.
The two key statutory variables for our analysis are the statutory corporate in-
come tax rate and the depreciation allowance rate, including schemes for six asset
categories (Buildings, Machinery, Office equipment, Computers, Intangible fixed
assets, and Vehicles). The EY Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides (WCTG) serve
as primary data source. These annual tax guides provide detailed information on
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the corporate tax regimes of 162 jurisdictions.12 In spite of considering multiple
sources, data coverage strongly varies across countries. The data on statutory
corporate income taxes exhibit the best coverage with reliable and complete in-
formation for 178 countries and all years from 1996 to 2016. Since WCTG only
provides country-level statutory corporate income tax rates, the reported rates
for countries imposing federal- and state-level taxes may be inaccurate. In order
to account for regional taxes, we retrieve data for the respective jurisdictions from
the OECD and World Bank databases.13
In addition to the statutory tax rates, information on tax depreciation al-
lowances constitutes the second main data compiled from WCTG. In this regard,
reliable data covering many countries is only available starting from 2004, which
is the reason why we calculate our effective tax measures for the years 2004 to
2016. Data coverage varies both across countries and with respect to depreci-
ation regulations for the different asset types. More specifically, information in
WCTG is most comprehensive for Buildings, Machinery and Vehicles, while the
(initial) data coverage for Computers, Office equipment and Intangible fixed assets
is somewhat fragmentary.14
In order to obtain a balanced panel for a broad and possibly comprehensive
analysis of effective tax measures, we make several assumptions which are briefly
outlined in the following. Two problems have been frequently encountered: First,
no specific rates apply but a ‘useful life’ should be assumed for the depreciation of
assets. Second, depreciation rates may not be available for all asset types within
a country. Concerning the ‘useful life’ principle, we follow previous approaches
(e.g., Spengel et al., 2017), and assume the useful life of Machinery to be 7 years
and the useful life of Intangible fixed assets to be 10 years.15 Moreover, for both
asset types, a straight line depreciation method is assumed to apply. Concerning
12When the information from theWCTG is insufficient or counterintuitive, additional sources
are considered, including the OECD, IBFD and World Bank databases as well as tax guides
provided by PwC and KPMG.
13Most notably, these countries include Germany, Switzerland, Japan, USA, and Canada.
14Concerning the allowances for buildings, we always choose the available rate for industrial
buildings. Furthermore, we have treated Furniture to be representative for Office equipment if
not specified differently.
15As data coverage for Intangible fixed assets is particularly poor, we assume a straight line
depreciation scheme for a period of 10 years whenever no information is specified for this asset
type, yet data on all other types is available.
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the problem of missing rates for some asset types, we resort to the assumption
that depreciation patterns are equal to the ones of similar asset categories, for
which information is available. For instance, if no rates for Office equipment are
specified, we assume the depreciation rates of Office equipment to equal the ones
of Machinery. Similarly, Computers is assumed to be part of Office equipment
whenever rates are not specified. When no rates for Vehicles are provided, we
also assume Vehicles to depreciate like Machinery.
Nonetheless, we have to disregard 15 countries, for which information is in-
sufficient. In many cases, this is related to political reasons: some countries have
dissolved during the considered time period, e.g., the Netherlands Antilles or Yu-
goslavia, other countries face violent interior or exterior conflicts, such as Syria
or Afghanistan.
2.4 Taxes around the world
The purpose of this section is to survey the three types of forward-looking tax
measures we have collected, first at the country level (Section 2.4.1), then at
the firm-industry level (Section 2.4.2).16 The first tax measure we will present
is the statutory tax rate (STR) on corporate profits. We have collected data on
STRs for 178 countries and over the time period from 1996 to 2016. The second
measure includes information on countries’ depreciation rules to account for tax
base effects. In particular, we calculate the NPV of depreciation allowances and
measure an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The EMTR captures the tax
burden on a marginal investment project that just breaks even. We further
present measures on an effective average tax rate (EATR), which captures the
average tax burden of a hypothetical investment project. The average tax burden
considers that the total project may earn above-normal returns and is therefore
the relevant incentive variable for discrete decisions of firms, such as location
choices. EMTRs as well as EATRs are presented for a sample of 142 countries
and over the time period 2004 to 2016. Both EMTRs and EATRs are calculated
following the theoretical approach discussed in Section 2.2.
16A precise definition of what we mean with firm-industry level is given below.
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2.4.1 Country-level tax measures
2.4.1.1 Statutory tax rates
Devereux et al. (2002) demonstrate that there is a clear downward trend when
depicting the yearly average of the statutory tax rate (STR) throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. For our sample of 178 countries and 21 years, Figure 2.4.1 confirms
this long-run pattern for the STR.
Figure 2.4.1: Statutory tax rates
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While it appears that this process has slowed down and the average STR
converges to a lower level of roughly 22%, between the years 1996 and 2016,
141 countries have cut their STRs, only 22 have increased it, and 15 countries
have kept it constant. The reduction in the average STR between 1998 and 2011
is particularly evident (7.8 percentage points), compared to the 0.7 percentage
points from 2011 to 2016.17 In any case, after the massive US corporate tax cut
in 2018, we expect the general downward trend in the STR to continue.
Figure 2.4.2 suggests that the distribution of the STRs has shifted to the
left. Very high values of the STR have disappeared over time. An interesting
17Note that we have collected data on STRs from 1996 to 2016. Although the focus of this
survey is on effective tax measures, which have been collected for the time period 2004 to 2016
– for reasons of data availability –, we present the STRs for the extended period of time to
additionally show a more long-run development which can be compared to previous studies
(Devereux et al., 2002; Loretz, 2008).
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observation is that, from 2009 on, the median value is virtually unchanged. Very
few countries have imposed STRs of more than 40%. Many larger economies have
implemented STRs above the global time-average value of 26.09%, for example,
France, Germany, Japan, and Canada in the late 1990s.18 In 2011, only Japan
and Puerto Rico sustained rates above 40%; in 2016, only the United States,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands imposed rates around 40%.
Figure 2.4.2: Statutory tax rates
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Notes: The box portrays the interquartile range (IQR) of the STR
distribution. The vertical line in the box represents the median. The
whisker’s range includes the most extreme values within the 1.5 × IQR.
The dots indicate extreme values outside of the 1.5 × IQR.
In Figure 2.4.3, we provide an alternative way of illustrating the distribution
of the STRs over time, depicting a non-parametric conditional density. In line
with the observation that the distribution has shifted, the most frequent STR
values have decreased from around 35% in 1996 to about 25% in 2016. Moreover,
it becomes evident that, in recent years, there is a larger probability density at
the left side of the distribution. Most importantly, this implies that an increasing
number of countries exhibit relatively low STRs. The figure also shows that a
non-negligible share of countries do not tax corporate income at all, i.e., the STR
is equal to 0.
18Note that the German STR accounts for the (average) local (municipality) business tax.
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Figure 2.4.3: Statutory tax rates (non-parametric conditional density)
Notes: We choose a kernel bandwidth according to Silverman’s
rule of thumb, the underlying density being Gaussian (Silverman,
1986).
In addition to the development and distribution of the tax over time, it is
worthwhile to shed light on the STR variation across countries. Our data shows
that there is substantial variation across countries, indicating that the tax-setting
behavior of countries vastly differs.19 An interesting insight is revealed when we
compare the tax rate distribution across countries at the beginning of the sample
period (1996) with the one at the end of the sample period (2016). In this regard,
Figure 2.4.4 and Figure 2.4.5 indicate that the vast majority of countries have
reduced their STR, whilst the US and several South American countries have
maintained a comparatively high STR.
19In Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix, for each country, we pool the annual STRs over the
period from 1996 to 2016 and subtract the global average STR (26.09%) from each country’s
time average.
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Figure 2.4.4: Statutory taxes across countries (1996)
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Notes: The darker in color a country’s area, the higher is the STR.
Figure 2.4.5: Statutory taxes across countries (2016)
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2.4.1.2 NPV of depreciation allowances
Since depreciation rules are the second major factor influencing ETRs, we will first
provide information on the NPVs of depreciation allowances for 142 countries over
the time period 2004 to 2016. A higher NPV of depreciation allowances implies a
reduction in taxable income (tax base) and therefore leads to a lower effective tax
burden. The values presented in Figure 2.4.6 are calculated following the method
established in Egger and Loretz (2010).20 Devereux et al. (2002) have identified a
pattern of base-broadening throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to Figure
2.4.6, it seems that the more recent cuts in STRs in the 2000s have also been ac-
20See the Appendix for more information.
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companied by less generous depreciation rules. However, particularly since 2009,
there appears to be some convergence to a value of about 0.482. The largest
changes in the NPV happened between 2005 and 2006 (0.011) as well as between
2007 and 2008 (0.0035). The average NPV has dropped by roughly 0.017 from
2004 to 2016. Over the 13 years covered in our data, the NPV of depreciation al-
lowances has decreased in 70 countries, increased in 41 and has not changed in 31.
Figure 2.4.6: NPV of tax depreciation allowances
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Figure 2.4.7: NPV of tax depreciation allowances
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Notes: The box portrays the interquartile range (IQR) of the NPV
distribution. The vertical line in the box represents the median. The
whisker’s range includes the most extreme values within the 1.5 × IQR.
The dots indicate extreme values outside of the 1.5 × IQR.
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Concerning the distribution of the NPVs, illustrated in Figure 2.4.7, we see
that the median NPV has not shifted to the left but remained relatively stable.
Moreover, our data suggest that also the whisker’s range, i.e., the distance be-
tween the 1.5 × interquartile range, and also the most extreme values outside
of this range do not change significantly. To conclude, while earlier contribu-
tions have observed tax-cut-cum-base-broadening, in particular for the 1980s and
1990s, our findings indicate that no clear base-broadening trend can be identified
for the last 13 years.
2.4.1.3 Effective marginal tax rates
This section presents our data on EMTRs. The EMTR, as outlined in Section
2.2, is a measure to quantify the corporate tax burden for a marginal investment,
which just earns the cost of capital. All calculations concerning the EMTR follow
the theoretical model introduced above.
We have demonstrated that between the years 1996 (2004) and 2016, tax
policy is, on the one hand, characterized by substantial corporate tax cuts; on
the other hand, no distinct base-broadening pattern can be observed. While
Devereux et al. (2002) do not identify any clear trend when analyzing EMTRs –
although they find a tendency for falling rates in the late 1990s –, Figure 2.4.8
suggests that the average EMTR has substantially declined between 2004 and
2011, but has then remained rather stable in the years until 2016. Over the
whole time period, i.e., from 2004 to 2016, the average EMTR has dropped from
roughly 13.97% to 11.19%. In 98 countries, the EMTR has decreased, it has
increased in 13 countries and has not changed in 31 countries between 2004 and
2016. While there is a positive increase from 2013 to 2014, it is a relatively small
one (0.00015 percentage points). Figure 2.4.9 demonstrates that the downward
trend in Figure 2.4.8 is not only driven by the disappearance of extreme values,
but also by a shift of the whole distribution.
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Figure 2.4.8: Effective marginal tax rates
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Figure 2.4.9: Effective marginal tax rates
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Notes: The box portrays the interquartile range (IQR) of the EMTR
distribution. The vertical line in the box represents the median. The
whisker’s range includes the most extreme values within the 1.5 × IQR.
The dots indicate extreme values outside of the 1.5 × IQR.
To sum up, given the findings of the previous sections, we can conclude that
cutting taxes outweighs the effect of a somewhat broader tax base, so that the
average EMTR has been declining for most of the time. Figure 2.4.8 suggests
that the average value has converged to a level of approximately 11.2%.
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2.4.1.4 Effective average tax rates
This section focuses on the measure of the average tax burden, the effective
average tax rate (EATR) for the years 2004 until 2016. As explained in Section
2.2, the EATR is a more appropriate measure for discrete or extensive-margin
investment decisions. We calculate it according to equation (2.2.5) above.
Devereux et al. (2002) have demonstrated that the average EATR has mostly
decreased in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2.4.10 suggests that this trend has
continued for the years from 2004 to 2016. In particular, the EATR has decreased
by 3.94 percentage points from 22.3% in 2004 to 18.36% in 2016. It seems that
it has stabilized at a value of below 18.5% since 2011. Over the whole time span,
the EATR has decreased in 98 countries, increased in 13 and has not changed in
31 countries. Similar to the EMTR, the decrease in the average value happened
at a relatively fast pace between 2004 and 2011. Thereafter, however, the EATR
remains at a rather constant level.
Figure 2.4.11 depicts the same pattern as the figures for the STR and the
EMTR. Extreme values (e.g., Kuwait) have disappeared over time; the median
value has slightly shifted to the left; the variance has declined.
Figure 2.4.10: Effective average tax rates
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Figure 2.4.11: Effective average tax rates
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Notes: The box portrays the interquartile range (IQR) of the EATR
distribution. The vertical line in the box represents the median. The
whisker’s range includes the most extreme values within the 1.5 × IQR.
The dots indicate extreme values outside of the 1.5 × IQR.
2.4.2 Firm-industry-level tax measures
The conceptual framework presented in Section 2.2 has shown that the forward-
looking effective tax measures are non-linear functions of numerous determinants,
most notably (i) statutory tax rates, (ii) depreciation allowances specific to the
type of investment, (iii) asset composition, and (iv) modes of financing (Egger
and Loretz, 2010). While statutory corporate tax rates are country specific (ab-
stracting from the distinction between state, federal and local taxes), the asset
composition of an investment as well as the share of debt financing are naturally
specific to the individual firm. In this section, we show how the country-level
statutory tax rates can be combined with firm- and industry-specific data in or-
der to yield firm-industry-level tax measures. The latter may be particularly
useful when analyzing behavioral incentives at the micro level, such as firms’
investment decisions (see Section 2.5.2).
In the preceding analysis of country-specific effective tax measures, we have
assumed a given set of asset types (Buildings, Machinery, Office equipment, Com-
puters, Intangible fixed assets, and Vehicles) and financing opportunities (debt
and equity) to calculate EMTR and EATR as weighted averages over these in-
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vestment and financing opportunities (Egger et al., 2009b). In line with most of
the existing literature referred to above, the weights we employ are defined as
identical across all countries. However, to the extent that asset composition and
the shares of debt-financed investment vary considerably across firms, effective
tax measures at the country level may be inaccurate. Disregarding the heteroge-
neous nature of firms with respect to their investment and financing opportunities
implies that tax measures based on uniform weights may not capture the correct
incentive effects for future decisions. In a sense, we would neglect that firms are in
different situations, reflecting choices made in the past (Egger and Loretz, 2010).
We therefore combine the collected (country-level) data on statutory taxes and
depreciation allowances with micro-level data for a large sample of firms, provided
in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database.21
In the country-level analysis (Section 2.4), assumptions on debt-financing
shares and asset composition necessarily have to be made. With respect to
the first point, exploiting balance-sheet data allows us to get firm-specific in-
formation in this regard. More specifically, we calculate a firm’s long-term debt
(non-current liabilities) ratio, i.e., long-term debt relative to total assets.22 When
it comes to the composition of a firm’s capital stock, the Orbis database does not
report firm-specific asset-type distributions. Similar to Egger et al. (2009b), how-
ever, we exploit variation at the industry-level to account for heterogeneous asset
composition. We do so by using industry-specific asset-type shares provided by
Fabling et al. (2014), matching their industry codes with the ones available in
Orbis.23
Based on the asset composition specific to industry i and the firm-j-specific
debt-equity ratio in year t, we then calculate effective tax measures at the firm-
21Orbis is a commercial database, providing comprehensive balance-sheet data for firms from
across the globe. In particular, we make use of 17,024,351 firm observations for the time period
2004 to 2014.
22In contrast to Egger and Loretz (2010), who employ the sum of non-current and current
liabilities, we think that long-term debt is the relevant measure to be considered in terms
of a firm’s investment opportunity. Only non-current liabilities can be harnessed to finance
investment projects. The long-term debt-to-total assets ratio, of course, underestimates a firm’s
(total) debt ratio, yet seems to be more accurate in the given context.
23Fabling et al. (2014) use data from Statistics New Zealand’s Longitudinal Business
Database, which combines administrative and survey data on New Zealand firms and pro-
vide the asset-type shares based on two-digit ANZSIC96 codes. The latter are very closely
related to the commonly used ISIC codes.
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industry level (EMTRjict and EATRjict, respectively). To this end, we con-
sider the 17,024,351 firm observations in our Orbis sample. Table 2.4.1 presents
industry-specific average ETRs for every industry i in country c, pooling all firm
observations from 2004 to 2014.
Table 2.4.1: Firm-industry-level effective taxes, pooled over time (2004-2014)
Industry Firm observations EMTR EATR
Accommodation and Food Services 228,124 0.1401 0.2577
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 514,975 0.1293 0.2303
Information Media and Telecommunication 71,455 0.1277 0.2433
Construction 2,334,641 0.1388 0.2828
Cultural and Recreational Services 180,568 0.1410 0.2615
Electricity, Gas, Water, Waste Services 351,376 0.1287 0.2487
Education and Training 105,443 0.1392 0.2518
Financial and Insurance Services 1,636,346 0.1336 0.2661
Health Care and Social Assistance 386,035 0.1434 0.2792
Manufacturing 4,581,178 0.1325 0.2504
Mining 145,685 0.1373 0.2467
Other Services 99,588 0.1435 0.2619
Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services 1,706,884 0.1409 0.2631
Retail Trade 1,411,142 0.1398 0.2614
Transport, Postal, Warehousing 796,796 0.1313 0.2563
Wholesale Trade 2,474,115 0.1342 0.2555
Notes: We use two-digit ANZSIC96 industry codes to determine industry-specific asset composi-
tions. Firm-specific debt and equity shares are taken from Orbis. For all industries, we pool firm
observations over the years 2004-2014 and calculate average firm-industry-level ETRs.
We see that there is substantial variation across industries. For the EMTR,
we observe values between 12.77% and 14.35%, values of the EATR lie in the
range of 23.03% and 28.28%. While the (pooled) industry-specific EMTRs are
only slightly larger than the average EMTRs at the country level (12.32%), it
becomes evident that the industry-specific EATRs are much higher than their
country-level counterpart, calculated in Section 2.4.1.4 (19.96%). A straightfor-
ward explanation for this is that the firm-specific long-term debt ratio, which is
our measure for the share of debt financing, is on average substantially lower than
before, where we assume a share of 1/3. This, in turn, leads to a higher weighted
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market interest rate and a ceteris paribus higher EATR. A further source of
variation lies in the industry-specific capital stock composition. As depreciation
allowances for asset types vary considerably, this may either increase or decrease
the EATR. In Figures 2.4.12 and 2.4.13, we compare the country-level ETRs with
the firm-industry-level ETRs.
Figure 2.4.12: EMTRs across countries – Country vs. firm-industry-level
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b) Firm-industry level
Notes: The darker in color a country’s area, the higher the respective country’s EMTR.
For both figures, we pool the ETRs for each country and depict the time
average, demeaned by the global mean over the whole sample period. Consid-
ering the EMTR, we see that countries like Canada, France, and India tend to
exhibit taxes exceeding the average more distinctly than in the country-level anal-
ysis. In contrast, the UK, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland seem to decrease
EMTRs compared to the average EMTR. Turning to the EATR, only for very
few countries (Canada and Brazil), taxes in relation to the average become higher
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when we exploit variation at the firm-industry level. Numerous countries both
in Europe (France, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary), South America (Venezuela,
Peru, Chile) and Australia exhibit lower firm-industry EATRs than country-level
EATRs (compared to the respective world average).
Figure 2.4.13: EATRs across countries – Country vs. firm-industry-level
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Notes: The darker in color a country’s area, the higher the respective country’s EATR.
2.5 Two applications
2.5.1 Laffer-Curve estimates
The objective of this section is to estimate whether corporate income tax revenue
(expressed relative to GDP) and statutory tax incentives are related in a way
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known as the Laffer-Curve.24 The latter is supposed to show an inverted-U-
shape as depicted in Figure 2.5.1, where we present the smoothed values of a
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of tax revenue on the statutory tax
rate for the period between 1996 and 2014.25
Figure 2.5.1: Non-parametric Laffer-Curve (STR)
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The concept of the Laffer-Curve reflects the insight that tax revenue is deter-
mined by statutory rate and tax base, where the latter is not a fixed quantity
but rather an endogenous outcome of tax-avoidance activities. Economists would
broadly agree on the existence of the concept and the associated notion of the
presence of a statutory tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. At which exact
point (or tax rate), however, the slope of the revenue function becomes negative
depends on the extent of behavioral responses of firms and individuals to a tax
and the specific design of the tax under consideration. Comprehensive empirical
24Arthur Laffer, economist and member of Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (1981
to 1989), became famous for making the argument that the relationship between tax revenue
and statutory tax incentives is such that a tax rate between 0% and 100% maximizes tax
revenue. Piketty and Saez (2013) argue that economists have known the idea of the inverted-
U-shaped revenue curve long before, early contributions going back more than 170 years (e.g.,
Dupuit, 1844). Loretz (2008) alike discusses the historical background of the concept, stating
that its origin dates back as far as the 14th century.
25Note that more recent tax revenue data have not been made available.
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investigations in this regard are surprisingly scarce.26 Clausing (2007) provides
empirical support for a parabolic Laffer-Curve relationship between statutory tax
rates and revenues for OECD countries and the years 1979 to 2002.27 In contrast
to this, Kawano and Slemrod (2012), who likewise focus on OECD countries, find
that the relationship between tax rates and revenue is rather tenuous.
In the following, we will illustrate how corporate income tax revenue in percent
of GDP (TAX REV ENUEc,t) is related to our measures of tax burden (STR,
EMTR, and EATR). The data for the corporate income tax revenue are taken
from the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD). The analysis is
based on 1,073 observations from 2004 to 2014 and 112 countries. To the best of
our knowledge, no previous study has examined such a large sample of countries
in this context. Our estimation approach accounts for time-constant country-
specific characteristics and aggregate year effects. To control for time-varying
determinants of tax revenue, we also include the variable GROWTHc,t.28 In
particular, we estimate the following linear regression model:
TAX REV ENUEc,t = α + β1TAXc,t + β2TAX2c,t (2.5.1)
+β3GROWTHc,t + Yt + Cc + εc,t
The variable TAXc,t is one of our measures of tax burden (STR, EMTR, or
EATR). Yt and Cc are year and country effects. The Laffer-Curve concept would
suggest that TAXc,t and TAX2ct predict an inverted U-shape relationship with
TAX REV ENUEc,t.
The estimation results presented in Table 2.5.1 suggest that GROWTHc,t is
always positively related to tax revenue, as expected. TAXc,t and TAX2c,t (or the
respective measures thereof, to be precise) are always estimated with a positive
26Most of the previous contributions to the literature have either (i) focused on trends
in corporate income tax revenue, without providing a thorough analysis of the sources of the
observed variations (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2000; Gropp and Kostial, 2000; Devereux et al., 2002,
2004; Loretz, 2008), or (ii) calculated country-specific Laffer-Curves (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011;
Strulik and Trimborn, 2012).
27Very broadly, our paper and Clausing (2007) differ in terms of the following aspects: the
observed time periods (1979-2002 vs. 2004-2016), the sample (29 OECD countries vs. 112
countries from all over the world), and the empirical approach.
28GROWTHc,t is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
database and is defined as GDP growth per capita of country c in period t.
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(TAXc,t) and negative (TAX2c,t) sign.29
Table 2.5.1: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions)
STR EMTR EATR
TAXc,t 9.801∗∗∗ 13.589∗∗ 11.309∗∗∗
(3.722) (5.828) (4.318)
TAX2c,t -15.695∗∗ -39.764∗∗ -21.239∗∗
(6.785) (17.715) (9.127)
GROWTHc,t 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 1.295∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗
(0.535) (0.484) (0.535)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,073 1,073 1,073
Adj. R-squared 0.8587 0.8584 0.8587
Within R-squared 0.100 0.098 0.099
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Note that we have also produced results where we include higher-order poly-
nomials, which turned out to be insignificant. Formal testing, where we compare
higher-order polynomials to the squared term specification, show that the latter
captures the shape of the revenue curve better than the former specifications. The
tests, based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) as well as the Akaike
information criterion (AIC), clearly suggest that a polynomial function of order
two best fits the data (see Table 2.5.2).
29Note that the constant in these estimates is not zero. At first glance, this may seem
contradictory to theory, which would suggest zero tax revenue at a zero tax rate. However, in
a fixed effects regression, this coefficient is not interpretable in a reasonable way (Wooldridge,
2010). When it comes to Figures 2.5.2 to 2.5.4, where we illustrate the predicted tax revenue
curves, we see in fact a non-zero intercept. However, this is justifiable as these figures visualize
the predictions from our linear regression model and hence, the model may predict a non-zero
tax revenue even with a zero tax rate.
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Table 2.5.2: Laffer-Curve estimation: Comparison of polynomials
Tax Polynomial BIC AIC
measure order
STR 2 2946.18 2876.49
3 2952.88 2878.21
4 2959.41 2879.76
EMTR 2 2948.20 2878.51
3 2953.38 2878.71
4 2960.22 2880.57
EATR 2 2946.37 2876.67
3 2953.00 2878.33
4 2959.59 2879.94
Figures 2.5.2 to 2.5.4 visualize the predicted revenue curves for the three tax
measures. The first insight of these estimates is that the shape of the revenue
curve looks quite similar, with a specific maximum point depending on the re-
spective tax.
Figure 2.5.2: Parametric Laffer-Curve (STR)
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Figure 2.5.3: Parametric Laffer-Curve (EMTR)
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Figure 2.5.4: Parametric Laffer-Curve (EATR)
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Table 2.5.3 illustrates the estimated revenue-maximizing values of the respec-
tive measures, the tax revenue associated with these revenue-maximizing rates
and the mean tax rates actually observed in our data. The revenue-maximizing
STR is estimated to be roughly 31%, the EMTR that maximizes tax revenue is
about 17%, and the EATR is around 27%.
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Table 2.5.3: Laffer-Curve estimation: Maximum and observed tax rates
Tax Tax rate Maximum tax Average
measure at maximum revenue tax rate
STR 31% 3.5038 25%
EMTR 17% 3.4946 14%
EATR 27% 3.4991 22%
Notes: The maximum tax values are those of the specific maximum
points from the Laffer-Curves in Figures 2.5.2 to 2.5.4. The average
tax values are those actually observed in the sample used for the
Laffer-Curve estimates.
Comparing these rates with the actual averages reveals that all measured
mean values lie clearly below the predicted revenue maximum: the means of
STR, EMTR, and EATR are 25%, 14%, and 22%, respectively (see Table 2.5.3).
This suggests that taxes are, on average, below the revenue-maximizing rates,
which is consistent with arguments on tax competition resulting in lower taxes in
equilibrium (see, e.g., Oates, 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Bucovetsky,
1991; Wilson, 1999). As a large literature on profit shifting argues that countries
compete not only for productive capital but also for taxable profits, it is not
surprising that the difference between revenue-maximizing tax and average tax is
largest for the STR.30
In order to underpin the robustness of the estimated Laffer-Curve relationship,
we include 95% confidence bands depicted by the dotted lines in the figures.
Taking into account that, as indicated by the vertical lines for the 90th percentiles
in Figures 2.5.2 to 2.5.4, the vast majority of countries have implemented tax
rates in a range where the confidence bands are rather narrow, the predicted
revenue curves prove to be precisely estimated. We see that in both tails of
the respective tax measures’ distributions, the confidence bands are broadening.
Particularly for high values of the tax measures, this can be explained by a
lower support of observations. Hence, the larger the deviation from the predicted
optimal rates, the more difficult it is to precisely estimate the Laffer-Curves. All
30The STR, which does not consider depreciation rules, is the relevant indicator when the
goal is to measure incentives in the context of profit shifting.
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in all, though, the estimates seem to predict a very plausible and robust pattern
of the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. Let us mention that in the
Appendix, we provide some statistics on the difference in tax-setting behavior,
distinguishing between small and large countries. This difference is not relevant
for the way we estimate the Laffer-Curve. The reason is that we remove all
cross-sectional variation between countries: the regressions condition on country-
specific effects so that all time-constant country characteristics are controlled for.
Moreover, the dependent variable in our regressions is the tax-revenue-to-GDP
ratio. This implies that the estimated shape of the Laffer-Curve reflects the
inefficiencies and distortions produced by the tax system. This is exactly what
we are interested in.
Note that, finally, we could use our approach to assess the potential revenue
consequences of the recent US corporate tax cut. Our estimates suggest that
the US moves from the right-hand side of the Laffer-Curve to the left-hand side.
Applying the relative change in the corporate-tax-to-GDP ratio implied by a 14
percentage points tax cut for the US to actual US tax revenue numbers (corporate
tax revenue over the last 10 years), we find that the yearly loss in revenue is equal
to about 16 billion US dollars. The advantage of our approach is that the Laffer-
Curve estimates directly account for potential growth effects through the tax
cut, which allows us to come up with a plausible estimate without having to
speculate about potential behavioral effects of lower taxes. However, according
to our prediction, these growth effects are not sufficient to compensate for the
loss through the direct tax-cut effect. We should be aware of the fact that any
quantification of a big tax reform implemented by a big country has major general
equilibrium implications. This naturally makes quantifications of such events very
difficult.
2.5.2 Taxes and investment
This section utilizes our tax data to better understand the micro-level investment
behavior of firms. For this purpose, we combine the tax data with firm-level in-
formation on firm j’s tangible fixed assets reported in the Orbis database. Tables
2.5.4 and 2.5.5 provide OLS results where we define the logarithm of the fixed
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assets of firm j as the dependent variable. The two tables crucially differ with
respect to the definition of the employed tax measures: In Table 2.5.4, we use
taxes measured at the country level, while in Table 2.5.5, we analyze the impact
of the firm-industry-specific taxes calculated above (Section 2.4.2).
All regressions include firm and year effects, descriptive statistics of all vari-
ables are presented in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix.31 As to Table 2.5.4, we are
mainly interested in the following tax variables measured at the level of coun-
try c at time t: EMTRc,t, EATRc,t, STRc,t, and NPVc,t (see above). We
further include two firm-j-specific variables: the one-period lagged log of sales
(log SALESj,t−1), and the one-period lagged log of the number of employees,
(log EMPLj,t−1).32 At the level of countries c, we control for the host coun-
try’s GDP (log GDPc,t), GDP per capita (log GDPPCc,t), and GDP growth
(GDP growthc,t) (all GDP measures are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development indicator database). The variable CPIc,t is an index measuring
corruption perception. It takes values from 0 to 10, where 10 is the hypothetical
case of a country that is completely free from corruption (the variable is provided
by Transparency International). FIFc,t is an index measuring financial freedom.
It takes values from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more financial freedom
(FIFc,t is provided in the Heritage indicator database). The variable domestic
credit provided by the banking sector (in % of GDP), DCBc,t, is included to
capture the depth of country c’s financial market (the variable is taken from the
World Bank’s World Development indicator database). NDTTc,t and NBITc,t
count the number of double taxation treaties (DTTs) and the number of bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) concluded by country c in year t (NDTTc,t and
NBITc,t are based on own calculations, where the respective information is taken
from UNCTAD). Finally, we condition on log TCAPc,t−1 to capture the general
attractiveness of a location. It is measured as the sum over the total assets of all
firms included in our data in a given country c and year t− 1.
31Note that our sample basically captures information from all unconsolidated balance-sheets
reported in Orbis for the years 2004 until 2014. We exclude firms operating in the financial and
insurance business as well as all firms associated with public administration, as these are often
subject to different tax rules and regulation. We finally require that a firm is observed for at
least 4 years in our data.
32We have chosen control variables in line with the paper by Egger et al. (2014), as far as
the respective information was available in Orbis.
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Table 2.5.4: Taxes and fixed asset investment - country level
(1) (2) (3)
EMTRc,t -2.2426∗∗∗
(0.5167)
EATRc,t -1.6069∗∗∗
(0.4035)
STRc,t -1.2908∗∗∗
(0.3645)
NPVc,t 1.6051∗
(0.9055)
log SALESj,t−1 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055 ) (0.0055)
log EMPLj,t−1 0.2968∗∗∗ 0.2967∗∗∗ 0.2972∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
log GDPc,t -0.2262 -0.2747 -0.1647
(0.3868) (0.3899) (0.3705)
log GDPPCc,t 0.6396∗ 0.6997∗ 0.5397
(0.3800) (0.3827) (0.3676)
GDP growthc,t 0.0071∗∗ 0.0073∗∗ 0.0074∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
CPIc,t 0.0144 0.0136 0.0133
(0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0228)
FIFc,t 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
DCBc,t 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
NDTTc,t -0.0052∗∗ -0.0044∗ -0.0051∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023)
NBITc,t 0.0007 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
log TCAPc,t−1 0.0478∗ 0.0451 0.0453∗
(0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0259)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 569,002 569,002 569,002
Adj. R-squared 0.9440 0.9440 0.9440
EMTR (elast.) -0.3321∗∗∗
EATR (elast.) -0.3927∗∗∗
STR (elast.) -0.3677∗∗∗
NPV (elast.) 0.9030∗
Dependent variable in all specifications: Logarithm of fixed asset
investment. Robust and clustered (country-year level) standard
errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The results provided in Table 2.5.4 are based on 569,002 observations and
99,198 firms.33 The panel is unbalanced with most observations in the year 2012
(71,727). The results indicate that taxes are negatively related to investment in
fixed assets. Below each column, for each tax measure, we provide the correspond-
ing tax elasticity. The estimated coefficient on the EMTR is highly significant
at the 1% level. Note that reported standard errors are robust and clustered at
the country-year level. The coefficient on the EATR is estimated to be slightly
smaller. Given the specification of the estimation equation (focusing on the in-
tensive margin of asset investment), and particularly given that we focus on time
variation by conditioning on firm-specific effects, we would expect that the EMTR
captures tax incentives in a more appropriate way.
Column (3) shows that the tax parameters can also be estimated when we
separate tax rate and tax base effects. Expressing the tax semi-elasticities as
elasticities demonstrates that our results are in a reasonable range and compa-
rable to previous studies (see De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), De Mooij and Ed-
erveen (2008) and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) for an overview, Zwick and Mahon
(2017)). The recent study by Zwick and Mahon (2017) suggests that US firms
(particularly small ones) are very responsive to changes in bonus depreciation.
Their average semi-elasticity of 3.7 with respect to bonus depreciation com-
pares to the NPV-semi-elasticity of 1.6 shown in the last column of Table 2.5.4.
They also provide a tax-term elasticity of -1.6, which is about 4.4 times larger
than the estimated elasticity on STR.34
The estimated effects of the control variables are in line with previous find-
ings. The negative effect of NDTTc,t can be interpreted as the consequence of
more regulation and information exchange – for example, to reduce profit-shifting
activities of multinational firms – between countries when concluding DTTs. The
positive effect of NBITc,t suggests that bilateral investment treaties facilitate
foreign direct investment in a country (the effect is not statistically significant,
however). Before we discuss the results of Table 2.5.5, we should note that the
time variation of the country-specific measures used above is substantial, as, given
33A firm in our data is an entity (affiliate) of a multinational enterprise. All j-specific
variables are taken from (unconsolidated) balance-sheet information provided for these entities.
34While both our estimates are smaller than in Zwick and Mahon (2017), we should also
note that the average change in NPVc,t is only -.002 (over all observations in our sample).
2.5. TWO APPLICATIONS 45
the estimation sample, the EMTRc,t changes its value more than 80 times (fo-
cusing on within-country variation and neglecting all cross-country differences).
Note that we may be concerned about how precisely the tax variables capture
incentive effects as firms differ in asset composition and financial choices. We
may therefore make use of the weighted tax variables as calculated in Section
2.4.2. The main advantage of using the weighted variables is that they introduce
additional variation through weights at the industry- and firm-level. The estima-
tion results of this latter analysis are presented in Table 2.5.5. Both EMTR and
EATR measured at the firm-industry-country-time level are significant at the 1%
level, and the reported elasticities also suggest a quantitatively very similar influ-
ence of taxes on investment as above (where we focus on country-time variation).
To be precise, a 1% increase in EMTRjict triggers a 0.33% decrease in fixed asset
investment. If we ignore the between-country variation of the industries and fo-
cus on global year-industry averages (EMTRINDjict and EATRINDjict ), the EMTR is
still significant at the 5% level.35 The EATR, however, does not seem to have a
significant impact on fixed asset investment, which is consistent with the notion
explained above, namely that the EMTR is the appropriate measure when we
are focusing on the intensive margin investment. But of course, variation in the
EATR may still be related to changes in investment as many big projects are
less marginal but rather lumpy. Note, finally, that if we include both measures
(the EMTR as well as the EATR), we always find a negative and significant im-
pact for the EMTR, and a positive though insignificant impact of the EATR.
Both variables are, however, strongly correlated with each other which inflates
the estimated standard errors to some extent.
Surprisingly, the variable NDTTc,t turns out to be insignificant in the last
two columns of Table 2.5.5. This means that a higher level of regulation and
information exchange seems to be less relevant in the last two specifications. One
way to explain this result is that including (possibly endogenous) variation at the
firm and industry level implies that we allow for firms engaging in tax-planning
behavior.
35Note that, of course, EMTRINDjict and EATRINDjict still contain variation at the country
level as the industry-specific weights are applied to the respective countries’ tax law variables.
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Table 2.5.5: Taxes and fixed asset investment - firm-industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMTRjict -2.5880∗∗∗
(0.6083)
EATRjict -1.4160∗∗∗
(0.3961)
EMTRINDjict -2.1153∗∗
(1.0099)
EATRINDjict -0.5513
(0.6207)
log SALESj,t−1 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)
log EMPLj,t−1 0.2968∗∗∗ 0.2968∗∗∗ 0.2965∗∗∗ 0.2962∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0152)
log GDPc,t -0.2229 -0.2684 -0.4092 -0.4097
(0.3865) (0.3939) (0.3854) (0.3867)
log GDPPCc,t 0.6466∗ 0.6923∗ 0.8601∗∗ 0.8626∗∗
(0.3797) (0.3879) (0.3896) (0.3909)
GDP growthc,t 0.0072∗∗ 0.0074∗∗ 0.0078∗∗ 0.0078∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
CPIc,t 0.0148 0.0121 -0.0065 -0.0066
(0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0242) (0.0243)
FIFc,t 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
DCBc,t 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
NDTTc,t -0.0048∗∗ -0.0045∗ -0.0035 -0.0035
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025)
NBITc,t 0.0007 0.0005 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016)
log TCAPc,t−1 0.0462∗ 0.0469∗ 0.0605∗∗ 0.0604∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0267) (0.0266)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 569,002 569,002 569,002 69,002
Adj. R-squared 0.9440 0.9440 0.9440 0.9440
EMTRjict (elast.) -0.3295∗∗∗
EATRjict (elast.) -0.3570∗∗∗
EMTRINDjict (elast.) -0.2786∗∗
EATRINDjict (elast.) -0.1392
Dependent variable in all specifications: Logarithm of fixed asset investment.
Robust and clustered (country-year level) standard errors in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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We finally address two concerns about the estimations in Tables 2.5.4 and
2.5.5. First, it may be that adjustment costs are relevant when analyzing the
log of the fixed assets. We therefore first-difference the estimation equation and
run dynamic regression models by including the lagged dependent variable as
explanatory variable. Since the latter approach violates strict exogeneity, we
apply the difference GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Second, we instrument EMTRjict as the weights used to capture financing and
asset composition may cause endogeneity issues (as mentioned above).
Table 2.5.6: Dynamics and endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log FAj,t−1 0.6333*** 0.6367*** 0.5980*** 0.7012*** 0.6081***
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0224) (.0216)
STRc,t -0.4714***
(0.080)
NPVc,t 0.4173***
(0.1811)
EMTRjict -1.0954*** -1.194*** -7.8075*** -5.5948***
(0.1421) (0.1416) (0.4561) (.3809)
Test for AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) 0.381 0.383 0.362 0.221 0.243
Notes: 384,606 observations, dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM (see Arellano and Bond,
1991). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) report z-values on the Arellano and Bond tests for autocorrelation. Specification
(1): differenced lag (∆log F Aj,t−1) instrumented by the two-period lagged level (log F Aj,t−2); Specification
(2): differenced lag (∆log F Aj,t−1) instrumented by the two-period lagged level (log F Aj,t−2); Specification
(3): differenced lag (∆log F Aj,t−1) instrumented by all available lagged level variables (log F Aj.); Specification
(4): differenced lag and EMT Rjict instrumented by the one-period lagged levels; Specification (5): differenced
lag and EMT Rjict instrumented by all available lagged level variables.
The results of the dynamic model are presented in Table 2.5.6. Note that we
include all additional control variables as before. The specifications differ in the
number of instruments used. Columns (1), (2), and (4) are parsimonious specifi-
cations employing only the two-period lagged level (of the dependent variable) to
instrument log FAj,t−1; columns (3) and (5) use all available instruments (lagged
levels), where we also treat EMTRjict as endogenous in columns (4) and (5).
The approach seems to produce reliable estimates for the following reasons: (i)
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the estimate on the lagged fixed asset variable lies in a plausible range; (ii) we
always reject (cannot reject) the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of order 1 (2)
at the 1% significance level; (iii) the estimated tax coefficients are negative; the
coefficient on EMTRjict is estimated to be -1.0954, which corresponds to a long-
run effect of about -3.0, which we can roughly compare to the coefficient of -2.6
in Table 2.5.5. The results where we instrument EMTRjict suggest substantially
higher semi-elasticities. These estimates need to be interpreted in light of the
quantitatively very moderate average change in EMTRjict of -0.0024.
2.6 Conclusions
This study demonstrates that there is significant variation in taxes on corporate
profits across countries and over time. To the best of our knowledge, no study has
calculated tax measures for such a large sample of countries as we do (including
measures of tax base, as well as effective marginal and average tax measures). We
describe the recent trends in tax policy and highlight salient features of the cross-
country distributions of different tax measures. We then combine statutory rules
with firm- and industry-level information on financing behavior as well as asset
composition. This allows us to calculate effective tax measures that account
for a typical firm with respect to financing and asset composition, given the
specific industry and country a firm is operating in. The latter may be interesting
for various reasons. For example, firms in high-tax countries use more debt
financing, on average, to avoid part of the profit tax through deductible interest
cost. A generic effective tax measure, neglecting weights at a more micro level,
may overestimate the effective tax burden faced by a typical firm.
We demonstrate that our data can be utilized for a number of interesting
research questions. First, we show that the predicted relationship between tax
revenue and statutory tax rates is inverse-U-shaped. This shape is known as the
Laffer-Curve. The maximum values, i.e., the revenue-maximizing tax rates, are
estimated to be above the mean (and median) tax rates observed in our data,
a finding we ascribe to strategic tax setting and international tax competition.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide more evidence that interna-
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tional tax competition is the driving force behind low tax rates, it is consistent
with the clear downward trend in taxes we observe in the descriptive statistics.
Furthermore, we make sure that the Laffer-Curve shape is not imposed on the
data by specifying tax revenue as a polynomial function of taxes: additional re-
sults show that higher-order polynomials in taxes are not significantly related
to tax revenue; non-parametric specifications of the relationship produce very
similar results. Finally, we believe that business cycle effects and other spurious
correlations are well captured by running regressions which control for country-
as well as year-specific shocks.
Second, we combine our tax data with firm-level information on investment in
fixed assets. We find very plausible tax and tax base elasticities. For example, the
firm- and industry-weighted EMTR elasticity is estimated to be -0.33. Separating
the statutory tax rate elasticity from the tax base (measured as NPV) elasticity
suggests an estimate of -0.37 for the former, and an estimate of 0.90 for the
latter. Future research may use our tax data to analyze numerous firm decisions
not analyzed in this paper, particularly in an international context.
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2.A Appendix
Depreciation allowances
The following formulas depict how the NPVs of tax depreciation allowances are
calculated for a given depreciation allowance regime and asset type i. The for-
mulas are adapted from OECD (1991).
Declining-Balance method:
AiD =
φiD · (1 + ρ)
ρ+ φiD
(2.A.1)
Straight-Line method:
AiS =
φiS · (1 + ρ)
ρ
·
(
1− 1(1 + ρ)N
)
(2.A.2)
Straight-Line method with initial allowance:
AiS,IN =
[ φiS,IN · (1 + ρ)
ρ · (1− 1(1+ρ)N )
]
+ AiS ·
( 1
(1 + ρ)N
)
(2.A.3)
Declining-Balance method with initial allowance:
AiD,IN = (φiD,IN · (1 + ρ)) · (φiD,IN) +
(
φiD · (1 + ρ)
φiD + ρ
)
· (1− φiD,IN) (2.A.4)
In the following, φiD (φiS) is the depreciation rate under the declining-balance
(straight-line) method, ρ is the market interest rate, N is the depreciation period,
φiD,IN (φiS,IN) is the initial allowance rate under the declining-balance (straight-
line) method.
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Equality of cashflow-based NPV model and neoclassical in-
vestment model
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we derive the specifications of our effective tax mea-
sures from a neoclassical investment model. Previous approaches (e.g., Devereux
et al., 2002; Egger et al., 2009a) primarily rely on a cashflow-oriented represen-
tation of NPVs to define the EMTR formula. Nonetheless, both approaches lead
to the same results:36
R = −(1− τA) + (1 + π)(1− τ)(p+ σ) + (1 + π)(1− σ)(1− τA)1 + ρ
!= 0 (2.A.5)
p = (1− τA)((1 + ρ)− (1 + π)(1− σ))(1 + π)(1− τ) − σ (2.A.6)
If we ignore π, we get:
R = −(1− τA) + (1− τ)(p+ σ) + (1− σ)(1− τA)1 + ρ
!= 0 (2.A.7)
p = (1− τA)(ρ+ σ)(1− τ) − σ (2.A.8)
Comparing with Equation (2.2.3) above, it becomes clear that both methods lead
to an equivalent term for the required pre-tax rate of return.
EATR Calculation
The calculation of the EATR follows Devereux et al. (2002). The following ex-
pression depicts the pre-tax NPV of the hypothetical investment.
R∗ = −I + 11 + ρ [(p+ σ)(1 + π) + (1− σ)(1 + π)] · I (2.A.9)
Setting investment I=1 and disregarding inflation, we can simplify this to
R∗ = −1 + 11 + ρ [(p+ 1)] =
p− ρ
1 + ρ (2.A.10)
36The only difference compared to Devereux et al. (2002) and Egger et al. (2009a) lies in the
way we define the NPV of depreciation allowances. In this regard, we follow Egger and Loretz
(2010) and separate the NPV of depreciation allowances (A) from the STR (τ).
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The NPV of a hypothetical investment subject to taxation is
R = −(1− τA) + (1− τ) · (p+ σ) + (1− τA)(1− σ)1 + ρ
= (1− τ)(p+ σ)− (1− τA)(ρ+ σ)1 + ρ (2.A.11)
Combining these two present values, we get
R∗ −R = p− ρ1 + ρ −
(1− τ)(p+ σ)− (1− τA)(ρ+ σ)
1 + ρ
=
τ
(
p+ σ(1− A)− ρA
)
1 + ρ (2.A.12)
and finally
EATR = R
∗ −R
p/(1 + ρ) =
τ
(
p+ σ(1− A)− ρA
)
p
(2.A.13)
The role of economic depreciation
As an alternative to the results assuming zero economic depreciation (i.e., σ = 0),
we have modified our calculations of the effective tax measures and rerun our es-
timations based on the adapted tax measures, using various values for σ. Incor-
porating economic depreciation in the model increases the required pre-tax rate
of return (thus, the user cost of capital) and consequently leads to larger ETRs.
The following comparative statics exercise shows this:
∂p̂
∂σ
= 1− τA1− τ − 1 > 0 (2.A.14)
∂EMTR
∂σ
= (1− τ) · ρ((1− τA) · ρ+ (1− A) · τσ)2 · (1− A) · τ > 0 (2.A.15)
∂EATR
∂σ
= τ(1 + A)
p
> 0 (2.A.16)
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We have calculated the ETRs with a non-zero economic depreciation rate and
compare various values for the latter: 0.01, 0.025, and 0.0608, where the latter
value is in line with the assumptions in OECD (1991) and Egger et al. (2009b).
Table 2.A.1 suggests that, in line with the theoretical predictions, the ETRs
(i) are higher than with economic depreciation assumed to be zero and (ii) are
increasing in the economic depreciation rate.
Table 2.A.1: The role of economic depreciation
EMTR(σ = 0) EMTR(σ = 0.01) EMTR(σ = 0.025) EMTR(σ = 0.0608)
MEAN 0.135 0.1571 0.1878 0.2517
SD 0.0554 0.0632 0.0736 0.0933
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 0.3515 0.3941 0.4485 0.5458
EATR(σ = 0) EATR(σ = 0.01) EATR(σ = 0.025) EATR(σ = 0.0608)
MEAN 0.2182 0.2239 0.2324 0.2528
SD 0.0778 0.0799 0.083 0.0905
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 0.4735 0.4857 0.504 0.5477
Statutory taxes: cross-country variation
For each country, we pool the annual STRs over the period from 1996 to 2016
and subtract the global (time-) average STR (26.09%) from each country’s time
average. These demeaned tax rates are illustrated in Figure 2.A.1; the darker in
color a country’s area, the higher the respective country’s STRs.
One can see that there is substantial variation across countries, indicating that
the tax-setting behavior of countries vastly differs. Highly developed countries
like the US, Germany, and Japan, but also a considerable number of very poor
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa exhibit STRs that are well above the global av-
erage. In contrast to this, the majority of Eastern European countries, including
Russia, have comparatively low statutory tax rates.
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Figure 2.A.1: (Demeaned) Statutory taxes across countries, 1996-2016 (pooled)
[-.27,-.13]
(-.13,-.03]
(-.03,0]
(0,.07]
(.07,.12]
(.12,.17]
No data
Notes: The darker in color a country’s area, the higher the respective country’s STRs.
Laffer-Curve estimates and country size
In the Laffer-Curve estimates above, we assume identical (average) tax base elas-
ticity coefficients for all countries. However, in general, one could argue that
country size affects optimal tax-setting behavior. The seminal work here goes
back to Bucovetsky (1991), who shows that small and large countries face a cap-
ital outflow after an increase in their tax rate. Yet, the larger country faces a less
elastic tax base and therefore chooses a higher tax rate.
While Figure 2.A.2, depicting the correlation between log(GDP) and the
statutory tax rate, confirms this pattern, we should be aware of the point that
this comparison is based on cross-sectional differences in country size.
The point about the cross-sectional comparison between countries becomes
crucial when interpreting the Laffer-estimates. There, we regress tax revenue (rel-
ative to GDP) of a country on country-specific (fixed) effects (which should take
out all cross-sectional variation, including the different tax-setting behaviour of
countries of different size), GDP growth and time dummies (which should account
for business cycle effects), and tax as well as tax squared (we also test for higher
order polynomials). The dependent variable is normalized by country size and all
cross-sectional variation is removed. As a consequence, the estimated shape of
the Laffer-Curve must be related to inefficiencies and distortions produced by the
tax system. This is exactly what we want but it makes an interpretation of the
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Figure 2.A.2: (Log) GDP and statutory tax rates
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Laffer-Curve in light of the literature on asymmetric tax competition difficult.
To conclude, if (at all) a distinction between small and large countries is made,
then this should be in the spirit of the seminal theoretical paper of Bucovetsky
(1991), i.e., in a cross-sectional analysis. In addition, in any empirical analysis,
the definition of a ‘small’ country is highly arbitrary, and a wide range of fun-
damentally different results could be produced, depending on how we define a
‘small’ country.37
37In our estimation approach, the difference in the tax-setting behavior between small and
large countries cannot be analyzed in a meaningful way. This is because identification is based
on changes in tax rates over time and all cross-sectional differences in country size are removed.
This generally implies that in the fixed effects approach, a marginal increase in GDP (which
is used to normalize the dependent variable, anyway) cannot be interpreted as the effect of
becoming larger. For example, a marginal increase in the GDP of Latvia would not make
Latvia a large country. We do not see a way to capture these discrete jumps in the definition
of being small.
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Descriptive statistics, variable definitions and sources (Sec-
tion 2.5.2)
Table 2.A.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
log FAj,t 7.379 2.540 -1.978 18.512
STRc,t 0.285 0.070 0.000 0.410
NPVc,t 0.563 0.076 0.000 0.705
EMTRc,t 0.148 0.041 0.000 0.231
EATRc,t 0.244 0.059 0.000 0.339
EMTRINDjict 0.132 0.011 0.117 0.160
EATRINDjict 0.252 0.017 0.214 0.298
EMTRjict 0.127 0.036 0.000 0.207
EATRjict 0.252 0.063 0.000 0.374
log SALESj,t−1 9.839 2.048 0.000 19.064
log EMPLj,t−1 4.161 1.599 0.000 12.545
log GDPc,t 27.538 1.227 23.056 30.475
log GDPPCc,t 10.364 0.365 8.331 11.479
GDP growthc,t 1.024 3.314 -14.800 15.316
CPIc,t 6.256 1.743 2.100 9.600
FIFc,t 65.169 12.253 30.000 90.000
DCBc,t 146.989 72.856 15.306 376.955
NDTTc,t 86.756 22.937 0.000 128.000
NBITc,t 77.091 29.141 1.000 136.000
log TCAPc,t−1 20.763 1.525 11.251 22.673
Notes: 569, 002 Observations. For variable definitions and sources, see 2.5.2
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Table 2.A.3: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition and Source
STRc,t Statutory corporate income tax rate of country c in period t; Source: EY,
OECD, WB
NPVc,t NPV of depreciation allowances of country c in period t; Source: EY, PwC
EMTRc,t Effective marginal tax rate of country c in period t; Source: EY, OECD,
IBFD, WB
EATRc,t Effective average tax rate of country c in period t; Source: EY, OECD,
IBFD, WB
EMTRINDjict Firm(j)-industry(i)-country(c)-level effective marginal tax rate in period t
with industry-specific weights; Source: EY, OECD, IBFD, WB
EATRINDjict Firm(j)-industry(i)-country(c)-level effective average tax rate in period t
with industry-specific weights; Source: EY, OECD, IBFD, WB
EMTRjict Firm(j)-industry(i)-country(c)-level effective marginal tax rate in period t;
Source: EY, OECD, IBFD, WB
EATRjict Firm(j)-industry(i)-country(c)-level effective average tax rate in period t;
Source: EY, OECD, IBFD, WB
TAX REV ENUEc,t Corporate income tax revenue in % of GDP of country c in period t; Source:
IMF; World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD)
TAXc,t Tax rate (STR, EMTR or EATR) of country c in period t; Source: EY,
OECD, IBFD, WB, PwC
GROWTHc,t GDP growth (in %) per capita of country c in period t; Source: World Bank,
World Development Indicator (WDI) database
FAj,t Fixed asset investment of firm j in period t; Source: Orbis
SALESj,t−1 Total sales of firm j in period t− 1; Source: Orbis
EMPLj,t−1 Number of employees of firm j in period t− 1; Source: Orbis
GDPc,t GDP of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
GDPPCc,t GDP per capita of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
GDP growthc,t GDP growth of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
CPIc,t Corruption perception index of country c in period t; Source: Transparency
International
FIFc,t Financial freedom index of country c in period t; Source: Heritage Founda-
tion
DCBc,t Domestic credit provided by the banking sector in % of GDP of country c
in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
NDTTc,t Number of double tax treaties concluded by country c in period t; Source:
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
NBITc,t Number of bilateral investment treaties concluded by country c in period t;
Source: UNCTAD database
TCAPc,t−1 Sum of total assets of all firms in country c in period t− 1; Source: World
Bank WDI database
Chapter 3
Tax Revenue, Tax Competition,
and the Laffer-Curve
ABSTRACT
This study contributes to a better understanding of how countries generate corporate
tax revenue in a globalized economy with increasing international integration. First,
we illustrate that the amount of tax revenue countries raise from different sources is
substantial. Second, we investigate the relationship between international statutory
corporate tax rates and tax revenue. Using a comprehensive dataset for 134 countries,
we estimate Laffer-Curves, reflecting the link between a country’s statutory corporate
tax rate and tax revenue. In addition, we control for foreign, competing countries’
tax-setting behavior in our empirical framework. We find that tax-avoidance activities
give rise to a robust inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship which is insensitive
to the inclusion of foreign countries’ tax rates. The latter have no significant effect
on corporate tax revenue and neither affect the revenue-maximizing tax rate nor the
corresponding maximum tax revenue predicted by the Laffer-Curve. Our findings sug-
gest that the responsiveness of firms to foreign statutory tax rates is, on average, very
limited. The revenue-maximizing statutory tax rate is considerably higher than the
average, observed tax rate in our sample. While this is most likely due to international
tax competition, our results show that such strategic tax-setting behavior implies too
low statutory tax rates and adverse tax revenue outcomes.
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3.1 Introduction
Thinking of global tax policy these days, a good deal of the recent public as well as
academic discussion centers around the comprehensive US tax reform signed into
law in December 2017. The focal point of the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA)
attracting a lot of attention is a substantial lowering of the federal corporate in-
come tax rate from 35% to 21%. As to the insights from the discussion about the
TCJA, one can broadly distinguish between two different angles. First, a num-
ber of contributions assess the reform from a domestic perspective and evaluate
potential effects on different margins of the US economy (e.g., Auerbach, 2018;
Chalk et al., 2018; Hanlon et al., 2018; Slemrod, 2018). While these contributions
predict positive domestic investment and labor market effects associated with the
reform, they also expect a substantial increase in federal deficits, as the amount
of (corporate) tax revenue raised will decline considerably.1 Second, some contri-
butions (e.g., Beer et al., 2018; Spengel et al., 2018; Boumans et al., 2019) adopt
an international perspective and discuss the expected impact of the reform on
other countries which might be worried about potential net outflows of capital
to the US.2 Many, mostly European, countries (e.g., France, UK, and Belgium)
have announced to react to the US tax cut by also decreasing statutory tax rates
on corporate profits (Mintz, 2018). From a theoretical perspective, and related to
an extensive literature in public finance (see Wilson, 1999, for an overview), this
can be explained by the notion that countries compete for mobile tax bases over
1The Joint Committee of Taxation (JCT) predicts an increase of 330 billion USD in federal
deficit related to the changes in corporate taxation over the next ten years, of which about
one third is expected to be offset by positive growth effects (JCT, 2017). Note that, in this
regard, two important aspects have to be kept in mind. First, there is large variation in the
estimates of the net revenue impact, mainly due to differences in the expected growth effects,
which vary between 0.6-1.1% (Penn Wharton Group) and 3% (Tax Foundation). Second,
apart from corporate taxation, the TCJA involves a lot of additional changes to the overall
US tax system. Hence, estimates trying to precisely assess the consequences of changes to
the corporate tax system should be interpreted with caution. In particular, growth effects are
difficult to attribute immediately to specific aspects. Moreover, substantial general equilibrium
effects remain a concern with any quantification of a far-reaching tax reform.
2The latter, however, is difficult to assess and forecasts vary a lot. While US inbound
investment by, for example, European multinational enterprises (MNEs) is likely to increase,
some features of the TCJA such as the move towards a territorial system and the GILTI and
BEAT provisions may also create incentives for US firms to increase investments abroad (Chalk
et al., 2018).
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statutory tax rates. Lowering statutory tax rates as a response to the TCJA may
help to mitigate a possible shrinking of the (domestic) tax base. Nevertheless,
the intensification of tax competition is, altogether, likely to lead to losses in tax
revenue in these countries.
Taken together, the insights from this discussion show that adverse revenue
effects of tax cuts should be a major concern - not only in the country implement-
ing lower rates in the first place, but also in an international context. How do
these considerations relate to the link between a country’s tax-setting behavior
and the amount of corporate tax revenue raised? To the extent that we observe
strategic tax setting and international tax competition between countries to pre-
vent an outflow of capital, can the trend towards lower tax rates be considered
‘optimal’? Taking into account the revenue consequences of changes to the inter-
national tax system seems to be increasingly important. This paper contributes
to a better understanding of how corporate tax revenue is related to statutory
tax incentives in an international context. We conduct an empirical analysis that
explicitly incorporates the notion that tax revenue in one country may be af-
fected by the tax-setting behavior in other countries. To this end, we use a rich
dataset for 134 countries and the time period from 2004 to 2014 and suggest a
Laffer-Curve framework, which typically reflects that statutory tax rate and rev-
enue in one country show an inverse-U-shaped relationship. We extend this basic
framework and link tax revenue in one country not only to the own tax rate and
other domestic determinants, but also to a weighted average of other countries’
tax rates. To the best of our knowledge, no previous contribution has considered
the revenue consequences of foreign tax rates in a global empirical assessment of
the Laffer-Curve relationship.
We find that the weighted-average foreign tax rate has no significant effect on
corporate tax revenue. Comparing our results to a purely domestic setting as in
Steinmüller et al. (2019), we show that taking into account the effects of com-
peting countries’ statutory tax rates on the Laffer-Curve relationship leaves the
optimal rate-revenue combination virtually unchanged. Moreover, the suggested
revenue-maximizing tax rate is considerably higher than the actual, global aver-
age tax rate observed in the sample. Strategic interaction between countries may
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be the driving force behind this finding. However, our predicted Laffer-Curves
controlling for this competitive pressure show that tax revenue is not maximized
at such a low tax rate. Our results suggest that the amount of tax revenue
raised by a country is, on average, insensitive to foreign tax rates. From a pol-
icy perspective, this indicates that international tax competition should not play
a dominating role in single countries’ tax-setting behavior.3 Reacting to other
countries’ tax-setting behavior, i.e., competing over statutory tax rates, leads to
adverse revenue effects. Considerations about marginal changes in the corporate
tax rate should therefore be mainly driven by the country’s current rate-revenue
combination and, hence, its location on the Laffer-Curve. We finally provide a
number of stylized facts to derive possible explanations for our findings. These
explanatory approaches are related to the, on a global scale, very large share
of purely domestic firms and the limited tax-responsiveness of some (often very
large) MNEs due to their ability to avoid taxes through shifting corporate income
to affiliates in low-tax countries.
Our paper relates to several strands of previous literature, which can be dis-
tinguished along three general lines. First, a number of contributions discuss
the development in corporate income tax revenue collection in a broader con-
text (e.g., Devereux et al., 2004; Loretz, 2008; Fuest et al., 2019). De Mooij and
Nicodème (2008) as well as Caiumi et al. (2018) analyze the determinants of tax
revenue and discuss why, in spite of a significant downward trend in statutory
corporate tax rates, tax revenue numbers have remained on a fairly constant level
in the last decades. For the most part, this can be explained by an increasing
degree of incorporations and a more profitable corporate sector. A second, not
too extensive strand of literature is concerned with an empirical assessment of the
link between statutory corporate tax rates and tax revenues, testing whether an
inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship can be confirmed using country-level
data. Brill and Hassett (2007) as well as Clausing (2007) provide evidence for
3Note that in this paper, we focus on one particular form of ‘international tax competition’
– cross-country competition over statutory tax rates on corporate income–, and any statements
about the role of ‘international tax competition’ refer to the specific policy instrument of statu-
tory tax rates. We are fully aware that countries moreover compete over a number of other
tax-policy instruments. We comment on this in Section 3.6 and, in the Appendix, discuss the
robustness of our results against considering effective rather than statutory tax rates.
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a Laffer-Curve relationship for OECD countries. Steinmüller et al. (2019) use a
considerably larger sample of 112 countries and find (i) a robust parabolic rela-
tionship between statutory as well as effective tax rates and corporate tax revenue
and (ii) actual, global average tax rates to be significantly lower than the revenue-
maximizing rates suggested by the Laffer-Curves.4 Third, our study relates to
the comprehensive tax competition literature. Theoretical tax competition mod-
els often predict a ‘race to the bottom’ with respect to statutory corporate tax
rates, as countries compete for mobile capital (or taxable profits) through strate-
gic tax-setting behavior.5 Apart from a few tax haven countries, admittedly,
there is hardly any empirical evidence of such a ‘race to the bottom’. However,
Devereux et al. (2002) and Steinmüller et al. (2019) illustrate a downward trend
in statutory taxes throughout the past decades. A number of empirical contri-
butions analyze whether this decline can be explained by strategic interaction
in tax rates between countries.6 While empirical results as to the latter are not
as clear-cut as those of the classical theoretical tax competition models, these
contributions generally confirm that governments compete over statutory taxes,
which explains the downward trend in tax rates (Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch
and Rincke, 2011; Redoano, 2014; Egger and Raff, 2015).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a
general overview and some stylized facts on tax revenue and the public budget.
In Section 3.3, we discuss the conceptual framework of the Laffer-Curve. Sections
3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively, outline our estimation approach and provide infor-
mation on the data we use. Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 present the empirical results
and some sensitivity checks. In Section 3.5, we discuss our results in light of fur-
4All these approaches have in common that corporate tax revenue is regressed on domestic
determinants only. However, the fundamental difference with respect to the empirical approach
taken by Steinmüller et al. (2019), compared to previous contributions, is that all cross-sectional
variation in the sample is removed because country-specific effects are included in the estimation
equation. Hence, identification is based on variation over time only.
5Seminal contributions to the theoretical tax competition literature include Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986); Wilson (1986, 1999); Wildasin (1988, 1989), and Haufler and Wooton
(1999). More recently, the New Economic Geography literature (see, e.g., Ludema and Wooton,
2000; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004) has suggested an explanation
for the empirical regularity that most countries are still able to set non-zero tax rates. The
latter is, in short, related to location-specific rents due to agglomeration economies.
6Brückner (2003) and Devereux and Loretz (2013) provide reviews of the empirical tax
competition literature.
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ther descriptive evidence and findings from previous literature. Finally, Section
3.6 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 Tax revenue and the public budget
How do countries generate tax revenue and, more fundamentally, how can we jus-
tify that governments levy taxes on different types of income, goods and services?
From a very general perspective, the discipline of public finance unifies two sides
of one coin. While the coin in this idiom is a country’s public budget, the two sides
are, on the one hand, public expenditures, and, on the other hand, public rev-
enue. A government’s public expenditures most notably serve two purposes: the
financing of public goods and services and the redistribution of income through
some form of a social security system.7 Broadly speaking, the costs of public
sector activity are, for the most part, offset by public income. The main source
of public income is, by far, tax revenue: Considering a panel of 27 EU countries,
Mourre and Reut (2019) find that the average share of tax revenue in total public
revenue is 88%.8 This share is slightly smaller for less developed economies, but
still represents the vast majority of public revenue. Figure 3.2.1 illustrates the
evolution of total tax revenue over time, grouped by world regions, and offers
three insights.9 First, one can see that the amount of (total) tax revenue raised is
substantial. Second, it varies considerably across world regions. There seems to
be a positive correlation between a world region’s level of economic development
and the share of total tax revenue relative to GDP. In particular, the level of
tax revenue raised by highly developed economies in Europe is distinctly above
average. Third, Figure 3.2.1 suggests that, in most regions, revenue has either
7In Germany, for example, 60.3% of total public expenditures in 2017 are attributed to social
security and health (data taken from Eurostat). Further major public expenditure categories
are related to education (9.3%), economic development & support (7.1%), and public security
& legal protection (3.5%).
8Other (non-tax) sources of public revenue include, for example, dividends distributed by
state-owned enterprises, fees for public health services, road and bridge tolls, and rental income
from government land and buildings (Mourre and Reut, 2019).
9We follow the classification scheme of world regions in the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicator (WDI) database, distinguishing between the seven regions depicted.
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remained on a rather stable level or increased slightly since 2004.10
Figure 3.2.1: Total tax revenue (2004-2014, 151 countries) by world regions
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Central Asia. Source: IMF
Total tax revenue can be roughly subdivided into taxes levied on (personal
and corporate) income and consumption (value added taxes (VAT) and excise
taxes on specific goods).11 Figure 3.2.2 illustrates the global average shares of
the most important sources of tax revenue. It shows that these shares are quite
stable over time and the largest shares of revenue stem from VAT (lightest gray
area) and personal income taxation (second lightest gray area).
10Note that this seems consistent with the observation that public expenditures have steadily
increased over the last decades (as indicated by the World Bank’s World Economic Outlook
(WEO) database). A straightforward consequence of this would be that also public income
should have increased over time. If this was not the case, public debt would have increased
significantly. Many countries manage to offset public expenditure costs to a large extent,
thus maintaining a more or less stable debt level. However, in some countries, (e.g., Japan,
Greece, and Italy), public expenditures and revenue have diverged over the past years, leading
to increasing public debt levels.
11Other sources of tax revenue include, among others, property taxes, trade taxes, and
payroll taxes.
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Figure 3.2.2: Tax revenue by source (2004-2014, 151 countries), global average
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Notes: The labeling refers to the depicted areas from the bottom up, i.e.,
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represents revenue from personal income taxes. Source: IMF
In this paper, however, we focus on corporate income tax revenue. Figure 3.2.2
shows that the fraction of revenue raised from corporate income taxes is lower
compared to VAT and personal income taxes. In light of the significant decline
in corporate tax rates in the 1980s and 1990s, Weichenrieder (2005) argues that
one can expect this development to continue and statutory corporate taxes to
eventually go down to zero. This would be consistent with classical models of
tax competition suggesting a race to the bottom. However, more recent evidence
shows that this has not happened and the clear downward trend in tax rates
seems to have slowed down since 2011 (Steinmüller et al., 2019). Nonetheless,
due to the ever increasing economic integration observed in the past decades,
the taxation of (potentially) mobile corporate profits remains a challenging task
and a persistent and controversial topic in policy debates (Haufler and Stähler,
2013). In short, two (very different) arguments in favor of maintaining a corporate
tax can be established. First, related both to current policy discussions and a
very fundamental ability-to-pay-principle, most people would argue that a fair
and socially desirable tax system includes a tax on corporate profits. Second,
and more technically, a corporate tax may act as an important backstop to the
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personal income tax (Slemrod, 2004; Clausing, 2013).12
In our empirical analysis below, we use data on corporate income tax revenue
for 134 countries from all over the world.13 Several interesting, descriptive insights
can be inferred from these data. As already suggested by Figure 3.2.2, we do not
see any clear trend as to the development of global average corporate tax revenue
(in % of GDP) over time (Figure 3.2.3).
Figure 3.2.3: Corporate tax revenue (2004-2014, 134 countries), global average
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If at all, corporate tax revenue seems to have increased in the years prior to 2007,
then decreased and eventually remained rather stable in recent years. However,
this development is, to the greatest extent, similar for the other sources of tax
revenue depicted in Figure 3.2.2. Moreover, we see that corporate income tax
revenue varies substantially across countries. This is shown in Figure 3.2.4, where
we illustrate the global distribution of corporate tax revenue, pooling the latter
for each country and depicting the time average, demeaned by the global mean
over the whole sample period.
12Suppose that only personal income is subject to taxation and the statutory corporate tax
rate is zero. Then, a loophole emerges in the sense that the income tax can be avoided by
classifying labor income (or any other form or personal income) as corporate income. These
retained, seemingly ‘corporate’ earnings could then be distributed to shareholders by other, tax-
preferred means (Slemrod, 2004). Together with the decline in corporate tax rates in recent
decades, this incentive is consistent with the result of De Mooij and Nicodème (2008), who find
a steady increase in the extent of incorporations.
13The data are taken from the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD). For more
information, see Section 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.2.4: Corporate tax revenue across countries (2004-2014)
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Notes: The darker in color a country’s area, the higher is corporate tax revenue (in % of
GDP). The classification of countries is based on the following percentile ranges of the global
distribution of (demeaned) corporate tax revenue: [1-10], (10-25], (25-50], (50-75], (75-90],
(90-99]. Source: IMF
3.3 The Laffer-Curve and tax revenue maximiza-
tion
3.3.1 Conceptual framework
When it comes to a government’s tax-policy considerations, how can we define a
suitable objective function? As an instrument to derive statutory corporate tax
rates which can serve as an optimality benchmark, we suggest the use of Laffer-
Curves. The concept of the Laffer-Curve reflects the idea of an inverse-U-shaped
relationship between tax rate and tax revenue and thus suggests that there exists
a statutory tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. The exact shape of the Laffer-
Curve and hence the specific, revenue-maximizing tax rate (and corresponding
revenue) depends on two factors: first, the specific design of the respective tax
and, second, the extent of behavioral responses to the tax under consideration
(Steinmüller et al., 2019).
We typically distinguish between a mechanical (or direct) and a behavioral
(or indirect) effect of a tax rate change on tax revenue. As to the first effect,
without any behavioral responses, a tax increase (decrease) merely implies a
proportionate increase (decrease) in tax revenue. In most cases, however, the tax
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base is not perfectly inelastic with respect to the tax rate.14 Rather than that,
the tax base is endogenously determined by the aggregate responses to changes
in the tax rate. The tax base itself varies with the tax rate, an increase in the
latter usually leads to increasing efforts by taxpayers to reduce their tax burden
and, as a consequence, to a reduction of the tax base. Due to these tax-avoidance
endeavors, the behavioral effect is negative, which makes the overall effect of a
tax rate change on tax revenue ambiguous. In particular, this implies that the
marginal effect of a change in the tax rate crucially depends on the exact position
on the Laffer-Curve.
Note that, broadly speaking, the behavioral effect induced by a tax change and
the corresponding shape of the Laffer-Curve can reflect two types of avoidance
activities: domestic and international ones. As to the first type, firms may, in a
general sense, respond to higher taxes by reducing overall domestic investment,
implying lower profits and, hence, a lower tax base.15 As to the second type, firms
may shift real economic activity and/or paper profits abroad. While the first type
of avoidance activities can apply to all kind of firms – purely domestic as well as
multinational ones –, the second type is restricted to MNEs.16 In related litera-
ture on the Laffer-Curve, the behavioral response restricted to MNEs is merely
embodied implicitly as one of many avoidance activities. Moreover, all previous
empirical contributions model a Laffer-Curve where corporate tax revenue is re-
lated to domestic determinants only (see, e.g., Clausing, 2007; Steinmüller et al.,
2019). On the contrary, a large body of literature (for a survey and a meta-study,
see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003) discusses international investment activities of
MNEs as being determined not only by domestic tax rates, but also by the tax
rates of foreign countries. To the extent that firms respond to changes in these
14In case of a perfectly inelastic tax base, obviously, the tax would be lump-sum and a
revenue-maximizing tax rate would not exist by definition.
15Note that tax-avoidance efforts in a broader sense can take numerous forms, comprising
different activities that allow a firm to reduce the tax burden. These may include, for example,
an increased use of debt financing or shifting part of the tax burden to other production factors
(Egger et al., 2014). Moreover, lower aggregate investment may also reflect a (partial) shift
of economic activity into the informal sector as a response to a tax increase. This is often
observed in developing and newly-industrialized countries, as documented by Rachter et al.
(2018), Ulyssea (2018), and Waseem (2018).
16It is important to note that this does not imply that all MNEs are equally responsive to
corporate tax rates in this context. We discuss this issue in more detail below (Section 3.5).
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foreign countries’ statutory tax rates, the latter may affect domestic tax revenue.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no thorough empirical evidence
as to this question.
In this context, to what extent would we hence expect that taking into ac-
count foreign tax rates in the Laffer-Curve framework could alter the revenue-
maximizing statutory tax rate and the corresponding revenue level, compared to
a purely domestic setting as in Steinmüller et al. (2019)? First, suppose that
we would see significant differences between the predicted Laffer-Curves. This
could imply that, at the margin, the majority of firms in one country (country
A) respond to changes in, say, country B’s tax rate.17 If this was the case, then
these tax-responsive firms would react to a decline in country B’s statutory cor-
porate tax rate by shifting economic activity and/or paper profits from country
A to country B. This potentially triggers a comparable tax cut in country A,
which seeks to prevent severe outflows of taxable profits and, as a consequence,
a shrinking tax base. Hence, if firms are mostly responsive to foreign tax rates,
then we should see a lower revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate and a lower
level of tax revenue associated with this rate. In contrast, if we do not see any
sizable difference between the two settings and the respective Laffer-Curves pre-
dicted, then this could point towards a very limited responsiveness of firms to
foreign statutory tax rates. In this case, a country’s tax base and, accordingly,
its revenue-maximizing statutory tax rate would not be affected by the competi-
tive pressure of other countries’ tax rates.
3.3.2 Revenue maximization as government objective
Note that the framework outlined in Section 3.3.1 inherently assumes the max-
imization of tax revenue as a government’s objective. In previous literature, as-
suming revenue maximization is often referred to as having in mind a Leviathan-
type government (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Oates, 1985; Kanbur and
Keen, 1993; Haufler and Stähler, 2013; Haufler and Mardan, 2014). In this con-
17To be precise, what we measure in our empirical setting is a change in the weighted-average
foreign statutory tax rate. This, in turn, is affected by the changes in the (separate) competing
countries’ tax rates - to intuitively illustrate the mechanisms at play, we may refer to two
countries A (domestic) and B (foreign).
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text, however, it is important to distinguish between two fundamentally different
perceptions of governments in general and (tax) policy-making in particular (Kan-
bur and Keen, 1993; Edwards and Keen, 1996). On the one hand, a public choice
approach would interpret governments as trying to exploit as much revenue as
possible out of entirely self-serving motives.18 On the other hand, one can think
of revenue maximization as an act of benevolence with strongly redistributive
rather than self-serving intentions.
Regardless of this distinction, a number of reasons can be pointed out to jus-
tify that assuming a revenue-maximizing government is appropriate. First, it is
a frequently used assumption in the tax competition literature. Second, given
the substantial amounts of tax revenue raised in most countries (as illustrated in
Section 3.2), it is natural to argue that tax revenue generation is an important
objective for governments.19 Third, and related to the latter, there is consider-
able public and political pressure on governments to raise adequate revenue from
taxing corporate profits. Widespread public attention on issues of international
taxation (and the aggressive tax-avoidance activities of large MNEs) has led to
far-reaching discontent with the overall tax system and the aim to enforce that
firms, and particularly large MNEs, pay their ‘fair share’ in profit taxes (Haufler
and Stähler, 2013; Haufler et al., 2018).
Moreover, from a more theoretical perspective, to what extent is the premise of
revenue maximization consistent with plausible assumptions on the preferences of
the involved economic agents? Thinking of consumers, the revenue-maximization
approach corresponds to a situation in which consumers value consumption of
public goods to be financed through tax revenue highly, compared to private
good consumption (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008). A
similar reasoning can be brought forward thinking of firms if we argue that they
18Another strand of literature pioneered by Oates (1985) interprets competition among gov-
ernments as a welfare-improving constraint on self-interested Leviathans. This holds true in
particular for federal systems with different levels of local government because horizontal fis-
cal competition restrains the opportunities of Leviathans to channel resources into the public
sector.
19Note that, in contrast to most previous contributions, we consider countries from all over
the world and with different levels of economic development in our empirical analysis. Particu-
larly in developing countries, for which comprehensive empirical studies on tax revenue and its
determinants are scarce, a comparatively large share of tax revenue is raised through corporate
income taxation (Gordon and Li, 2009; Crivelli et al., 2016).
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rely heavily on (i) public goods and services such as infrastructure or the in-
stitutional environment, and/or (ii) subsidies and other means of governmental
support financed via a tax and transfer system. Accordingly, governments can
justify that they are pursuing the goal of tax revenue maximization. In general,
revenue maximization with predominantly redistributive motives can also be seen
as ascribing a lot of importance to the equity objective of fiscal policy.
One alternative way of modeling a government’s objective function would be
to additionally include the profits of domestically owned firms. As Haufler and
Mardan (2014) argue, such a more general welfare function would then define
national welfare as a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of net-of-tax
profits of domestic firms.20 Obviously, including firm profits in a government’s
objective function would lead to a different optimal tax-setting behavior (in terms
of lower welfare-maximizing tax rates). However, explicitly taking into account
firm profits in the government’s (national) welfare function is also subject to
plausibility concerns. Empirical evidence indicates that households mostly invest
capital through financial intermediaries (e.g., insurance companies, pension or
investment funds), leading to highly diversified global portfolios (Haufler and
Mardan, 2014). As a consequence, it seems problematic to include ‘firm’ profits
in a government’s objective function which is concerned with national welfare.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Estimation approach
As outlined in Section 3.1, empirical investigations of the relationship between
statutory corporate tax rates and revenue are generally scarce. Previous contribu-
tions, such as Steinmüller et al. (2019), have implemented empirical estimations
of the Laffer-Curve focusing on domestic variation only: changes in tax revenue
of country c are induced by changes in country c’s own tax rate and, indirectly,
tax base. The latter is elastic with respect to tax rate changes, reflecting firms’
efforts to reduce the tax burden.
20The aggregate profits of domestic firms can be assumed to reflect the private (capital)
income of a representative domestic consumer (Haufler et al., 2018).
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In the empirical analysis of this paper, we explicitly incorporate the notion
that corporate tax revenue in one country may be affected by the tax-setting be-
havior in other countries, competing for mobile tax bases over statutory corporate
tax rates. A number of recent empirical papers (see Devereux and Loretz, 2013,
for a survey) find evidence for strategic interaction between countries competing
over statutory tax rates. This behavioral pattern seems to be, to a considerable
extent, responsible for the observed downward trend in corporate taxes. How-
ever, no previous contribution has considered the impact of foreign statutory tax
rates on corporate tax revenue in an empirical assessment of the Laffer-Curve
framework. We do this by relating corporate tax revenue in country c not only
to the statutory tax rate in this country, but also to a weighted average of (po-
tential) competitor countries’ statutory tax rates.21 We estimate the following
linear regression model, predicting corporate tax revenue from variation in both
domestic determinants and international tax-setting behavior:
TAX REV ENUEc,t = α + β1TAXc,t + β2TAX2c,t + β3FTAXWc,t (3.4.1)
+β4GROWTHc,t + Yt + Cc + εc,t
Corporate income tax revenue in percent of GDP (TAX REV ENUEc,t) in coun-
try c and at time t is modeled as a function of the following observable deter-
minants. TAXc,t is the statutory corporate tax rate in country c and period
t, where the squared term specification reflects the suggested inverse-U-shaped
relationship between statutory corporate tax rate and tax revenue. For each
country c, FTAXWc,t is the weighted (indicated by superscript W ) average of the
corporate tax rates of foreign, potential competitor countries.22 GROWTHc,t
is country-level GDP growth per capita, which we include to control for time-
varying determinants of corporate tax revenue. Moreover, this ensures that our
estimates directly account for potential growth effects induced by a tax cut. Yt
and Cc are year and country effects, respectively. Accounting for these in our
estimation, we capture (i) aggregate, year-specific shocks as well as (ii) any po-
21Note that we focus on the relationship between statutory corporate tax rates and revenue.
In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our results to the use of effective (average and
marginal) tax rates.
22We provide more details on the employed weighting schemes below.
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tentially confounding, time-invariant country-specific characteristics, including
political and institutional aspects which may be of particular importance in the
context of tax revenue collection. Hence, we remove all cross-sectional variation
between countries, and identification is based on variation over time.
Let us go into more detail on how we construct the composite competitor tax
rate:
FTAXWc,t =
∑N
j=1,j 6=cwc,jTAXj,t (3.4.2)
From the perspective of country c, FTAXWc,t is a linear combination of other
(j = 1, ..., N , and j 6= c) countries’ corporate tax rates in the given period t, with
weights wc,j ≥ 0. Moreover,
∑N
j=1,j 6=cwc,j = 1, i.e., weights sum up to unity. It
is important to note that these weights are not estimated but defined a priori
(Overesch and Rincke, 2011; Redoano, 2014).23 In the empirical tax competition
literature, spatial weighting matrices have been defined according to a number
of different approaches. The specific weighting scheme is crucial in the sense
that it reflects what we consider an appropriate choice of the relevant foreign
tax rates exerting competitive pressure between countries (Devereux and Loretz,
2013). A first parsimonious method in early work by Devereux et al. (2008) is
to assume a uniform weighting scheme, meaning that the tax rates of all other
countries in a given year affect country c’s tax policy alike. This, however, does
not seem suitable in our large country sample for two reasons. First, in this
case, the composite competitor tax is (almost) collinear to a year effect which
is common to all countries. In other words, it would be impossible to identify
the effect of a change in the (average) competitor tax rate separately from a year
effect.24 Second, from an intuitive perspective and also based on the theoretical
tax competition literature, it is natural to assume a heterogeneous impact of
different countries’ tax policies on a given country c’s tax revenue. To account
for this heterogeneity, most of the previous contributions, such as Egger et al.
(2005), Heinemann et al. (2010), Overesch and Rincke (2011), Redoano (2014),
23As illustrated in Equation (3.4.2), all weights employed in the various specifications in our
empirical analysis are constant over time. We address this issue in more detail below.
24Instead, omitting the year effects in the estimation equation would imply that the effect
attributed to FTAXWc,t rather measures a common, year-specific shock.
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and Egger and Raff (2015), have employed weights that are predetermined based
on some measure of inverse geographical distance. This can be justified by robust
empirical evidence that distance has a negative effect on FDI.25
Apart from geographical distance, one can also think of other (inverse) dis-
tance measures that determine the degree of interdependencies between different
countries’ tax policies. For example, Mardan (2018) argues that tax competition
between ‘similar’ countries is more intense because many MNEs have the greater
part of their affiliates located in countries with a similar level of development.26
Following this notion, one can construct bilateral inverse-‘distance’ measures for
two countries c and j with respect to economic development, measured by, for
example, GDP per capita levels or GDP per capita growth rates.
We can capture a more general idea of ‘distance’ (DISTc,j) between two coun-
tries c and j to illustrate how the weights are constructed. For a total of N coun-
tries, the row-normalized element wcj of the spatial weighting matrix gives us the
weight assigned to the tax rate of country j from the perspective of country c:
wc,j =
1
DISTc,j∑N
k=1,k 6=c
1
DISTc,k
(3.4.3)
Let us finally address one potential concern with regard to the choice of ap-
propriate weights. It is important that the predetermined weighting scheme guar-
antees a separate identification of the effect of changes in the foreign statutory
tax rates. More specifically, we have to make sure that changes in the weighted-
average competitor tax rate FTAXWc,t are only driven by changes in foreign coun-
tries’ taxes and not in the weights. This is why, in all weighting schemes employed,
we rely on time-constant spatial weights. If the latter are defined according to
geographical distance, this is not an issue, as geographical distance is constant
25Seminal contributions in this regard include, e.g., Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus
(2002), and Blonigen and Piger (2014). Baier and Bergstrand (2001) highlight that transport
costs are closely related to geographical distance. Portes and Rey (2005) emphasize that, on
top of that, distance also increases information costs, which may additionally hamper FDI.
Furthermore, previous contributions, such as Overesch and Rincke (2011), have argued that
also pure paper-profit shifting should be inversely related to geographical distance. While this
is probably true when we think of intra-firm trade, transactions and transfer pricing, recent
developments with regard to information and communication technologies may to some extent
mitigate the influence of geographical distance in the context of profit shifting.
26Particularly in the case of horizontal FDI, this view is supported by empirical evidence
(e.g., Becker et al., 2005; Buch et al., 2005; Krautheim, 2013).
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over time by definition and can therefore be safely considered exogenous in this
context. In case of other measures, such as the ones based on distance in terms
of GDP per capita or GDP growth per capita, we cannot use year-specific val-
ues of, for example, GDP per capita and GDP growth per capita distances to
construct year-specific weights. Doing so would imply that changes in FTAXWc,t
may originate from both changes in the determinants of the weights and changes
in foreign tax rates, which means that we would get biased estimates of the tax
competition effect (Overesch and Rincke, 2011). To overcome this problem in
our analysis, we use the averages of GDP per capita and GDP growth per capita
distances between two countries in the sample period. This should still provide a
suitable measure for (average) ‘distance’ between countries in this context, while
ensuring that variation in FTAXWc,t comes from changes in tax rates only.
3.4.2 Data
For our empirical analysis, we create a rich dataset with 1,247 observations from
134 countries for the years 2004 to 2014, relying on several sources. This dataset
mainly includes self-collected tax data (see Steinmüller et al., 2019, for more
information) and data provided by international organizations.27 Statutory cor-
porate tax rates are self-collected from various sources and tax revenue data are
taken from the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD). Information
on GDP growth per capita is provided by the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator (WDI) database.
To calculate the spatial weights determining the respective average competitor
countries’ tax rates, we rely on information from two sources, depending on the
particular weighting scheme. In case of weights defined according to inverse geo-
graphical distance, we use the geodesic distance between the most populated cities
or agglomerations of two countries, provided by the CEPII GeoDist Database.28
The latter database also includes the information on countries’ population size,
which we use in alternative calculations of the weighting matrices. In further
specifications, we impose weights based on the similarity of countries with re-
27Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix summarizes all variables and their respective sources.
28For more information on the CEPII data, see Mayer and Zignago (2011).
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spect to economic development and wealth. To this end, we use data from the
World Bank’s WDI database: GDP and GDP per capita as well as a classifica-
tion scheme for countries according to their regional location and information on
whether a country is an OECD member.
3.4.3 Results
In this subsection, we present the findings from our empirical analysis, estimating
to what extent a country’s corporate tax revenue is related to the various deter-
minants outlined in Section 3.4.1 above. Table 3.4.1 displays regression results
in this regard. In all specifications, we account for outliers potentially distorting
our predictions by omitting the observations with the 1% largest values of the
dependent variable.29
In the first column, for the sake of comparability, we include a specification
in the spirit of Steinmüller et al. (2019), where tax revenue is modeled as a
function of domestic determinants only. In all other empirical specifications,
however, we explicitly incorporate the notion that tax revenue in one country
may as well be affected by the tax-setting behavior of other countries. Hence,
the estimates provided in column 1 serve as a benchmark in the analysis of the
results of all other empirical specifications below. Other countries’ tax-setting
behavior is reflected by the weighted averages of competitor countries’ tax rates,
FTAXWc,t . The specifications in columns 2 to 4 differ with respect to the choice
of the weighting matrix. We first employ weights based on the inverse squared
geographical distance between countries to calculate FTAXWc,t . Thereafter, we
impose two different similarity measures – the ‘distances’ between two countries
with respect to GDP per capita and GDP growth per capita, respectively – to
determine the weighted-average foreign tax rate.
29Note, however, that our results are robust against using (i) the full sample of observations
and (ii) alternative outlier treatments (see Tables 3.A.3, 3.A.4, and 3.A.5 in the Appendix.)
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Table 3.4.1: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth
geographical distance distance distance
TAXc,t 10.26∗∗∗ 10.39∗∗∗ 9.905∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗∗
(3.214) (3.218) (3.233) (3.215)
TAX2c,t -16.58∗∗∗ -16.74∗∗∗ -16.07∗∗∗ -16.54∗∗∗
(5.828) (5.832) (5.851) (5.832)
GROWTHc,t 0.0194∗∗ 0.0197∗∗ 0.0194∗∗ 0.0194∗∗
(0.00869) (0.00869) (0.00869) (0.00869)
FTAXWc,t -1.578 -2.455 0.748
(2.033) (2.448) (2.306)
Constant 1.202∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗ 1.940∗∗ 0.990
(0.464) (0.699) (0.869) (0.803)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,234 1,234 1,234 1,234
Adj. R-squared 0.8369 0.8368 0.8369 0.8368
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAXREV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The results in the first column are in line with previous contributions, suggest-
ing a highly significant inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship between tax
revenue and tax rate (Clausing, 2007; Steinmüller et al., 2019).30 The estimates
presented in columns 2 to 4 provide two main insights. First, the coefficients
on TAXc,t (positive) and TAX2c,t (negative) are both highly significant. This
indicates that tax-avoidance activities imply a robust Laffer-Curve relationship,
also when controlling for other countries’ tax rates. Second, no matter which
weighting scheme is applied, we do not see any significant effect of the average
competitor tax rate on tax revenue in a given country. Quantitatively, the coef-
ficients on TAXc,t and TAX2c,t are very close to those in the first specification.
Together with the fact that there is no significant relation between tax revenue
and the competitor tax rates, this suggests a similar shape of the Laffer-Curves.31
30To be precise, however, results differ quantitatively compared to Steinmüller et al. (2019)
because (i) we drop outliers from the sample and (ii) we use a more comprehensive sample (134
compared to 112 countries). Nevertheless, the qualitative insights are the same.
31Note that, apart from these two insights which are crucial to our research question, the
results for all specifications in Table 3.4.1 show that GROWTHc,t is positively related to tax
revenue, as expected. Moreover, controlling for GROWTHc,t implies that our estimates of the
Laffer-Curve already take into account potential growth effects induced by a tax cut.
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An immediate impression from this result is that the domestic tax policy
trade-off reflected by the link between (own) statutory tax rate and tax revenue
is virtually not affected by the competitive pressure from other countries. In
order to elaborate on this finding, we provide further illustrations of our results
in the following. In Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we depict the predicted Laffer-Curves
for the estimates in column 1 (domestic determinants only) and 2 (controlling for
geographical distance-weighted competitor tax rates), respectively.
Figure 3.4.1: Laffer-Curve (Table 1, column 1), domestic determinants only
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Notes: The solid line depicts the predicted revenue curve, the dashed
lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals (CI) of our estimates.
Figure 3.4.2: Laffer-Curve (Table 1, column 2), including foreign tax rates
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One can see that the shape as well as the position of the predicted revenue
curves are indeed very similar.32 The estimated revenue-maximizing statutory
corporate tax rates are 30.94% and 31.03%, respectively, the corresponding pre-
dicted maximum corporate tax revenues are 3.23% and 3.24% of GDP.
One finding of Steinmüller et al. (2019) is that the tax rates actually observed
are, on average, considerably lower than the revenue-maximizing rates. This is
consistent with the extensive tax competition literature and the idea that com-
petition forces imply lower statutory tax rates, which was a central motivation
to explicitly control for other countries’ tax rates in the empirical approach of
the study at hand. However, the Laffer-Curve in Figure 3.4.2 shows that tak-
ing into account the competitive pressure of other countries’ tax-setting behavior
still leads to a revenue-maximizing rate (31%) which is significantly higher than
the global average statutory tax rate over the whole time period in our sample
(25.8%). While cross-country tax competition may still be a driving force behind
this pattern, our results indicate that these comparatively low rates are far from
optimal in the sense of the Laffer-Curve. The estimates in Table 3.4.1 and the
corresponding Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 suggest that taking into account the effects
of competing countries’ tax rates on the rate-revenue relationship reflected by the
Laffer-Curve neither affects the revenue-maximizing tax rate nor the correspond-
ing tax revenue. In other words, even if strategic interaction between countries
drives down the equilibrium statutory tax rate, our predicted Laffer-Curves con-
trolling for this competitive pressure show that tax revenue is not maximized at
such a low rate. We discuss this result at length in Section 3.5, where we provide
several explanatory approaches for our findings and underpin the plausibility of
the latter with additional descriptive statistics.
3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We assess the robustness of our empirical results against several alternative spec-
ifications outlined in the following. First, we employ different weighting schemes
to calculate the weighted averages of competitor countries’ statutory tax rates.
32We include 95% confidence bands in the figures. The predicted revenue curves are precisely
estimated, as statutory tax rates in the majority of countries are in a range where the confidence
bands are rather narrow.
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More specifically, we use alternative weighting metrics which can be classified
in the context of the broad distinction between some form of geographical prox-
imity on the one hand, and similarity with respect to economic development
on the other hand. As to the first category, we include a measure where the
inverse geographical distance between countries determines the weight assigned
to a specific (foreign) country’s tax rate (Table 3.4.2, column 1). Compared to
using the squared inverse distance as above, naturally, this implies that the as-
signed weights do not decline as strongly with distance. Moreover, additionally
incorporating size and market potential of foreign countries, we calculate (log)
population-adjusted squared distance weights and (log) GDP-adjusted squared
distance weights (Table 3.4.2, columns 2 and 3, respectively).33 In any case, it is
advisable to test whether our main results are robust against modifications with
respect to the exact measure of geographical distance employed.34
Furthermore, in Table 3.4.3, we include four alternative foreign tax measures,
where, along two criteria, we narrow the set of foreign countries a given country
(potentially) competes with. First, we only take into account the statutory tax
rates of countries in the same world region, weighted by (i) the inverse squared
geographical distance and (ii) the inverse ‘distance’ of two countries with respect
to GDP per capita (Table 3.4.3, columns 1 and 2, respectively).35 Second, dis-
tinguishing between countries according to economic development, we calculate
average foreign tax rates based on the notion that OECD countries only compete
with other OECD countries, and vice versa for non-OECD countries.36 Again,
and in addition to this binary distinction, we weight the tax rates within the two
33Taking into account country size and market potential in the weights is a common way to
capture the idea that ‘large’ countries are usually assumed to be stronger and more important
competitors than smaller ones (see, e.g., Overesch and Rincke, 2011; Egger and Raff, 2015).
34Note that we do not implement a weighting scheme based on the so-called contiguity
criterion of a common border. This is a frequently used approach in the literature on spatial
competition on a more local level (see, e.g., Case et al., 1993; Egger et al., 2005). At the
country level, however, this is rather inappropriate, due to the fact that a non-negligible share
of the countries in our sample are islands or only have maritime borders with closely connected
economies (e.g., Sweden and Denmark).
35Following the classification scheme in the World Bank’s WDI data, we distinguish between
7 regions: North America, Latin America and Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, Middle
East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific.
36Note that the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries is almost congruent
with the World Bank’s former categories of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, which it
stopped using in 2016.
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groups by (i) the inverse squared geographical distance and (ii) the inverse ‘dis-
tance’ of two countries with respect to GDP per capita (Table 3.4.3, columns 3
and 4, respectively). Tables 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 present the results of the estimations
using the average foreign tax rates based on these alternative weighting matrices.
Table 3.4.2: Laffer-Curve estimates: alternative weighting schemes (1)
(1) (2) (3)
Weights based on... inverse inverse squared inverse squared
geographical distance population-adjusted GDP-adjusted
geographical distance geographical distance
TAXc,t 10.57∗∗∗ 10.44∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗∗
(3.223) (3.218) (3.216)
TAX2c,t -16.96∗∗∗ -16.79∗∗∗ -16.59∗∗∗
(5.835) (5.831) (5.831)
GROWTHc,t 0.0203∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ 0.0194∗∗
(0.00872) (0.00869) (0.0087)
FTAXWc,t -7.512 -2.277 -0.0696
(6.138) (2.158) (1.852)
Constant 3.190∗ 1.802∗∗ 1.221∗
(1.689) (0.733) (0.679)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,234 1,234 1,234
Adj. R-squared 0.8370 0.8369 0.8367
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAX REV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Similar to Table 3.4.1, we see that throughout all specifications in Tables 3.4.2
and 3.4.3, the weighted-average competitor countries’ tax rate does not have a
significant effect on corporate tax revenue. Overall, the estimates clearly show
that the main results presented in Table 3.4.1 are robust against these alternative
weighting schemes. Thus, we can safely argue that the empirical findings are not
specific to the metrics employed in this regard.
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Table 3.4.3: Laffer-Curve estimates: alternative weighting schemes (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weights based on... same world region, same world region, OECD/non-OECD, OECD/non-OECD,
inverse squared inverse inverse squared inverse
geographical distance GDPPC distance geographical distance GDPPC distance
TAXc,t 10.57∗∗∗ 10.21∗∗∗ 10.32∗∗∗ 10.19∗∗∗
(3.219) (3.217) (3.215) (3.228)
TAX2c,t -17.01∗∗∗ -16.52∗∗∗ -16.61∗∗∗ -16.46∗∗∗
(5.831) (5.832) (5.829) (5.855)
GROWTHc,t 0.0202∗∗ 0.0193∗∗ 0.0196∗∗ 0.0194∗∗
(0.00870) (0.00870) (0.00869) (0.00869)
FTAXWc,t -2.709 -1.699 0.919 -0.584
(1.812) (2.044) (1.970) (2.408)
Constant 1.897∗∗∗ 0.958 1.661∗∗ 1.376
(0.657) (0.699) (0.721) (0.852)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,234 1,234 1,234 1,234
Adj. R-squared 0.8371 0.8368 0.8368 0.8367
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAX REV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
A further way to assess the sensitivity of the empirical results is to test whether
different outlier treatments, i.e., the removing of the most extreme values of the
dependent variable, alter our findings.37 Tables 3.A.3, 3.A.4, and 3.A.5 in the
Appendix provide results in this regard. The latter show that outliers do not
drive our estimates, which are robust against (i) making use of the full sample of
observations (Table 3.A.3) and (ii) different outlier treatments (Tables 3.A.4 and
3.A.5).
Taken together, the empirical results presented in this section suggest a very
robust pattern concerning the relationship between a country’s corporate tax
revenue and international statutory tax incentives. Our estimates indicate that
tax-avoidance activities give rise to a Laffer-Curve relationship which is insensitive
to the inclusion of other, potentially competing countries’ statutory tax rates
in the estimation equation. We do not observe any significant effect of these
weighted-average competitor tax rates on tax revenue in a given country. This
37Tables 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics of (among others)
the dependent variable, indicating that outliers may potentially affect our estimation results.
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result proves to be very robust against the use of alternative weighting schemes
and outlier treatments. Moreover, comparing these results to a purely domestic
setting as in Steinmüller et al. (2019), the graphical illustrations of our predictions
(Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) show that the corresponding Laffer-Curves have a very
similar position as well as shape and, as a consequence thereof, suggest virtually
identical revenue-maximizing tax rates.
Considering these findings, a preliminary conclusion from a tax-policy per-
spective is that international tax competition forces should not play a defining
role in single countries’ tax-setting behavior. To put it differently, if a country
considers a marginal change in its corporate tax rate, this decision should not
be driven by other countries’ tax-setting behavior, but mainly be based on the
country’s current location on the Laffer-Curve.38 At first sight, this may seem
to be a fairly strong conclusion. This is particularly true in the light of the far-
reaching policy debate centered around international corporate tax competition
and mobile tax bases and the fact that many countries feel pressured to respond
to statutory tax cuts in other countries. Given the empirical results presented in
this section, however, such a tax-setting behavior may lead to adverse outcomes
in terms of tax revenue, even when taking into account positive growth effects
induced by a tax cut.
3.5 Explanatory approaches
How can we explain that, taking into account the competitive pressure exerted
by changes in other countries’ statutory tax rates, the Laffer-optimal, revenue-
maximizing tax rate is still considerably higher than the mean value of the corpo-
rate tax rate in our data? In the following, substantiated by descriptive evidence
and findings in previous contributions, we present some explanations and inter-
pretations of our empirical results with respect to the Laffer-Curve. First and
foremost, we discuss the responsiveness of firms to foreign tax rates and scrutinize
the role and the relative importance of MNEs in this context.
38More precisely, a country is typically located to the left or to the right of the Laffer-Curve’s
maximum point. A country’s specific location hence determines the so-called ‘distance to the
peak’, which provides a quantification of potential revenue gains in case of a move to the peak
(Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011; Strulik and Trimborn, 2012).
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Our empirical results suggest that the majority of firms seems to be rather
insensitive to foreign statutory tax rates, because for a country, even if the own
tax rate remains rather high, the tax base is sufficiently large to generate more
tax revenue as with a lower tax rate. To further explain this finding, it seems
worthwhile to take a closer look at the specific firm characteristics which are
crucial in this context. First, foreign tax rates are irrelevant for purely domestic
firms.39 In this regard, note that domestic firms still account for 72% of global
GDP and 67% of global output (Cadestin et al., 2019).40 While these numbers
may seem surprisingly high, given the on-going, controversial discussions about
the dominating role of MNEs in the global economy, note that this by no means
contradicts the trend towards increasingly globalized economies and the prolifer-
ation of MNEs. The latter is undeniable, as we have seen an unprecedented surge
of MNEs in the last decades. Moreover, also domestic firms are often active on
international markets and participate in global value chains. In the context of the
specific question whether a firm is sensitive to foreign corporate taxes, however,
the high share of purely domestic firms simply indicates that the majority of firms
is, most likely, not responsive at all in this regard.41
Furthermore, as OECD (2017) and Cadestin et al. (2019) highlight, most of
39To be precise, this is only correct if we abstract from (i) ex ante purely domestic firms
that decide to establish a foreign affiliate, possibly for tax-optimization reasons, and (ii) general
equilibrium effects and spillovers resulting from the activities of firms affected by the respective
foreign taxes, which in turn influence purely domestic firms.
40The contribution by Cadestin et al. (2019) draws on the OECD Analytical AMNE database
and distinguishes between three types of firms: domestic non-MNEs, i.e., domestic firms which
do not have any affiliates abroad (accounting for 72% of global GDP and 67% of global output),
domestic MNEs, i.e., MNEs’ headquarters and domestic affiliates (18% of GDP and 21% of
output), and foreign-owned MNE affiliates (10% of GDP and 12% of output). As to the total,
global number of firms, obviously, no precise information exists. The most recent available data
on the number of MNEs date back to 2010, estimating the number of MNE parent corporations
to amount to roughly 103,000, with almost 900,000 affiliates (UNCTAD, 2010).
41Apart from measuring the share of domestic and multinational firms in terms of GDP
and output, it would be of particular interest to know how large the shares of the respective
firm types are when it comes to (aggregate) corporate taxes paid, as these determine the tax
base of a country. Unfortunately, such data are not available to the author, neither from the
OECD AMNE database, nor from firm-level databases like Orbis. The latter generally includes
firm-level information on annual corporate taxes paid. However, aggregating this information
provides misleading results for two reasons. First, firm coverage for a lot of newly-industrialized
and developing countries is generally poor in the Orbis data. Second, in particular for the latter
countries, there is an overrepresentation of larger firms in general, and MNEs in particular.
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these domestic firms are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).42 This has
two main implications: first, thinking about potential dynamics in our context,
most SMEs probably remain purely domestic firms. Setting up foreign affiliates is
associated with internationalization costs (Lu and Beamish, 2001). Thus, going
abroad is much less likely for SMEs, as, in contrast to large MNEs, SMEs often
face more severe financial and managerial constraints (Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt,
2006). Second, SMEs are typically much smaller than MNEs, or, to be precise,
the single entities of an MNE. Recent contributions, such as Egger et al. (2014),
Davies et al. (2018), and Tørsløv et al. (2018), not only find that the median
MNE affiliate tends to be considerably larger, but, in addition, a few very large
MNEs contribute an overproportionally high share to GDP. This implies that if
one considers the sheer number of firms rather than the share in GDP or output,
then purely domestic firms outnumber MNE affiliates even more clearly.
While the irrelevance of foreign tax rates for purely domestic firms is straight-
forward, the case is less clear-cut for MNEs.43 In general, one could think that
MNE affiliates in country A respond to a statutory tax reduction in country B by
relocating investment capital and taxable profits to country B. This seems partic-
ularly straightforward if the respective MNE already has an affiliate in country B.
Nonetheless, it may also be the case that the tax reduction in country B induces
the MNE to set up a new foreign affiliate in this very country. Provided that such
(tax-motivated) relocations of capital are common, MNEs could be considered to
react sensitively to international corporate taxes. A meta-study of empirical con-
tributions in this regard, provided by De Mooij and Ederveen (2006), suggests
a median semi-elasticity of MNEs’ foreign investments with respect to the host
country’s corporate tax rate of -2.1. This means that a one-percentage-point in-
crease in a country’s tax rate is, on average, associated with a 2.1% decrease in
42Given the fact that we employ a very large country sample, we consider both developed,
newly-industrialized, and developing economies. Particularly in the latter, purely domestic
SMEs constitute the vast majority of firms (Lediga et al., 2019).
43In the following, speaking about MNEs and their behavioral responses to tax rates, we
think of any corporate entity which is part of a multinational group, i.e., an MNE’s domestic
and foreign affiliates as well as its headquarters.
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FDI in the respective country.44
However, several reasons give rise to the hypothesis that this view may be too
simplistic. First, other meta-studies suggest substantially different median semi-
elasticities (see, e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011).
Second, the authors of these meta-studies highlight that, in general, the findings
in the papers considered vary a lot, depending on the empirical specification and
the data employed. Hence, the tax responsiveness of MNE investment is expected
to be very heterogeneous, and fundamentally influenced by the specific character-
istics of the respective MNE (Egger et al., 2014). Third, previous contributions
elaborate on the heterogeneity of MNEs’ tax responsiveness in relation to tax
avoidance and profit shifting (Desai et al., 2006; Hong and Smart, 2010; Egger
et al., 2014; Behrendt and Wamser, 2018). In a nutshell, these contributions find
that the corporate tax responsiveness of MNEs is declining in their ability to
shift profits. Hence, the extent to which statutory tax rates matter for MNEs
depends on the degree to which these MNEs are able to avoid taxes. In the limit
case where an MNE is able to fully avoid taxes, its tax burden and, thus, its
tax responsiveness is zero (Egger et al., 2014). Naturally, however, MNEs differ
with respect to their ability to avoid taxes. Moreover, not all affiliates should be
equally able to engage in avoidance activities. As a firm’s ability to avoid corpo-
rate taxes by shifting profits is inherently unobservable, it is difficult to precisely
quantify the share of tax-avoiding MNEs and the tax elasticities of investment for
different types of MNEs. The approach taken by Egger et al. (2014) is, to the best
of our knowledge, the only one being able to identify two latent groups of MNEs:
‘non-avoiders’, for which investment is negatively affected by (host-country) cor-
porate taxes, and ‘avoiders’, for which investment proves to be unresponsive to
44We are perfectly aware that this tax-semi-elasticity is concerned with, specifically, FDI and
host country taxes. What we have in mind (and implicitly consider in our empirical analysis)
is, first of all, the question whether statutory tax rates in country B generally matter for MNE
activity (and ultimately tax revenue) in country A. However, from a more general perspective,
suppose that, in the spirit of De Mooij and Ederveen (2006), MNE affiliate investment is
sensitive to profit taxation in the host country. In this case, it seems plausible to think that
MNEs’ investment decisions are generally distorted by corporate tax rates. Hence, MNE activity
in one country should also be sensitive to other, competing countries’ tax rates as investment
capital may be relocated within the network of MNE affiliates.
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taxes.45 Along this binary distinction, the authors find further notable differences
between MNE affiliates. Non-responsive, tax-avoiding affiliates are, on average,
significantly larger and belong to multinational groups with considerably more
affiliated entities.
While not distinguishing explicitly between two groups within the universe
of MNEs, the empirical results in Desai et al. (2006) and Behrendt and Wamser
(2018) are consistent with Egger et al. (2014): larger, globally more diversified
MNEs tend to be much less tax-responsive. In a similar vein, using firm-level
data on French-based MNEs, Davies et al. (2018) find that a comparatively small
number of very large firms accounts for the vast majority of tax-avoidance activi-
ties. Moreover, taxes are, for the most part, avoided by manipulating intra-MNE
transfer pricing schemes and, by this means, shifting profits to tax haven coun-
tries. The fact that the bulk of MNEs’ tax avoidance does not occur by relocating
economic activity or shifting profits between ‘similar’ – and hence ‘competing’ –
countries indicates that marginal changes in the statutory tax rates of ‘similar’
countries are not important for MNEs, as long as they are able to avoid taxes
anyway.
Taken together, this section has provided some key insights that help us to
interpret our empirical results, in particular when it comes to the underlying
behavioral responses of firms to foreign corporate taxes. We have highlighted a
number of observations which, from an aggregate perspective of a specific country,
rationalize a very limited relevance of other countries’ statutory tax rates for
optimal tax-setting behavior. First, purely domestic firms still account for the
bulk of economic activity within a country, measured by the number of firms as
well as in terms of a country’s economic fundamentals such as GDP and output.
Second, MNEs and their affiliates should be seen as a heterogeneous mass of
firms, which crucially differ with respect to their responsiveness to corporate
taxes. Previous evidence clearly suggests that a sizable fraction of mostly large
and globally diversified MNEs is, to the greatest extent, unresponsive to corporate
45Egger et al. (2014) analyze a sample of German MNEs and their foreign affiliates for the
period of 1999 to 2010, relying on Census-type data from the Microdatabase Direct Investment
(MiDi) provided by the German Central Bank. They find that 11% of the German-owned
foreign affiliates prove to be unresponsive to corporate taxes, however, these affiliates account
for 58% of the stock of foreign fixed assets.
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taxes due to their distinct ability to avoid them.46 All in all, this seems consistent
with the conclusion drawn from our empirical analysis that probably only a minor
fraction of all firms responds to changes in foreign tax rates. Coming back to the
aggregate country perspective taken in our empirical approach, this implies that
the tax base and, as a consequence, the tax revenue a country is able to generate
are, on average, not responsive to foreign tax rates.
3.6 Conclusions
The last decades have witnessed a steady decline in statutory corporate tax rates,
which has mostly been explained by international tax competition and the notion
that taxing mobile tax bases has become more and more difficult. While the
downward trend in statutory corporate tax rates seems to have slowed down in the
last few years, it is expected to strengthen again, with many countries planning
to cut tax rates as a reaction to the recent US tax reform. This development
gives rise to concerns about adverse revenue effects on a larger scale.
Focusing on corporate taxation, this study contributes to a better understand-
ing of the revenue consequences of changes to the international tax system. We
first demonstrate that the amount of (total) tax revenue countries raise from dif-
ferent sources is substantial. Taking into consideration that governments face a
budget constraint, raising sufficient tax revenue is essential, as public expendi-
tures are, to a large extent, financed with tax revenue. Second, we take a closer
look at the link between international statutory tax incentives and tax revenue.
Previous approaches suggest an inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship be-
tween a country’s statutory corporate tax rate and tax revenue, which can be
explained by inefficiencies and distortions induced by the tax system. Using a
comprehensive dataset for 134 countries, we extend this framework to an inter-
46The finding that some (often very large) MNEs seem to be non-responsive to corporate
taxes entails an immediate policy implication in the context of international tax competition
and the current, widespread efforts to prevent profit shifting. Suppose that, as recently recom-
mended by the OECD’s BEPS proposal, countries would successfully implement and enforce
anti-tax-avoidance-rules to prevent profit shifting. This would make the share of formerly
tax-insensitive MNEs tax-sensitive, as the ability to avoid taxes is vastly restricted. As a con-
sequence, this would most likely lead to intensified tax competition between countries over the
highly mobile assets and affiliates of these MNEs, implying a further downward pressure on
statutory corporate tax rates (Egger et al., 2014).
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national context and estimate Laffer-Curves, modeling corporate tax revenue as
a function of the domestic statutory tax rate (and its squared term) and, in ad-
dition, a weighted average of other, competing countries’ statutory tax rates.47
Our empirical results suggest that taking into account other countries’ tax rates
has no significant effect on corporate tax revenue. Moreover, compared to the
results of Steinmüller et al. (2019), we see that, on average, controlling for foreign
tax rates neither affects the revenue-maximizing tax rate predicted by the Laffer-
Curve nor the corresponding maximum tax revenue. This result proves to be
very robust against the use of a wide range of different weighting schemes for the
composite competitor tax rate and alternative outlier treatments. We present a
number of stylized facts, descriptive statistics, and references to previous research
in order to further explain our empirical finding that, from the perspective of a
single country, the relevance of other countries’ tax rates is rather limited. First,
on a global scale, the vast majority of firms are still purely domestic ones. Second,
MNEs differ considerably in terms of their responsiveness to statutory tax incen-
tives. In particular, large and globally active MNEs are mostly able to engage
in comprehensive tax-avoidance activities, implying a low level of sensitivity to
statutory taxes.
From a tax-policy perspective, our empirical results entail that international
tax competition and, as a consequence thereof, concerns about shrinking tax bases
should not play a dominating role in a country’s optimal tax-setting behavior.
However, our results indicate that precisely this might be the case: the global
mean and median tax rates observed in our dataset are considerably lower than
the revenue-maximizing tax rates predicted by our Laffer-Curves. International
tax competition is likely to be the driving force behind this pattern. However,
our estimates show that such strategic tax-setting behavior implies too low tax
rates and adverse tax revenue outcomes, even if we explicitly take into account (i)
the competitive pressure exerted by other countries’ tax setting and (ii) positive
growth effects induced by a tax cut. Instead, if a country considers a marginal
change in its statutory corporate tax rate, this should be mainly related to the
respective country’s current rate-revenue combination and, hence, its location
47As explained above, in our estimations, we moreover control for GDP growth per capita,
country-specific effects, and year effects.
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on the Laffer-Curve. In this regard, given that statutory corporate tax rates
in the bulk of countries already are considerably below the revenue-maximizing
rates predicted by the Laffer-Curve, further tax cuts would most likely imply
additional adverse effects on public revenue.
Finally, let us emphasize that our findings, in particular the one that inter-
national tax competition should not play the defining role in a country’s optimal
tax-setting behavior, refer to the statutory corporate tax rate as a policy instru-
ment. From a broader perspective, however, to fully capture the mechanisms
of and the behavioral responses to tax policy and tax institutions in an interna-
tional context, it is necessary to consider how governments further compete over a
wide range of other policy instruments at their disposal. The latter include both
tax-policy instruments designed to attract firms and investment as well as instru-
ments to restrict the tax-avoidance activities of, in particular, MNEs. Improving
our understanding in this complex matter, however, is left to future research.
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3.A Appendix
Descriptive statistics and variable description
Table 3.A.1: Variables: descriptive statistics and sources
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
TAX REV ENUEc,t 3.2494 2.7549 0.0043 25.507 Corporate income tax revenue (in % of GDP)
of country c in period t; Source: IMF WoRLD database
TAXc,t 0.2583 0.0864 0 0.55 Statutory corporate tax rate of country c in period t
Source: Steinmüller et al. (2019)
GROWTHc,t 2.7008 3.9984 -17.341 18.488 GDP growth per capita of country c in period t;
Source: World Bank, WDI database
FTAXWc,t (sq. geo. dist.) 0.2445 0.0479 0.0445 0.3526 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse squared geographical distance)
FTAXWc,t (GDPPC dist.) 0.2500 0.0427 0.0325 0.3638 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse GDP per capita distance)
FTAXWc,t (growth dist.) 0.2555 0.0398 0.1112 0.3656 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse GDP growth per capita distance)
FTAXWc,t (geo. dist) 0.2437 0.0218 0.1787 0.3068 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse geographical distance)
FTAXWc,t (pop-adj. sq. geo. dist.) 0.2496 0.0481 0.0483 0.3663 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse squared (log) population-adjusted
geographical distance)
FTAXWc,t (GDP-adj. sq. geo. dist.) 0.2469 0.0489 0.0380 0.3635 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse squared (log) GDP-adjusted
geographical distance)
FTAXWc,t (region; sq. geo. dist.) 0.2482 0.0424 0.1352 0.3390 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse squared geographical distance,
countries in same region only)
FTAXWc,t (region; GDPPC dist.) 0.2534 0.0607 0.0429 0.3713 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse GDP per capita distance,
countries in same region only)
FTAXWc,t (OECD; sq. geo. dist.) 0.2463 0.0269 0.1527 0.3253 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse squared geographical distance,
OECD/non-OECD countries only)
FTAXWc,t (OECD; GDPPC dist.) 0.2550 0.0444 0.0234 0.3404 For country c in period t: weighted-average foreign tax
rate (weights based on inverse GDP per capita distance,
OECD/non-OECD countries only)
For all weighted-average foreign tax rates, we use statutory corporate tax rates from Steinmüller et al. (2019) and information from (i) the CEPII
GeoDist database (geographical distance and population size) and (ii) the World Bank’s WDI database (GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth per capita,
regional classification, OECD membership status) to determine the specific weights.
Note that the descriptive statistics in Table 3.A.1 refer to the full sample (1,247
observations for 134 countries). Taking a closer look at the statistics for the de-
pendent variable, TAXREV ENUEc,t, potential concerns about outliers become
evident. Referring to the outlier treatments employed in the sensitivity checks
presented in Tables 3.A.3 to 3.A.5, the following table illustrates how, in partic-
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ular, the mean and the maximum of TAX REV ENUEc,t change if we remove
the most extreme values of TAX REV ENUEc,t.
Table 3.A.2: Descriptive statistics - outliers
Variable Mean SD Min Max
TAX REV ENUEc,t 3.0664 2.0897 0.0043 17.0469 [1 % outliers dropped]
TAXc,t 0.2581 0.0867 0 0.55
TAX REV ENUEc,t 2.9589 1.7810 0.0043 11.1473 [2 % outliers dropped]
TAXc,t 0.2577 0.0869 0 0.55
TAX REV ENUEc,t 2.7708 1.4480 0.0043 7.4953 [5 % outliers dropped]
TAXc,t 0.2570 0.0874 0 0.55
We see that gradually removing the most extreme values of TAXREV ENUEc,t
implies considerably smaller maximum and mean values of TAX REV ENUEc,t,
while not affecting the distribution of TAXc,t to any substantial extent. Ta-
ble 3.A.2 reinforces that it is advisable to test whether outliers may drive our
empirical results. Tables 3.A.3 to 3.A.5, however, show that this is not the case.
Sensitivity checks: outliers
Table 3.A.3: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions): full sample
(1) (2) (3)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth
geographical distance distance distance
TAXc,t 9.860∗∗ 9.992∗∗ 9.666∗∗
(4.726) (4.749) (4.721)
TAX2c,t -17.51∗∗ -17.74∗∗ -17.19∗∗
(8.565) (8.595) (8.564)
GROWTHc,t 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
FTAXWc,t -2.367 2.227 1.326
(2.982) (3.585) (3.381)
Constant 1.969∗ 0.691 0.983
(1.027) (1.275) (1.178)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247
Adj. R-squared 0.7977 0.7976 0.7976
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAX REV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.A.4: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions): 2% outlier treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth
geographical distance distance distance
TAXc,t 10.30∗∗∗ 9.820∗∗∗ 10.08∗∗∗
(2.944) (2.961) (2.943)
TAX2c,t -17.04∗∗∗ -16.38∗∗∗ -16.68∗∗∗
(5.335) (5.357) (5.338)
GROWTHc,t 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FTAXWc,t -2.792 -1.824 1.395
(1.873) (2.243) (2.116)
Constant 1.858∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗ 0.742
(0.643) (0.797) (0.737)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,222 1,222 1,222
Adj. R-squared 0.8119 0.8116 0.8116
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAX REV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3.A.5: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions): 5% outlier treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth
geographical distance distance distance
TAXc,t 9.106∗∗∗ 8.611∗∗∗ 8.910∗∗∗
(2.441) (2.453) (2.439)
TAX2c,t -12.97∗∗∗ -12.27∗∗∗ -12.57∗∗∗
(4.433) (4.449) (4.434)
GROWTHc,t 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
FTAXWc,t -2.263 -2.228 2.167
(1.550) (1.855) (1.754)
Constant 1.530∗∗∗ 1.613∗∗ 0.330
(0.534) (0.659) (0.610)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,184 1,184 1,184
Adj. R-squared 0.8059 0.8058 0.8058
The dependent variable in all specifications is TAX REV ENUEc,t. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Sensitivity checks: effective tax rates
Throughout our analysis in this paper, we focus on the relationship between
statutory corporate tax rate (STR) and tax revenue. In the following, we present
additional results that prove the robustness of our main findings to the use of
forward-looking effective average and marginal tax rates (EATR and EMTR,
respectively), taken from Steinmüller et al. (2019).
While the STR is the simplest indicator for the tax payments to be expected,
it neglects the rules determining the tax base. In contrast, effective tax rates
(ETRs) are considerably more complex measures which, in addition to the statu-
tory tax rates, take into account the various rules related to the determination
of a firm’s tax base, such as specific depreciation allowances for different asset
types. More precisely, the EATR measures the tax burden on an average in-
vestment and constitutes the most accurate indicator in the context of discrete,
lumpy investment decisions. In contrast, the EMTR reflects the tax burden on
marginal investment projects. In all cases where the way the tax base is deter-
mined is not relevant for firms (as, for example, in the context of paper-profit
shifting where no real investment is involved), the STR is the appropriate mea-
sure (Overesch and Wamser, 2009). Tables 3.A.6 and 3.A.7 present the estimation
results using EATRs and EMTRs, respectively. From the perspective of country
c, EATRc,t and EMTRc,t are the (own) forward-looking effective corporate tax
rates, and FEATRWc,t and FEMTRWc,t are the weighted (indicated by superscript
W ) averages of the effective tax rates of foreign, potential competitor countries.
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Table 3.A.6: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions): robustness (EATRs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth inverse squared
geographical distance distance distance population-adjusted
geographical distance
EATRc,t 11.60∗∗∗ 11.91∗∗∗ 11.47∗∗∗ 11.40∗∗∗ 11.49∗∗∗
(3.625) (3.624) (3.624) (3.637) (3.623)
EATR2c,t -22.33∗∗∗ -22.57∗∗∗ -22.13∗∗∗ -22.15∗∗∗ -22.01∗∗∗
(7.651) (7.642) (7.648) (7.658) (7.650)
GROWTHc,t 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗
(0.00969) (0.00969) (0.00969) (0.00970) (0.00970)
FEATRWc,t -4.896∗ -5.550 -2.476 6.246
(2.673) (3.963) (3.558) (4.343)
Constant 1.351∗∗∗ 2.389∗∗∗ 2.628∗∗∗ 1.980∗ -0.476
(0.451) (0.723) (1.017) (1.009) (1.347)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034
Adj. R-squared 0.8440 0.8444 0.8442 0.8439 0.8442
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. In all
specifications, we omit the observations with the 1 % largest values of the dependent variable (TAX REV ENUEc,t).
Table 3.A.7: Laffer-Curve estimates (OLS regressions): robustness (EMTRs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weights based on... inverse squared inverse GDPPC inverse GDP growth inverse squared
geographical distance distance distance population-adjusted
geographical distance
EMTRc,t 13.17∗∗∗ 13.73∗∗∗ 13.12∗∗∗ 13.28∗∗∗ 12.83∗∗∗
(4.915) (4.914) (4.919) (4.942) (4.916)
EMTR2c,t -39.15∗∗∗ -40.09∗∗∗ -39.02∗∗∗ -39.33∗∗∗ -37.53∗∗
(14.91) (14.89) (14.92) (14.94) (14.93)
GROWTHc,t 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗
(0.00971) (0.00970) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00971)
FEMTRWc,t -8.220∗∗ -2.345 1.022 8.832
(3.943) (5.410) (4.934) (5.532)
Constant 1.741∗∗∗ 2.825∗∗∗ 2.077∗∗ 1.577∗ 0.117
(0.409) (0.661) (0.877) (0.892) (1.096)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034
Adj. R-squared 0.8435 0.8440 0.8433 0.8433 0.8437
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. In all
specifications, we omit the observations with the 1 % largest values of the dependent variable (TAX REV ENUEc,t).
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We see that our results are, by and large, robust against using effective tax
measures. First, the results suggest an inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship
between the (domestic) effective corporate tax rate and tax revenue. Second,
when it comes to the impact of foreign ETRs, it is merely in the case of a weighting
scheme based on the inverse squared geographical distance (column 2 in Tables
3.A.6 and 3.A.7, respectively) that we see a (weakly) significant impact of the
average foreign ETRs on domestic tax revenue, which, surprisingly, is negative.
To further assess the impact of geographical distance-weighted foreign ETRs, we
also include specifications using (log) population-adjusted geographical-distance
weights (column 5 in Tables 3.A.6 and 3.A.7, respectively). Doing so reflects the
notion that taking into account country size and market potential in addition
to the sheer geographical distance may measure competition forces better in the
context of real investment decisions at the extensive and intensive margin. The
results of these estimations, on the contrary, indicate that there is no significant
effect of weighted-average foreign ETRs on corporate tax revenue. All in all,
this suggests that our finding that, on average, foreign corporate tax rates do
not affect domestic tax revenue also holds when we consider effective rather than
statutory tax measures.
In the main body of the paper, we use statutory tax rates for several reasons.
First, the classical Laffer-Curve framework in its origins reflects the relationship
between statutory tax rates and revenue. Second, taking a distinct policy perspec-
tive, one can argue that changes in the statutory tax rate are the most prominent
and immediate tax policy measure, attracting a lot of public attention. Related
to this, statutory tax rates might often be the best information available to firms
when it comes to their expected tax payments, particularly in an international
context and compared to the more complex nature of ETRs, which comprise
numerous details of tax legislation (Overesch and Wamser, 2009).48 Third, in-
formation on STRs is available for a considerably larger set of countries. In the
48In addition, ETRs are inherently firm-specific in the strict sense, as they depend not only
on statutory tax rates and depreciation rules, but also on firm-specific asset composition and
modes of financing (Steinmüller et al., 2019). When it comes to analyzing firms’ behavioral
incentives at the micro level, this is of particular relevance, as Egger et al. (2009) note that
especially for EMTRs, firm-specific effects are relatively important. Effective tax measures at
the country level, which are the only ones we can use in our aggregate analysis, are hence less
accurate in capturing the incentive effects involved.
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first place, this directly affects the number of countries in our sample (108 com-
pared to 134). In the second place, this also has an impact on the weights we
use to calculate the weighted-average foreign tax rates. More precisely, the set
of countries to consider competitors in our sample reduces. This is particularly
salient for countries in less-developed world regions, for which we do not always
have reliable information on the rules and legislations with respect to depreciation
allowances.
Chapter 4
Understanding the Tax-Setting
Behavior of Developing
Countries1
ABSTRACT
This paper models the tax-setting behavior of a government, whose objective it is to
raise revenue from taxing firm profits. Firms, however, may attempt to bribe the tax
agent in charge with the aim of avoiding the profit tax. The extent to which such
behavior is detected and punished by the government depends on a number of country
characteristics. These characteristics affect optimal tax policy, suggesting that a coun-
try belongs to one of three possible country types and either (i) ignores, (ii) combats, or
(iii) tolerates tax evasion. Countries which are characterized by widespread corruption,
weak fiscal institutions, and high location-specific rents (e.g., due to natural resource
abundance) are likely to set relatively high tax rates and to tolerate tax evasion. For
these countries, the incentive to improve their tax system tends to be rather low and
they are at risk of getting stuck in a regime of inefficient tax collection, widespread eva-
sion, and bureaucratic corruption. We find robust evidence for this pattern in the data,
and show that a big push – substantial and persistent improvements – towards stricter
tax enforcement and more efficient revenue collection can help developing countries to
escape this regime, raise sufficient tax revenue, and foster economic growth.
1This paper is joint work with Thomas Letsche and Georg Wamser.
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4.1 Introduction
Functioning institutions as well as an efficient organization of the government are
important preconditions for growth and development. Particularly the activities
of the public sector require an efficient system of collecting taxes. This, however,
appears to be one of the major problems of poorer countries. Using data from
Steinmüller et al. (2019), the 25% poorest countries measured in terms of GDP
per capita raise on average about 2.38% of GDP in corporate income tax revenue,
whereas corporate income tax revenue amounts to about 3.68% of GDP, on aver-
age, in the 25% richest countries; the 10% richest countries even raise more than
4% revenue from taxing business profits. The fact that the average statutory tax
rate is about 6 percentage points higher in the 10% poorest countries (an average
tax of 32% compares to an average tax of 26%) may be interpreted in two ways.
First, countries have implemented inefficiently high tax rates that lead to sub-
stantial tax-avoidance activity. In other words, these countries might be on the
wrong side of the Laffer-Curve, which raises the question of why governments of
these countries do not cut taxes.1 Second, institutions in these countries do not
work, irrespective of the tax level, so that significant amounts of tax revenue are
lost through different forms of tax evasion or informal market activity.2
It is the goal of this paper to shed light on the corporate tax policy of countries
operating under very different conditions with respect to a variety of aspects such
as the level of corruption, the quality of fiscal institutions and tax enforcement or
location-specific rents (the latter may be high in resource-abundant countries).
We particularly aim at understanding (i) why some (often it seems poor) coun-
tries set comparatively high corporate tax rates and do not cut taxes to reduce
inefficiencies and raise more tax revenue; (ii) why countries do not take action
and fix institutions to facilitate the collection of taxes; (iii) how a substantial and
permanent improvement of tax revenue collection may be achieved.
1The concept of the Laffer-Curve implies the notion of an inverse-U-shaped relationship
between statutory taxes and tax revenue. Thus, there exists a tax rate between 0% and 100%
which maximizes tax revenue.
2However, this argument suggests that tax revenue is lower at all potential tax levels
(a downward-shift of the Laffer-Curve). As highlighted by Abbas and Klemm (2013) and
Abramovsky et al. (2014), generous special tax regimes and incentives may also play an impor-
tant role in this regard.
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As a possible explanation for this pattern, we first propose a theory predicting
that countries operate in one of three “tax-setting regimes”. Tax-setting behavior
is endogenously determined and crucially depends on the respective regime: under
the first one, countries can ignore tax evasion; countries in the second regime will
implement measures against tax evasion; countries operating in the third regime
will tolerate tax evasion. To which of these regimes a country is assigned to
specifically depends on the level of corruption, the quality of fiscal institutions,
and on country-specific rents (e.g., associated with natural resource abundance).
In our theory model, we assume a government whose objective it is to maxi-
mize revenue from taxing firm profits. Firms, however, have an incentive to avoid
taxation by the government. For this purpose, two strategies are at their dis-
posal: they can either refrain from investing in the country’s (formal) economy
entirely, or evade taxes by paying a bribe to the tax agent in charge.3 Whether
it is worthwhile for firms to opt for one of these activities depends on their tax
burden. Thus, the government is limited in its tax setting by firms’ implicit
threats to evade taxes or to leave the formal economy, and the extent to which
the government is able, and willing, to prevent firms from doing so depends on
a number of country characteristics. More precisely, the government’s ability to
detect and punish tax evasion hinges on the corruption level and the quality of
fiscal institutions, while country-specific rents determine firms’ gross profits and,
as a consequence, their incentives to enter the economy and to evade taxes. Ac-
cordingly, these country characteristics affect optimal tax policy, suggesting that
a country belongs to one of three possible country types and either (i) ignores, (ii)
combats, or (iii) tolerates tax evasion. We demonstrate that countries character-
ized by widespread bureaucratic corruption, weak institutions, and high resource
rents are very likely to be in the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime. In the latter
regime, countries will set relatively high tax rates, thus inducing firms to evade
3Several studies suggest that such bribes are relatively common in many countries, especially
in less developed ones. In the countries included in the World Enterprise Survey, for example,
18% of the surveyed firms have experienced at least one bribe payment request, and 13.3%
expect to make informal payments in meetings with tax officials. Conducting a field experiment
in Pakistan, Khan et al. (2015) demonstrate that tax collector compensation crucially affects the
scope of tax evasion and the level of bribe payments, and Alm et al. (2016) identify corruption
of tax officials as a significant determinant of tax evasion behavior of firms. Anecdotal evidence
on the topic is provided by Besley and McLaren (1993), as well as Cheung et al. (2012).
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taxes, as fines from convicted evaders contribute to total tax revenue.
Our theory further suggests that the relationship between revenue collection
and tax enforcement is non-monotonic. In particular, small improvements on tax
enforcement usually do not translate into higher revenue for countries operating
under the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime. Therefore, these (often resource-rich,
developing) countries lack the incentives to improve their current tax system and
are stuck in a regime of inefficient tax collection, widespread evasion, and far-
reaching corruption. It is only through a big push – that is, substantial and
persistent improvements of institutions – towards stricter tax enforcement that
such countries may escape the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime.
We then present an empirical assessment of our theoretical findings, using a
large dataset on 128 countries and the time period from 2005 to 2014. We find
evidence for an empirical pattern which reinforces our theoretical predictions and
their policy implications: if countries want to increase tax revenue, they should
aim for a stricter enforcement of tax law. In this regard, our empirical results con-
firm that the relationship between tax revenue and more rigorous tax enforcement
is non-monotonic. In fact, and in line with the theoretical findings, our results
show that it is precisely through a big push towards stricter tax enforcement that
countries benefit substantially in terms of increased tax revenue. We find that,
for the greater part, the countries putting in considerable and persistent efforts
in improving tax collection are newly-industrialized countries, which is evidence
for the notion that favorable economic development often goes hand in hand with
improvements in tax enforcement. This finding is consistent with our theoretical
model: induced by a big push in terms of tax enforcement and revenue collection,
these countries seem to have succeeded in switching the tax-setting regime and
eventually increased their capability to generate tax revenue. By contrast, we
do not find any countries with very low levels of development among the ones
experiencing a big push towards stricter tax enforcement. This is in line with
our theoretical finding that the least developed countries are likely to be the ones
which lack the incentive to implement changes to tax policy and tax enforcement.
As a consequence, the least developed countries may be at risk of never being
able to escape the regime of inefficient revenue collection and widespread evasion.
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Only if institutions are fixed in a big push, these countries will be able to raise
significantly more tax revenue.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. In line with previous contri-
butions on the topic, we highlight the differences between developed and devel-
oping countries with respect to optimal tax policy.4 There are several obstacles,
like, e.g., weak institutions, bureaucratic corruption, and lacking expertise of tax
agents, that may hinder revenue collection and lead to widespread tax evasion and
the persistence of substantial informal sectors, especially in less developed coun-
tries. For instance, La Porta and Shleifer (2014) find that economic development
is associated with a decline of the informal sector, which should make it easier
to raise tax revenue. Exploiting a large formalization program in Brazil, Rachter
et al. (2018) demonstrate that lowering taxes reduces firm informality, yet only at
the cost of lower net tax revenue. Gokalp et al. (2017) find that competition from
the informal sector may induce formal firms to evade taxes, especially if institu-
tions and regulations are inefficient and burdensome. Similarly, Schneider and
Torgler (2007) identify governance and institutional quality as well as tax morale
as limiting factors of informal activity, and Dreher et al. (2009) provide evidence
that institutional quality reduces both the size of the shadow economy and the
corruption level. Bird et al. (2008) suggest that tax revenue could be significantly
higher if corruption was reduced and ‘voice and accountability’ were improved.
Furthermore, several studies analyze governments’ optimal tax policy in a setting
where tax collection and enforcement are imperfect, which should be particularly
true in less developed countries. For instance, Best et al. (2015) show that charg-
ing taxes on turnover, rather than profits, may reduce tax evasion by firms, which
explains why many developing countries rely on such a production inefficient tax
policy.5 Dharmapala et al. (2011) demonstrate how administrative costs of tax
collection can justify the exemption of firms from taxation if their output level is
below a certain threshold, although such a policy leads to tax-avoidance behavior
by firms and may induce a “missing middle”. The latter suggests that only small
4General analyses of (optimal) tax policies for developing countries are provided by Besley
and Persson (2014) and Tanzi and Zee (2000), while Abbas and Klemm (2013) and Abramovsky
et al. (2014) discuss corporate taxation in this context.
5Production inefficiencies arise in this case as a turnover tax puts a wedge between the
social and private returns to output.
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tax-exempted and large firms exist, a phenomenon commonly observed in devel-
oping countries. Carrillo et al. (2017) stress the importance of tax authorities’
enforcement capacity for revenue collection, by highlighting the limited influence
of third-party reporting on tax compliance in developing countries. Finally, Gor-
don and Li (2009) set up a model where firms are able to evade taxes if they
conduct all business in cash and avoid using the financial sector. Such a strategy
seems to be more applicable in developing countries, as the value of financial in-
termediation tends to be smaller there. Accordingly, the threat of corporate tax
evasion has a larger impact on developing countries’ optimal tax policy, compared
to more developed ones.
How well a country can cope with the aforementioned problems depends on
the effectiveness of its tax system, or, in a broader sense, on its fiscal capacity.
Following Besley and Persson (2013), the concept of fiscal capacity refers to a
government’s capability to generate tax revenue. The higher a country’s fiscal
capacity, the more tax revenue the country can potentially generate. Accord-
ingly, differing tax policies of industrialized and developing countries may well
be justified, as they are likely to result from the lower fiscal capacity of the lat-
ter type of countries. In order to increase its fiscal capacity, a country has to
make investments targeted to improve, e.g., the structure of the tax system, the
quality of institutions, the enforcement power of tax authorities, and the exper-
tise of tax agents. To measure fiscal capacity, previous contributions have used
various indicators of political institutions to proxy for fiscal capacity and tax
enforcement. This should reflect that higher levels of political stability and co-
hesion as well as more inclusive political institutions are strongly correlated with
a country’s fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009; Besley et al., 2013). On
a more specific level and with a distinct focus on tax enforcement, Besley et al.
(2013) analyze investments in administrative structures that support tax revenue
collection. Historically, these investments are mainly related to the implementa-
tion and, henceforth, the increasing enforcement of different types of taxes. In
recent years, more and more countries have concluded Double Taxation Treaties
(DTTs), which are mostly based on the OECD Model Tax Convention. The lat-
ter points out two main objectives of DTTs. While the first one is concerned
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with alleviating double taxation of foreign-earned income, the second major ob-
jective behind DTTs is to restrict tax avoidance and tax evasion (Blonigen and
Davies, 2004; Egger et al., 2006). Blonigen and Davies (2004) argue that DTTs
can reduce both tax evasion and administration costs related to tax enforcement
and revenue collection. To the extent that this is the case, the number of DTTs
concluded by a country may serve as a valid proxy for the strictness of a country’s
tax law enforcement. In the particular context of developing countries, Brumby
and Keen (2016) as well as Hofmann and Riedel (2018) state that it is question-
able whether less developed countries benefit from DTTs. On the one hand, these
concerns are related to compliance costs for firms and uncertainty on the part
of taxpayers. On the other hand, high administration costs associated with the
negotiation and enforcement of DTTs may also harm developing countries or, at
least, outweigh the positive revenue effects. The empirical part of this paper will
use the number of DTTs as a proxy for a country’s effort (strictness) in tax-law
enforcement.
Concerning the interplay of improvements on tax enforcement and other di-
mensions of institutional progress, Besley and Persson (2013, 2014) argue that
an adjustment of the tax system should be accompanied by, and be part of, a
broader economic development. This reasoning is in line with Acemoglu et al.
(2005), who reason that institutions are a fundamental cause of economic growth.
Similarly, Mehlum et al. (2006) show that countries suffer from natural resources
in terms of lower growth rates if institutions are weak and bureaucratic corrup-
tion is widespread. By contrast, resource-rich countries with good institutions
experience higher growth rates than countries with less resources.6 Note, though,
that natural resources (implying high location-specific rents) by themselves con-
stitute a main determinant of countries’ tax policy and investment in fiscal ca-
pacity. Besley and Persson (2013) and Jensen (2011) argue that natural resource
abundance reduces a country’s non-resource tax effort and, as a consequence, its
investment in fiscal capacity. Jensen (2011) estimates that a 1% increase in the
6The negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic performance
observed for many countries is referred to as ‘resource curse’ in the literature (cf. Sachs and
Warner, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006, among others). In line with Mehlum et al. (2006), several
studies (e.g., Kolstad and Søreide, 2009; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; van der Ploeg, 2011)
identify corruption and weak institutions as driving forces behind this pattern.
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ratio of resource revenue to total revenue is associated with a 1.4% decrease in
fiscal capacity, as measured by non-resource tax effort. This notion is supported
by Crivelli and Gupta (2014), who estimate that each additional percentage point
of GDP in resource revenue is associated with a reduction of about 0.3 percentage
points of GDP in domestic non-resource revenue.
As these studies highlight the impact of corruption, institutional quality, and
natural resource abundance on the (optimal) tax policy of countries, they strongly
motivate the approach we take in the following. We add to the existing literature
by (i) providing a rich theory that allows us to establish three tax-setting regimes
in which countries may operate. A country’s tax policy, in particular the way
how to deal with bureaucratic corruption and tax evasion, crucially depends on
the respective regime; (ii) illustrating that the corporate tax-setting behavior of
less developed countries is in line with countries maximizing expected revenue, al-
though it may differ fundamentally from the tax-setting behavior of industrialized
countries; (iii) explaining why (mainly resource-rich, developing) countries often
lack the incentive to improve their inefficient tax system; (iv) demonstrating (the-
oretically and empirically) that, for these countries, a big push towards stricter
tax enforcement may be the only way to overcome the problems of widespread
corruption and tax evasion, which proves to be an indispensable step in poor
countries’ economic development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we propose
a theory of optimal tax policy for different country types. Thereafter, Section
4.3 analyzes the relationship between tax enforcement, revenue collection, and
country development. Section 4.4 provides some basic empirical evidence strongly
supporting our theoretical findings, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical model
Let us consider a country hosting a continuum of identical, risk-neutral firms of
mass one. Each firm can initiate an investment project generating payoff Π ≥ 0
if successful (with probability ps). In case of failure (with probability 1 − ps),
the payoff is zero. Thus, a firm’s expected gross profit when realizing the project
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is E[Π] = psΠ. Alternatively, firms can settle for the exogenously given outside
option πo ≥ 0. We assume that πo cannot be taxed by the country.7 The
probability of success ps as well as the respective profit levels are assumed to be
common knowledge. By contrast, the outcome of the investment project (i.e.,
whether the firm is successful or not) is private information to the firm and the
respective tax agent in charge, while it remains unknown to the government of
the country. Profits that arise from the investment project are taxed at rate t.
However, a firm can try to evade the tax by paying a bribe B to the assigned tax
agent. The latter reports a failure of the firm’s investment, and hence profits of
zero, to the government if he accepts the bribe. Thus, a firm does not have to pay
taxes at all if the bribe payment B is accepted by the tax agent (with probability
1− s) and not detected by the government afterwards (with probability 1−p). If
the bribe attempt is rejected by the agent (with probability s) or detected by the
government (with probability p), the tax burden of the firm increases by factor
λ > 1, instead of being reduced.8
The structure of the game, which we depict in more detail in Figure 4.2.1,
is as follows. In the first stage, the government decides about the corporate tax
rate t. Afterwards, firms make their choices about investment projects. The
gross profits of investing firms are realized in the third stage. Subsequently, firms
attempt bribery or they behave tax-compliant. After that, tax agents account
for a potential bribe offer and report firm profits to the government. Finally, tax
revenue (government) as well as (net) payoffs (agents and firms) are realized. The
model is solved via backward induction.
7We can think of πo as a firm’s net profit after relocation to a neighboring country, for
example. The outside option πo may also represent a firm’s payoff when operating in the
informal sector.
8While our study focuses on tax evasion, it should be noted that both legal tax avoidance
and illegal evasion pose serious problems to revenue collection in developing countries, as shown
by Cobham (2005). Similar to our model, several papers (Gauthier and Goyette, 2014, 2016;
Sanyal et al., 2000, among others) analyze a government’s optimal behavior when it has to deal
with corrupt tax agents that may allow firms or individuals to cheat on their tax payments in
exchange for bribes. While these models differ with respect to the government’s main policy
instrument, which may be the optimal public sector wage scheme (Besley and McLaren, 1993),
degree of monitoring activity (Gauthier and Goyette, 2016), auditing (Sanyal et al., 2000), or
tax rate (the present paper), they all share the common finding that it may be optimal for a
government to tolerate tax evasion, at least to some extent. Hindriks et al. (1999) examine
optimal private income taxation in the presence of corrupt inspectors and evasion. A more
general analysis of the interaction between governmental policy and bureaucratic corruption is
provided by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).
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Figure 4.2.1: Game structure
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4.2.1 Tax agents
In the last stage before outcomes are realized, tax agents, who are randomly
assigned to firms, decide on whether or not to accept a bribe. We assume two
types of risk-neutral agents. The first type is susceptible to bribery, whereas
the second type is not. Accordingly, we call agents of the first type pliable and
agents of the second type steadfast. An agent’s type is his private information.
Firms and the government only know that a fraction s of all agents is steadfast.
Bribery is detected afterwards with probability p, in which case the agent loses
his job and the associated wage payment w, but nevertheless gets the bribe B.9
For simplicity, we set the opportunity wage of the agents to zero. Furthermore,
corrupt behavior is associated with personal cost m > 0 for a tax agent.10 This
cost is assumed to be the same for all pliable agents who accept the bribe if
B + (1− p)w −m ≥ w ⇔ B ≥ B∗ = pw +m.11 (4.2.1)
9The results of the model are qualitatively the same if bribe payments accrue to the gov-
ernment and become tax revenue in case of detection.
10We may interpret m as moral concerns or remorse associated with corrupt behavior. As a
consequence, we assume m to arise even in case of non-detection. Note, however, that in some
contributions (like, e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1999), corrupt agents face personal cost only in case
of detection. Adopting this premise does not alter the qualitative results.
11For convenience, we assume that agents accept the bribe in case of indifference, while firms
prefer honest behavior over evasion, as well as initiating the project over their outside option in
case of indifference. Moreover, we suppose that no (further) bargaining between agent and firm
takes place. Cheung et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that supports this notion. Their
findings suggest that lower-level government officials are far less able to expropriate bribery-
related rents from firms, as opposed to high-ranked officials. In line with inequality (4.2.1),
Khan et al. (2015) show that the scope of tax evasion and the level of bribe payments crucially
depend on tax collector pay. However, as demonstrated by Fjeldstad (2003), higher public
wages may simply improve the bargaining power of corrupt agents and lead to higher bribes
instead of lower corruption if control mechanisms and sanctions are weak.
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Thus, bribe payments are accepted if the net payoff exceeds opportunity cost w.
B∗ defines the lowest bribe offer that is accepted by a pliable agent. The existence
of steadfast agents may represent the fact that the personal cost m is infinitely
high for a fraction s of all agents. For these agents, inequality (4.2.1) is never
satisfied. We assume p, w, m, and, consequently B∗, to be common knowledge.
4.2.2 Firms
The behavior of firms is determined in the second, third, and fourth stage of
the game.12 In the fourth stage, firms decide whether to attempt bribery. If the
responsible tax agent accepts the bribe, he reports a failure and zero profits of the
firm to the government, implying that the firm does not have to pay taxes at all.
Accordingly, failed firms, as well as firms which reject the investment project and
choose the outside option, have no incentive to bribe as they do not pay taxes.
Given the distribution of tax agents and the fact that firms know B∗, a bribe
attempt fails and is reported with probability s. Even in case of a successful bribe
attempt, tax evasion and the associated bribery are discovered with probability p.
The corresponding penalty on the firm is assumed to be the same in both cases.
In particular, we assume that a firm’s payment to the tax authorities (i.e., the
government) is increased by a factor of λ if attempted or accomplished bribery is
exposed. We assume p and λ to be exogenous.13 Accordingly, a bribe attempt is
12Our model primarily applies to small- and medium-sized firms. Large multinational com-
panies tend to rely on profit shifting in order to reduce their tax burden, and the associated
losses in revenue seem to be even larger in developing countries, compared to advanced ones
(Cobham and Janskỳ, 2018; Crivelli et al., 2016; Johannesen et al., 2017). By contrast, smaller
firms often lack the possibility to legally avoid taxes and may, therefore, engage in tax eva-
sion or migrate into informality (Djankov et al., 2010; Slemrod et al., 2017; Waseem, 2018).
Consistently, Gokalp et al. (2017) find a negative relationship between firm size and tax eva-
sion. Using data on Ugandan firms, Gauthier and Reinikka (2006) provide evidence that large
companies benefit from tax exemptions, while smaller firms tend to evade taxes. In line with
these findings, Campos and Giovannoni (2007) and Harstad and Svensson (2011) argue that
lobbying and bribery are substitutes, with bribery being far more common for rather small
firms (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007) and in less developed countries (Harstad and Svensson,
2011). Supporting this notion, Ayyagari et al. (2007) report that small- and medium-sized firms
constitute most of the private sector in these countries.
13Allowing for endogenous p and λ should not alter the qualitative results of the model. Even
if the government was able to choose these variables optimally, it is reasonable (and common
in the literature) to assume that it would be limited in doing so by monitoring or auditing cost
(regarding p) and legal and political obstacles (regarding λ). Consequently, firms may have an
incentive to evade taxes, at least in some countries, even if p and λ are optimally chosen.
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associated with the following expected net profit π̂e for an evading firm:14
π̂e = (1− qλt)Π− (1− s)B∗, (4.2.2)
where q ≡ (1 − s)p + s denotes the overall probability of detection.15 In case of
compliant (or honest) behavior, a firm’s net profit is
πh = (1− t)Π. (4.2.3)
Consequently, a firm attempts bribery if
π̂e > πh ⇔ t > teh ≥ 0, (4.2.4)
where
teh ≡ (1− s)B
∗
(1− qλ)Π (4.2.5)
defines the tax rate for which a firm is indifferent between evading and honest
behavior.16
When deciding about the investment project in the second stage, firms an-
ticipate their subsequent compliance behavior in case of success. The necessary
condition for initiating the project is given by
psπ̂
e ≥ πo ⇔ t ≤ toe = 1
qλ
(
1− π
o + ps(1− s)B∗
psΠ
)
(4.2.6)
for evading firms and
psπ
h ≥ πo ⇔ t ≤ toh = 1− π
o
psΠ
(4.2.7)
for honest firms. toe (toh) defines the maximum tax rate for which an evading
14We refer to all firms that attempt bribery as evading, although actual tax evasion only
takes place if the bribe attempt is successful.
15Note that tax evasion is never worthwhile if the expected penalty is at least one: qλ ≥ 1.
Therefore, qλ < 1, is often assumed in the literature. By contrast, we generally allow for
qλ ≥ 1. Thus, the expected penalty may be sufficiently high in some (but not all) countries to
fully deter tax evasion.
16Note that the threshold teh only constitutes an upper limit to taxation of compliant firms
if its value is positive, i.e. for qλ < 1. If qλ > 1 (implying teh < 0), tax evasion is never
worthwhile for firms.
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(honest) firm just prefers the investment project over its outside option.17
4.2.3 Government behavior
At the first stage of the game, the government sets the tax rate to maximize
expected revenue. It is limited by firms’ alternatives, which are evasion and the
outside option. The attractiveness of these alternatives and the corresponding
threshold values of the tax rate are defined by inequalities (4.2.4), (4.2.6), and
(4.2.7). In order to understand the mechanisms of the model, it proves helpful to
depict teh, toe, and toh as functions of 1 − s, the share of pliable agents. Recall
that teh corresponds to the tax rate for which a firm is indifferent between evading
and honest behavior, toe is the maximum tax rate for which an evading firm just
prefers the investment project over its outside option, and toh is the maximum tax
rate for which an honest firm just prefers the investment project over its outside
option. Let us map firms’ optimal behavior for different combinations of 1 − s
and t in Figure 4.2.2. We may think of 1− s as a proxy for corruption and, thus,
interpret a high value of this variable as a high corruption level in the following.
Figure 4.2.2: Threshold tax rates and possible firm behavior
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17If toe (toh) is negative, t < 0 (i.e., a subsidy) is necessary to induce evading (honest)
firms to start the investment project. However, t < 0 cannot be optimal in our model for a
revenue-maximizing government. The latter then simply refrains from taxing the respective
firms.
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From the perspective of the government, we can distinguish between four
different areas in Figure 4.2.2, each representing a certain behavior of firms.
The lower area denoted by H captures all combinations of 1 − s and t for
which it is optimal for firms to initiate the project and behave compliant in case
of success. Formally, t ≤ toh, teh holds in this area.
The right area denoted by E captures all combinations of 1 − s and t for
which it is optimal for firms to initiate the project, but attempt bribery in case
of success. Formally, teh < t ≤ toe and teh < toh hold in this area.
The upper left (oH) and upper right area (oE) capture combinations of 1− s
and t for which it is optimal for firms not to pursue a project and resort to
their outside option instead. More precisely, the oH-area depicts combinations for
which firms would prefer paying taxes over attempting bribery if they successfully
undertook the project. Formally, toh < t ≤ teh holds in this case. By contrast,
the oE-area depicts combinations for which firms would prefer tax evasion over
compliant behavior if they successfully undertook the project. Formally, t >
teh, toe holds in that case.
As the considered firms are homogeneous, they all behave in the same way.
The government can influence firm behavior through its tax setting. Firms invest
and behave compliant in the country if t is set sufficiently low, i.e. for t ≤ toh, teh.
Graphically, the black toh- and the dark grey teh-curves determine the upper
boundary of the H-area in Figure 4.2.2.
Depending on the value of 1− s (and on the other determinants of teh (4.2.5)
and toh (4.2.7)), either the outside option or the possibility to evade is more
attractive to firms. Thus, either the toh- or the teh-threshold defines the maximum
tax rate the country can implement while still inducing firms to initiate the
investment project and subsequently behave compliant. In particular, firms prefer
evasion over the outside option if toh > teh, which holds if 1−s is sufficiently high.
In Figure 4.2.2, this applies to all points lying to the right of the intersection of
the toh- and the teh-curve. The reason is obvious: the higher the corruption level
1− s, the higher the expected profit in case of evasion π̂e (4.2.2). That is, a high
value of 1− s makes investment with subsequent tax evasion in the country more
attractive to firms. Accordingly, teh is decreasing in 1−s, while toh is independent
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of this parameter. As a consequence, the E-area in Figure 4.2.2 emerges once
toh > teh holds and (then) becomes larger for higher values of 1− s.
A key result of our analysis is the following. If toh > teh holds, it may be op-
timal for a country (the government) to tolerate evasion if the expected revenue
from fines on detected bribery is sufficiently high. Accordingly, we may distin-
guish between three different tax policies, or country types. The first type, type
1, refers to all cases where toh ≤ teh. Then, tax evasion is no relevant alternative
for firms and, hence, can be ignored by the country’s government when setting
the tax rate. Instead, the maximum attainable tax rate depends on firms’ outside
option and equals toh.18 By contrast, firms’ possibility to evade affects the tax
setting of the second and third country type, for which toh > teh holds. In such
countries, firms will engage in evasion if the tax rate is too high. A country’s
government may implement a maximum tax rate equal to teh, making evasion
unprofitable and, thus, inducing firms to behave compliant (cf. equation (4.2.4)).
We refer to such a country that combats evasion as type 2. Alternatively, a coun-
try’s government can tolerate tax evasion and settle for revenue from fines on
detected bribery. When doing so, it is able to set a tax rate higher than teh.
However, it has to make sure that firms’ expected profit from attempted bribery
in the country is at least as high as their outside option (cf. equation (4.2.6)).
Therefore, the tax rate in a type 3 country must not exceed the threshold value
toe. To summarize, the three country types are
1. Ignoring tax evasion19 (since it is not a serious problem): Outside option
of compliant firms as limiting factor (toh ≤ teh). The (limit) tax rate is
toh (4.2.7) and increasing (decreasing) in Π, ps (πo), and independent of
w,m, s, p, λ.
2. Combating tax evasion: Tax evasion as limiting factor. (Limit) tax rate
is teh (4.2.5) and increasing (decreasing) in w,m, s, p, λ (Π), and indepen-
dent of ps, πo.
18Suppose that firms are internationally mobile. Then, their outside option is determined
by other countries’ tax rates and we may state that type 1 countries engage in “ordinary” tax
competition. See Letsche (2019), for more details.
19Note that such countries may of course take measures to combat corruption. If this is
successful, it would reflect in s, for example.
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3. Tolerating tax evasion: Outside option of evading (!) firms as limit-
ing factor. Government tolerates evasion, (expected) revenue stems from
fines on detected evaders. (Limit) tax rate is toe (4.2.6), and increasing
(decreasing) in Π, ps (πo, w,m, s, p, λ).
It is worthwhile for a country to combat evasion if
E[R]eh ≥ E[R]oe, (4.2.8)
where E[R]eh (E[R]oe) denotes the expected tax revenue of a type 2 (3) country.
As mentioned above, tax revenue stems from fines on detected bribery in type
3 countries. Thus, tax revenue depends directly on the expected penalty qλ. In
particular, the expected tax revenue is
E[R] =

E[R]oh = max{tohE[Π], 0} = max{psΠ− πo, 0} for type 1
E[R]eh = tehE[Π] = ps(1−s)B
∗
1−qλ for type 2
E[R]oe = qλtoeE[Π] = ps(Π− (1− s)B∗)− πo for type 3.20
(4.2.9)
Figure 4.2.3 plots E[R] against 1−s and illustrates, together with Figure 4.2.2,
how corruption influences tax rate, expected revenue, and type of a country.
The expected tax revenue is, c.p., lower and decreasing in 1 − s for country
types 2 and 3. This can be seen from equation (4.2.9) and Figure 4.2.3. In such
countries, evasion constitutes an obstacle to tax policy and limits governments’
ability to raise revenue. This problem is more severe, the more widespread cor-
ruption is. Note, however, that the optimal tax policies of type 2 and type 3
countries differ fundamentally. As argued above, type 2 countries combat evasion
by setting their tax rate low enough to induce compliant behavior by firms. By
contrast, type 3 countries tolerate evasion to some extent, which allows them to
charge a relatively high tax rate. Consequently, as tax evasion is more attractive
to firms if the corruption level is high (∂π̂e/∂(1− s) > 0), the tax rate teh (toe) is
decreasing (increasing) in 1− s in type 2 (3) countries (cf. Table 4.2.1).
20Given the definition of the three country types, qλtoeE[Π] > 0 always holds for country
type 3.
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Figure 4.2.3: Country types and corresponding expected tax revenue
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4.2.4 Tax-setting behavior of different countries in light
of the theory
Table 4.2.1 summarizes the effects of different tax determinants for each country
type. The impact of the respective variable on the tax rate depends on the specific
tax-setting regime and, thus, may differ across countries.
Table 4.2.1: Tax rate determinants
1. ignore 2. combat 3. tolerate
toh teh toe
Π + - +
πo - o -
s o + -
p o + -
λ o + -
Given our model setup, investment in a country is more attractive to firms if
the associated gross profit Π is relatively large, compared to the outside option πo.
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Thus, toh (4.2.7) and toe (4.2.6), the maximum tax rates that can be charged in
regimes 1 and 3 (under which the government is limited by firms’ outside option),
respectively, are increasing (decreasing) in Π (πo). By contrast, firms’ incentives
to evade limits the tax rate teh (4.2.5) in the ‘combating-tax-evasion’ regime.
Accordingly, we find a positive relationship between country-specific rents Π and
the tax rate for regimes 1 and 3, whereas a higher rent implies larger tax savings
in case of evasion and a lower threshold teh for the second regime. By contrast,
we expect the impact of πo on the tax rate to be negative (for country types 1
and 3) or zero (for country type 2).
It is worth noting that countries operating under the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’
regime tend to be characterized by rather large location-specific rents. This fol-
lows from (4.2.5) and (4.2.8). Making use of (4.2.8), we can determine the max-
imum gross profit level for which a country prefers the ‘combating-tax-evasion’
regime over the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime, Π, as
E[R]eh ≤ E[R]oe ⇔ Π ≤ Π ≡ π
o
ps
+
(
1 + 11− qλ
)
(1− s)B∗. (4.2.10)
Thus, for a country to operate under the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime, its
location-specific rents Π must exceed the threshold level Π.
The remaining parameters in Table 4.2.1, s, p, and λ, affect the expected net
profit π̂e (4.2.2) in case of tax evasion and, thus, firms’ incentives to attempt
bribery. High values of s and p mean that a bribe attempt is very likely to be
rejected by a steadfast agent (with probability s) or discovered by the government
(with probability p), and a high value of λ implies a harsh penalty in both cases.
Accordingly, π̂e (4.2.2) is decreasing in s, p, and λ. The associated effect on the
tax rate is different for each tax-setting regime. Tax evasion and, consequently,
(small) changes in π̂e can be ignored by countries operating under the first regime.
By contrast, countries in the second regime combat tax evasion. This means that
they have to adjust their tax rate whenever firms’ incentives to evade changes. If
π̂e is reduced (due to an increase of s, p, or λ), the threshold tax rate teh (4.2.5), for
which firms still behave compliant, becomes higher and the government can charge
a higher tax. In sharp contrast to the first and, in particular, the second regime,
the third one is characterized by a tax policy that tolerates evasion. Countries
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operating in this regime are limited in their tax setting by evading firms’ outside
option π0. Thus, an increase of s, p, or λ, implying that tax evasion becomes
less worthwhile as π̂e is reduced, forces such countries to reduce their tax rate toe
(4.2.6) in order to prevent evading firms from choosing the outside option.
In sum, our theory indicates that the influence of s, p, and λ on the tax
rate differs fundamentally across the three tax-setting regimes. This strongly
suggests that country characteristics and, eventually, the tax-setting regime a
country operates in should be taken into consideration when conducting tax-
policy analysis.
4.3 The role of tax enforcement in revenue col-
lection and country development
We have just argued that countries operating under the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’
regime are forced to reduce their tax rate if s, p, or λ increase – in order to
induce firms to invest (and evade taxes later on). The tax rate is given by toe
(4.2.6) in this case. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Figure 4.2.3 and equation
(4.2.9), the expected revenue E[R]oe of these countries depends negatively on the
corruption level 1 − s (i.e., E[R]oe is increasing in s). Hence, if the goal of a
government is to maximize E[R]oe, it has an incentive to reduce the corruption
level 1− s. However, doing so seems to be a challenging long-term task (at least
if we think of s as being determined by moral values towards corruption within
society). Instead, it seems more natural and promising for governments whose
goal it is to increase revenue to make tax collection more efficient by increasing
the detection probability p.
Following (4.2.9) and the definition of B∗ in (4.2.1), it becomes apparent that
the effect of p on a country’s expected revenue E[R] is different for each country
type. Most notably, expected revenue of a country operating in the third regime,
E[R]oe, is decreasing in p. This means that such a country has no incentive
to increase p by, for example, taking measures to improve tax enforcement or
increase transparency, unless these improvements allow the country to switch the
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tax-setting regime it operates in.21 By changing its tax-setting regime from 3
to 1 or 2, a country may be able to reach a higher expected revenue level E[R]
(4.2.9).
To see how an increase of p may allow a country of type 2 or 3 (for which
toh > teh) to switch regime, recall that a firm’s expected net profit in case of
evasion, π̂e, is reduced as p rises. Tax evasion then becomes less attractive and
it may no longer be the limiting factor of a country’s tax setting. Formally, teh
(4.2.5) rises if p is increased and it may be that toh > teh no longer holds. If this
is the case, the country switches from regime 2 or 3 to 1.
Furthermore, for a country of type 2 or 3, tax enforcement becomes stricter
if p is increased, allowing the country to charge a higher tax and generate more
revenue under the ‘combating-tax-evasion’ regime (teh (4.2.5) and E[R]eh (4.2.9)
both increase). As a consequence, the condition for a country to operate in
the second (instead of the third) regime, E[R]eh ≥ E[R]oe (4.2.8), may then be
satisfied and a type 3 country may switch to the second regime and start to
combat tax evasion. This is also shown by the fact that the maximum gross
profit level for which a country combats evasion, Π (4.2.10), becomes larger as p
increases (∂Π/∂p > 0).
Figure 4.3.1 illustrates the effect of an increase in p on E[R]. The figure
can be interpreted as follows. For low values of p, tax enforcement is too weak
to make combating evasion worthwhile: the country is in the ‘tolerating-tax-
evasion’ regime. As argued above, E[R] (4.2.9) is decreasing in p for this part
of the function, i.e. for countries in the third regime. Better tax enforcement
(a higher level of p) does not translate into higher expected revenue for these
countries because they are forced to reduce their tax rate as the threshold toe
(4.2.6) declines (cf. Table 4.2.1). Instead, a higher detection probability p reduces
the expected tax revenue E[R]oe.22
21Mardan (2018) obtains a similar result in the context of corporate profit shifting.
22An increase in p reduces toe (4.2.6) in two ways: by increasing the expected penalty qλ and
the bribe payment B∗. Given that the expected revenue of type 3 countries E[R]oe = qλtoeE[Π]
is proportional to both qλ and toe, the direct increase of E[R]oe and the indirect reduction via
toe that are induced by a raise of qλ offset each other, implying that E[R]oe declines as p
increases (due to the additional reduction of toe via a higher B∗).
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Figure 4.3.1: Probability of detection and expected revenue
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While E[R]oe is decreasing in p, teh (4.2.5) and E[R]eh (4.2.9) are increasing
in this variable. That is, combating evasion becomes more rewarding as tax
enforcement becomes stricter. Once p is sufficiently high for E[R]eh ≥ E[R]oe
(4.2.8) to hold, the country switches from tolerating to combating evasion, i.e.
from regime 3 to 2. This is illustrated by the first kink of the E[R]-function in
Figure 4.3.1.
Unlike countries operating under the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime, countries
in the ‘combating-tax-evasion’ regime have a clear incentive to take measures in
order to improve tax enforcement, as teh and E[R]eh are increasing in p. Accord-
ingly, the second, dark grey part of the E[R]-function, which captures all values
of p for which the country operates in regime 2, is upward-sloping in Figure 4.3.1.
The second kink point of the E[R]-function in Figure 4.3.1 describes the level
of p for which
E[R]eh = E[R]oh ⇔ tehE[Π] = tohE[Π] ⇔ teh = toh (4.3.1)
holds. From this point, evasion is no longer the limiting factor of taxation and
the country switches from regime 2 to 1, i.e., from combating to ignoring tax
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evasion.23 Under the ‘ignoring-tax-evasion’ regime, the country’s tax rate toh
(4.2.7) and expected revenue E[R]oh (4.2.9) are independent of the detection
probability p. Therefore, the third, black part of the E[R]-function is parallel to
the x-axis in Figure 4.3.1. The figure also shows that expected revenue E[R] is
always higher under regime 1, compared to regime 2 and 3. The same holds true,
to a large extent, for regime 2 (compared to regime 3).
This highlights the importance of strict tax enforcement for raising sufficient
revenue, as it shows that establishing a system of efficient tax collection is an
essential part of a country’s economic development. However, the above findings
also suggest a lack of incentive for countries operating under the ‘tolerating-
tax-evasion’ regime to increase tax enforcement. The reason is that, for these
countries, improvements on tax enforcement (implying an increase in p) do not
translate into higher expected tax revenue E[R] (4.2.9), unless they are associated
with a change of the tax-setting regime (from regime 3 to 2). To achieve this,
however, it may take several costly steps, or a big push, towards better tax enforce-
ment until a country eventually benefits from such an improvement (that is, until
(4.2.8) holds). Thus, countries operating under the third regime may be unwilling
to adjust their current system of tax collection and, therefore, are in danger of
never being able to effectively combat tax evasion, raise sufficient revenue, and
limit bureaucratic corruption. Such an outcome seems to be particularly likely
for resource-abundant developing countries. The latter are often characterized by
weak institutions, widespread corruption, and high location-specific rents, making
them very likely to be, and get stuck, in the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime.
Taken together, our results suggest that, above all, it is through a big push
in terms of tax enforcement that these countries will have the best prospects
of escaping the curse of the ‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime. In this sense, our
analysis provides an optimal tax perspective on the resource curse of developing
countries.
23As p rises, teh and E[R]eh rise as well, while toh and E[R]oh remain constant (cf. Table
4.2.1 and equation (4.2.9)). Thus, eventually, E[R]eh = E[R]oh (4.3.1) is satisfied.
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4.4 Empirical assessment
In light of the insights presented in Section 4.3, we now proceed to an empirical
assessment of some core predictions of our theoretical model and particulary the
big push hypothesis stated above. In this regard, it is important to note that our
empirical results should be interpreted as suggestive evidence only. While we do
not claim to capture causal relations, we do find robust evidence for an empirical
pattern which reinforces the theoretical predictions and their policy implications:
if countries want to increase tax revenue, they should aim for improved institu-
tional quality and more efficient tax collection in general, and stricter enforcement
of tax law in particular. As for the latter, and consistent with our theoretical
results, we find that a potentially positive relationship between tax revenue and
more rigorous tax enforcement is non-monotonic. Our results indicate that only
those countries which put in great (and persistent) efforts in improving tax col-
lection benefit in terms of substantially increased tax revenue.
4.4.1 Data and empirical specification
We base our empirical analysis on a comprehensive dataset containing information
on 128 countries and the time period 2005 to 2014. We combine data from vari-
ous sources. Corporate income tax revenue in % of GDP (TAX REV ENUEc,t)
is taken from the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD); statu-
tory tax rates (TAXc,t) are taken from Steinmüller et al. (2019). Moreover, we
use the number of DTTs (NDTTc,t) concluded in a country for a given year
as a measure of tax enforcement. In the spirit of our theoretical framework,
this variable should capture the probability of detecting tax evasion. NDTTc,t
is based on own calculations, the respective information is taken from UNC-
TAD.24 Further country-specific determinants of tax revenue are taken from two
sources: (i) the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database:
the share of total natural resource rents in % of GDP (TORSc,t), (log of) GDP
24Information on the number of DTTs concluded is available for a large number of countries.
Moreover, compared to other measures of institutional quality such as the various corruption
indices and rule-of-law estimates frequently used in the literature, we prefer the number of
DTTs as a proxy because (i) it can be directly influenced by policy-makers’ decisions and (ii)
it is a variable which is not based on individual perceptions and judgments.
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per capita (log GDPPCc,t), (log of) GDP (log GDPc,t), GDP growth per capita
(GROWTHc,t), and (ii), the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database:
government debt in % of GDP (DEBTRATIOc,t) and total public expenditure
in % of GDP (PUBLICEXPc,t).
We estimate the following linear regression model:
TAX REV ENUEc,t = α + βTAXc,t + γTAX2c,t + δTORSc,t (4.4.1)
+ζNDTTc,t + ηBIGPUSHc,t + θXc,t + Yt + εc,t.
Equation (4.4.1) implies that, in all specifications, we assume tax revenue to
depend on the tax rate, the squared term of the tax rate,25 natural resource rents
and the number of DTTs concluded. Moreover, we include the vector Xc,t, which
contains different country-specific determinants of tax revenue, depending on the
respective specification (see Tables 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 below), and aggregate
year effects (Yt).
The main variable of interest for our purpose is BIGPUSHc,t. The latter
is an interaction of a dummy for countries with a high (above median) share of
natural resource rents (HIGH TORSc,t) and a dummy for being in the upper
15 percent of the distribution of the change in the number of DTTs, ∆NDTTc,t
(HIGH ∆NDTTc,t):26
BIGPUSHc,t = HIGH TORSc,t ×HIGH ∆NDTTc,t (4.4.2)
Hence, the coefficient η reflects the additional revenue effect for the subset of
resource-rich countries which have newly concluded a disproportionately high
number of DTTs in the past year. In other words, we interpret BIGPUSHc,t
as a variable that captures those resource-rich countries that are likely in the
‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime and have put a lot of effort in fixing institutions
and particularly tax-law enforcement.
25This captures the notion of the Laffer-Curve, which suggests an inverse-U-shaped relation-
ship between the statutory corporate tax rate and tax revenue (Steinmüller et al., 2019).
26Note that in Table 4.4.3 below, we prove the robustness of our results against using al-
ternative definitions of the big push indicator, employing (i) a dummy for being in the upper
25 rather than 15 percent of the ∆NDTTc,t distribution, and (ii) a dummy for countries with
natural resource rents in the upper 40 (30) rather than 50 percent of the TORSc,t distribution.
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4.4.2 Results
Our estimation results are displayed in Table 4.4.1. In all specifications, we
employ corporate income tax revenue in % of GDP as dependent variable and
relate it to various sets of determinants.27
Table 4.4.1: Determinants of tax revenue: main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TAXc,t 14.99∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗ 19.12∗∗∗ 15.15∗∗∗ 19.33∗∗∗ 19.44∗∗∗ 19.68∗∗∗ 20.01∗∗∗
(5.354) (5.277) (6.283) (5.267) (6.213) (6.364) (6.180) (6.386)
TAX2c,t -24.63∗∗ -25.24∗∗ -31.18∗∗ -24.52∗∗ -30.40∗∗ -30.37∗∗ -31.56∗∗ -32.24∗∗
(11.50) (11.28) (12.96) (11.69) (13.01) (13.20) (13.00) (13.34)
TORSc,t 0.0431∗ 0.0447∗ 0.0592∗∗ 0.0475∗ 0.0608∗∗ 0.0621∗∗ 0.0628∗∗ 0.0656∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0264) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0253) (0.0257)
NDTTc,t 0.00448 0.00414 -0.00750 0.00643 -0.00423 -0.00154 -0.00446 -0.00145
(0.00356) (0.00376) (0.00471) (0.00612) (0.00622) (0.00710) (0.00623) (0.00717)
BIGPUSHc,t 0.897∗∗ 0.908∗∗ 0.850∗∗ 0.905∗∗ 0.843∗∗ 0.817∗∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.821∗∗
(0.434) (0.432) (0.427) (0.426) (0.410) (0.396) (0.410) (0.395)
GROWTHc,t -0.0120 0.0360 0.0271 0.0390 0.0304
(0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0257) (0.0252) (0.0241)
log GDPPCc,t 0.668∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.170) (0.177) (0.171) (0.180)
log GDPc,t -0.0498 -0.0820 -0.116 -0.0833 -0.124
(0.118) (0.100) (0.109) (0.101) (0.113)
PUBLICEXPc,t -0.0116 -0.0136
(0.0142) (0.0150)
DEBTRATIOc,t 0.00146 0.00237
(0.0045) (0.0046)
Constant 0.4414 0.5046 -6.0552∗∗∗ 1.5816 -4.8392∗ -3.9142 -4.9354∗ -3.9134
(0.7399) (0.7999) (1.7317) (2.7917) (2.9143) (2.9976) (2.8718) (3.0194)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947
Adj. R-squared 0.1076 0.1074 0.2015 0.1094 0.2073 0.2095 0.2070 0.2100
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
27Moreover, in all specifications presented in Tables 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we (i) cluster
the standard errors of the coefficients at the country level, and (ii) account for outliers poten-
tially biasing the estimation results by omitting the observations with the 3% largest values
of TAX REV ENUEc,t and TORSc,t, respectively. In this regard, however, our results prove
robust against a 1% and 2% outlier treatment.
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Table 4.4.1 provides three main insights, which are in line with some key
predictions from our theoretical framework. First, we see that tax rates are a
very important determinant of tax revenue. The coefficients of both TAXc,t and
TAX2c,t are highly significant throughout all specifications, with signs suggesting
an inverse-U-shaped Laffer-Curve relationship between statutory tax rate and
revenue. Second, our estimates indicate that there is a positive link between
tax revenue and a country’s level of natural resource rents (TORSc,t). This
pattern in the data seems to be very robust against the inclusion of a wide
range of different control variables. Third, and most importantly, the results
reinforce our theoretical finding that the role of tax enforcement is non-monotonic:
significant revenue effects are only discernible if a country has experienced a
big push towards improved tax enforcement. Moreover, the latter should be
considered in its interplay with resource rents.
In all specifications of Table 4.4.1, we include the variable BIGPUSHc,t. In
column 1, we present a parsimonious specification, only controlling for TAXc,t,
TAX2c,t, TORSc,t and NDTTc,t. Including NDTTc,t allows us to assess whether
there is a universal, linear effect of the number of concluded DTTs on tax revenue.
In the next four columns, we gradually include GROWTHc,t, log GDPPCc,t and
log GDPc,t. We do so to capture (i) time-variant determinants of tax revenue and
(ii) cross-sectional differences between countries, which may both be significant
drivers of corporate tax revenue. Last, in columns 6 to 8, we additionally control
for two fundamentals of public sector activity: the level of public expenditures
(PUBLICEXPc,t) and government debt (DEBTRATIOc,t), both measured in
% of GDP.
Considering our estimation results on the role of tax enforcement, we do not
find a significant effect of NDTTc,t on tax revenue in any of the specifications
in Table 4.4.1. This means that there is no evidence for a positive impact of
a marginal increase in the number of DTTs concluded. Rather than that, we
find robust evidence for significant and positive revenue effects of a big push with
respect to tax enforcement. More specifically, we estimate that being in the subset
of resource-abundant countries which have concluded disproportionately many
DTTs in the past year is, on average, associated with an increase in the corporate-
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tax-revenue-to-GDP-ratio by 0.817 to 0.908 percentage points compared to those
countries which have not experienced a big push. In absolute numbers, given an
average GDP of 1.38 trillion USD and a corporate tax revenue of 47.6 billion USD
in this subset of countries, this amounts to additional revenue of 11.27 to 12.53
billion USD.
We assess the robustness of our main results in Table 4.4.1 in a series of
alternative specifications, addressing two potential concerns about how to identify
the effect of stricter tax enforcement. First, we consider the estimations where
we control for a wide range of country-specific economic fundamentals, presented
in columns 5 to 8 in Table 4.4.1. However, instead of controlling for the number
of DTTs in place in a country (NDTTc,t) as in Table 4.4.1, we now control for
the change in the number of DTTs, ∆NDTTc,t (columns 1 to 4 in Table 4.4.2).
Doing so, we are able to analyze whether marginal changes in ∆NDTTc,t rather
than in the level of DTTs concluded have a significant effect on tax revenue.
The estimation results in Table 4.4.2 show, however, that there is no distinct
revenue effect of a marginal increase in ∆NDTTc,t. This result also holds if we
control for both the level of and the change in the number of DTTs in place
(columns 5 to 8 in Table 4.4.2). Moreover, these alternative specifications prove
the robustness of the coefficient on BIGPUSHc,t. The estimates indicate that we
maintain a positive revenue effect of a big push towards stricter tax enforcement
(significant at the 10% level). Note that this is strong evidence for a ‘big push
effect’, as BIGPUSHc,t is a function of ∆NDTTc,t.
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Table 4.4.2: Determinants of tax revenue: robustness (∆NDTTc,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TAXc,t 20.17∗∗∗ 20.65∗∗∗ 20.51∗∗∗ 21.48∗∗∗ 20.48∗∗∗ 20.67∗∗∗ 20.92∗∗∗ 21.48∗∗∗
(6.077) (6.445) (5.994) (6.477) (6.246) (6.426) (6.212) (6.463)
TAX2c,t -32.52∗∗ -33.39∗∗ -33.66∗∗∗ -36.07∗∗∗ -33.45∗∗ -33.45∗∗ -34.94∗∗∗ -36.09∗∗∗
(12.96) (13.51) (12.77) (13.65) (13.26) (13.47) (13.24) (13.62)
TORSc,t 0.0661∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗ 0.0650∗∗ 0.0656∗∗ 0.0702∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0239) (0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0266)
∆NDTTc,t 0.0379 0.0550 0.0382 0.0584 0.0480 0.0554 0.0490 0.0586
(0.0450) (0.0427) (0.0447) (0.0414) (0.0439) (0.0421) (0.0432) (0.0407)
NDTTc,t -0.00433 -0.000354 -0.00462 -0.000180
(0.00641) (0.00728) (0.00643) (0.00740)
BIGPUSHc,t 0.759∗ 0.703∗ 0.762∗ 0.700∗ 0.757∗ 0.704∗ 0.761∗ 0.701∗
(0.425) (0.417) (0.425) (0.414) (0.433) (0.413) (0.432) (0.410)
log GDPc,t -0.117 -0.128 -0.121 -0.139∗ -0.0740 -0.124 -0.0761 -0.137
(0.0790) (0.0798) (0.0816) (0.0819) (0.105) (0.113) (0.106) (0.117)
GROWTHc,t 0.0422 0.0239 0.0457∗ 0.0288 0.0381 0.0240 0.0422 0.0288
(0.0275) (0.0260) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.0281) (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0245)
log GDPPCc,t 0.630∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.177) (0.152) (0.182) (0.177) (0.185) (0.179) (0.189)
PUBLICEXPc,t -0.0180 -0.0209 -0.0176 -0.0207
(0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0155)
DEBTRATIOc,t 0.00151 0.00337 0.00189 0.00337
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0045)
Constant -3.310 -3.1827 -3.3249 -3.1962 -4.0796 -3.2977 -4.7924 -3.2546
(2.1495) (2.1587) (2.1263) (2.1363) (3.0796) (3.1535) (3.0502) (3.2002)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 835 835 835 835 835 835 835 835
Adj. R-squared 0.2016 0.2104 0.2013 0.2126 0.2035 0.2095 0.2036 0.2116
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Second, we prove that our main results are robust against alternative defini-
tions of our big push indicator. To this end, we construct BIGPUSHA1c,t (Alter-
native 1, A1), BIGPUSHA2c,t (Alternative 2, A2), and BIGPUSHA3c,t (Alternative
3, A3). BIGPUSHA1c,t defines the subset of countries (i) with an above median
share of natural resource rents; (ii) which are in the upper 25 (rather than 15)
percent of the ∆NDTTc,t distribution. Hence, this is a less restrictive way of
identifying countries which have experienced a big push, i.e., countries pursuing
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enhanced efforts in improving tax collection. In addition to this modification, in
BIGPUSHA2c,t and BIGPUSHA3c,t , we alter the definition of a resource-abundant
country. More precisely, BIGPUSHA2c,t (BIGPUSHA3c,t ) determines the subset
of countries with natural resource rents in the upper 40 (30) percent of the re-
source rents distribution and ∆NDTTc,t in the upper 25 percent. We use our
preferred specifications from the last three columns of Table 4.4.1 and employ
these alternative big push definitions. Table 4.4.3 presents the estimation results.
Table 4.4.3: Determinants of tax revenue: robustness (big push definitions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TAXc,t 19.74∗∗∗ 20.00∗∗∗ 20.33∗∗∗ 19.59∗∗∗ 19.82∗∗∗ 20.15∗∗∗ 19.20∗∗∗ 19.39∗∗∗ 19.72∗∗∗
(6.520) (6.341) (6.544) (6.501) (6.321) (6.521) (6.419) (6.238) (6.429)
TAX2c,t -30.90∗∗ -32.15∗∗ -32.82∗∗ -30.70∗∗ -31.83∗∗ -32.52∗∗ -29.83∗∗ -30.84∗∗ -31.51∗∗
(13.49) (13.28) (13.61) (13.44) (13.22) (13.55) (13.29) (13.05) (13.37)
TORSc,t 0.0601∗∗ 0.0607∗∗ 0.0636∗∗ 0.0589∗∗ 0.0593∗∗ 0.0623∗∗ 0.0550∗∗ 0.0552∗∗ 0.0582∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0257) (0.0261) (0.0246) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0258)
NDTTc,t -0.00112 -0.00405 -0.00104 -0.000866 -0.00380 -0.000782 -0.00109 -0.00378 -0.00101
(0.00710) (0.00624) (0.00717) (0.00713) (0.00626) (0.00719) (0.00706) (0.00624) (0.00712)
BIGPUSHA1c,t 0.543∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.548∗∗
(0.253) (0.259) (0.253)
BIGPUSHA2c,t 0.587∗ 0.607∗ 0.586∗
(0.317) (0.324) (0.316)
BIGPUSHA3c,t 0.815∗∗ 0.845∗∗ 0.808∗∗
(0.336) (0.347) (0.333)
GROWTHc,t 0.0269 0.0388 0.0302 0.0266 0.0385 0.0298 0.0273 0.0381 0.0302
(0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0238) (0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0237) (0.0255) (0.0247) (0.0238)
log GDPPCc,t 0.751∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.172) (0.182) (0.178) (0.172) (0.181) (0.179) (0.172) (0.181)
log GDPc,t -0.129 -0.0959 -0.137 -0.131 -0.0973 -0.138 -0.128 -0.0975 -0.135
(0.108) (0.101) (0.112) (0.109) (0.101) (0.112) (0.108) (0.101) (0.112)
PUBLICEXPc,t -0.0116 -0.0136 -0.0118 -0.0137 -0.0108 -0.0126
(0.0142) (0.0151) (0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0149)
DEBTRATIOc,t 0.00150 0.00242 0.00137 0.00229 0.00127 0.00212
(0.00446) (0.00459) (0.00446) (0.00458) (0.00442) (0.00454)
Constant -3.7460 -4.7644 -3.7431 -3.6261 -4.6486 -3.6263 -3.541 -4.4719 -3.5455
(2.9805) (2.8859) (3.0022) (2.9936) (2.8877) (3.0123) (2.9797) (2.8729) (2.0964)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947
Adj. R-squared 0.2085 0.2061 0.2092 0.2080 0.2053 0.2085 0.2120 0.2098 0.2124
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
140 CHAPTER 4.
One can see that the positive, additional revenue effect proves robust against
these alternative definitions of the big push indicator. Quantitatively, the coeffi-
cients on the latter in the first six specifications are lower than before; however,
this is due to the less restrictive distinction of the subset of big push countries and,
hence, the substantially higher share of countries in this subset.28 Moreover, the
results in Table 4.4.3 reinforce the impression that there is no linear, monotonic
effect of the number of DTTs concluded on tax revenue: the coefficients clearly
show that there is no significant marginal effect of a change in NDTTc,t on tax
revenue.29
The empirical results presented in Table 4.4.1 as well as the sensitivity checks
(Table 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) have demonstrated that there is robust evidence for sub-
stantial revenue effects of a big push towards stricter tax enforcement. Let us
finally present some descriptive evidence on the countries which, in terms of our
baseline definition above, have experienced such a big push and are hence part
of the subset for which BIGPUSHc,t takes the value 1. In total, there are 44
country-year observations in this group.30 As to the latter, two interesting pat-
terns of tax enforcement policy can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are
countries for which we observe large one-time increases in the number of DTTs.
This is the case, e.g., for Albania (6 newly concluded DTTs in 2010) and Bahrain
(5 newly concluded DTTs in 2009). On the other hand, rather than experienc-
ing a one-time big push, there are a number of countries which appear several
times in the sample period. This means that these countries pursue a persistent
tax policy towards stricter enforcement, with at least 2 newly concluded DTTs
in several years during the sample period. This applies to, e.g., Malaysia and
Mexico (4 appearances), Kazakhstan and North Macedonia (3 appearances), as
28With the baseline definition of BIGPUSHc,t used in Table 4.4.1, there are 44 (4.6%)
observations in this subset. Compared to this, using the less restrictive 75th percentile of the
∆NDTTc,t distribution as in BIGPUSHA1c,t , we have 112 (11.78%) observations. Strength-
ening the restrictions with respect to the resource rents distribution as in BIGPUSHA2c,t and
BIGPUSHA3c,t , we have 89 (9.4%) and 67 (7.1%) observations, respectively, in the subset of big
push countries.
29Similar to Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, the Laffer-Curve relationship between tax rates and
revenue as well as the link between natural resource rents and tax revenue is very robust
throughout all specifications.
30Note that, as described above and illustrated in Table 4.4.3, we have also employed alter-
native, less restrictive definitions of the big push indicator, implying a higher share of countries
for which we identify a big push in terms of tax enforcement.
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well as Armenia, Bulgaria, Chile, India and Morocco (2 appearances).
It should be noted that, regardless of which of the two tax enforcement pol-
icy strategies these countries pursue, they have one thing in common. They can
be characterized as newly-industrialized countries, having made a first transition
from developing countries to more developed economies. In this regard, we may
argue that this positive economic development is often accompanied by tax-policy
(including tax-enforcement regulation) reforms.31 Note that this is perfectly con-
sistent with our theoretical findings. From an ex-post perspective, these countries
might have managed to switch the tax-setting regime and, in the end, benefit from
more efficient tax collection and stricter tax enforcement in terms of increased
tax revenue.
In contrast, countries with a very low level of development are not part of the
subset of countries experiencing a big push. The least developed countries are
those which, particularly from a short-run perspective, have a lack of incentive
to improve tax enforcement and are therefore at risk of never being able to raise
sufficient tax revenue. The example of the newly-industrialized countries clearly
reveals that if countries engage in the long and costly process of improving tax
enforcement, they can ultimately benefit from such an improvement. We may
therefore refer to these countries as best-practice examples, demonstrating that
economic development often goes hand in hand with changes in tax policy.
4.5 Conclusions
Bureaucratic corruption and weak fiscal institutions may encourage firms to evade
taxes and limit a country’s ability to raise revenue. We examine how the threat
of corporate tax evasion affects a government’s tax-setting behavior and demon-
strate that there may be fundamental differences across countries. More precisely,
we first develop a theoretical model which suggests the existence of three country
types, or tax-setting regimes. Depending on the corruption level, institutional
31However, it is important to highlight that our empirical analysis allows us to disentangle
these two aspects. We control for (i) cross-sectional differences between countries with respect
to a wide range of economic fundamentals and (ii) time-varying determinants of tax revenue.
Hence, we are confident that the positive revenue effect of a big push in terms of tax enforcement
is not confounded by the effect of the general economic development on tax revenue.
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quality, and location-specific rents, a country will follow a tax policy that ei-
ther (i) ignores, (ii) combats, or (iii) tolerates tax evasion. In particular, we
expect countries characterized by widespread corruption, weak institutions, and
high location-specific rents (e.g., due to natural resource abundance) to charge a
relatively high tax and to tolerate tax evasion (to a large degree).
Furthermore, our theoretical findings demonstrate that functioning institu-
tions and powerful tax enforcement are essential preconditions not only for rais-
ing adequate tax revenue, but also for country development as a whole. Coun-
tries characterized by widespread corruption and tax evasion may never be able
to overcome these problems, unless they fix the setting in which tax collection
takes place, i.e., unless they put in great effort towards stricter tax enforcement.
This seems to be particularly important for developing countries, especially for
those with high location-specific rents, as these countries are very likely in the
‘tolerating-tax-evasion’ regime. Countries operating in this regime may have no
incentive to increase the efficiency of tax collection, as small (but costly) improve-
ments on tax enforcement usually do not translate into higher revenue. Thus, our
model can explain why some, often resource-rich, developing countries are stuck
in a regime of inefficient tax collection, widespread evasion, and a high corruption
level.
We provide robust evidence for an empirical pattern which reinforces some
core predictions of our theoretical model and, in particular, their policy implica-
tions. If countries want to increase tax revenue, they should aim for stricter
enforcement of tax law. In line with our theoretical findings, we show that
the relationship between tax revenue and more rigorous tax enforcement is non-
monotonic. Our estimates show that marginal improvements on tax enforcement
do not lead to a significant increase in tax revenue. Rather than that, it is only
through a big push – substantial and/or persistent improvements towards stricter
tax enforcement – that a country, in the end, benefits in terms of a sizable increase
in tax revenue.
We finally illustrate which countries have experienced such a big push in terms
of tax enforcement. Most of them are newly-industrialized countries, suggesting
that a favorable economic development can and should be accompanied by im-
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provements on tax enforcement and revenue collection. Again, this is fully consis-
tent with our theoretical findings: these countries might have managed to switch
the tax-setting regime – induced by a big push towards stricter tax enforcement
– and finally benefit in terms of increased tax revenue. In contrast to this, in our
sample, countries with a very low level of development do not experience such
a big push. However, from a tax policy perspective, overcoming the problems
related to poor tax enforcement and inefficient revenue collection proves to be an
indispensable step on a country’s way towards persistent growth and economic
development.
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Cobham, A. and P. Janskỳ (2018): “Global Distribution of Revenue Loss
from Corporate Tax Avoidance: Re-estimation and Country Results,” Journal
of International Development, 30, 206–232.
Crivelli, E., R. De Mooij, and M. Keen (2016): “Base Erosion, Profit
Shifting and Developing Countries,” FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
72, 268–301.
Crivelli, E. and S. Gupta (2014): “Resource Blessing, Revenue Curse? Do-
mestic Revenue Effort in Resource-rich Countries,” European Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 35, 88–101.
Dharmapala, D., J. Slemrod, and J. D. Wilson (2011): “Tax Policy and
the Missing Middle: Optimal Tax Remittance with Firm-Level Administrative
Costs,” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1036–1047.
Djankov, S., T. Ganser, C. McLiesh, R. Ramalho, and A. Shleifer
(2010): “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship,”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 31–64.
Dreher, A., C. Kotsogiannis, and S. McCorriston (2009): “How Do
Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?” International Tax
and Public Finance, 16, 773–796.
Egger, P., M. Larch, M. Pfaffermayr, and H. Winner (2006): “The
Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and
Evidence,” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d’Economique,
39, 901–931.
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2003): “Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tan-
zania Revenue Authority,” Public Administration and Development: The In-
ternational Journal of Management Research and Practice, 23, 165–175.
Gauthier, B. and J. Goyette (2014): “Taxation and Corruption: Theory
and Firm-level Evidence from Uganda,” Applied Economics, 46, 2755–2765.
——— (2016): “Fiscal Policy and Corruption,” Social Choice and Welfare, 46,
57–79.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Gauthier, B. and R. Reinikka (2006): “Shifting Tax Burdens through Ex-
emptions and Evasion: an Empirical Investigation of Uganda,” Journal of
African Economies, 15, 373–398.
Gokalp, O. N., S.-H. Lee, and M. W. Peng (2017): “Competition and Cor-
porate Tax Evasion: An Institution-based View,” Journal of World Business,
52, 258–269.
Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009): “Tax Structures in Developing Countries:
Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,” Journal of Public Economics, 93,
855–866.
Harstad, B. and J. Svensson (2011): “Bribes, Lobbying, and Development,”
The American Political Science Review, 105, 46–63.
Hindriks, J., M. Keen, and A. Muthoo (1999): “Corruption, Extortion and
Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 74, 395–430.
Hofmann, P. and N. Riedel (2018): “Transfer Pricing Regimes for Developing
Countries,” Bulletin for International Taxation, 72, 1–9.
Jensen, A. D. (2011): “State-Building in Resource-rich Economies,” Atlantic
Economic Journal, 39, 171–193.
Johannesen, N., T. Tørsløv, and L. Wier (2017): “Are Less Devel-
oped Countries More Exposed to Multinational Tax Avoidance? Method and
Evidence from Micro-data,” Wider working paper 2016/10, The United Na-
tions University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-
WIDER), Helsinki.
Khan, A. Q., A. I. Khwaja, and B. A. Olken (2015): “ Tax Farming
Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131, 219–271.
Kolstad, I. and T. Søreide (2009): “Corruption in Natural Resource Man-
agement: Implications for Policy Makers,” Resources Policy, 34, 214–226.
148 CHAPTER 4.
La Porta, R. and A. Shleifer (2014): “Informality and Development,” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 28, 109–126.
Leite, C. and J. Weidmann (1999): “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural
Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Paper 99/85,
International Monetary Fund.
Letsche, T. (2019): “The Threat of Tax Evasion and its Impact on Corporate
Taxation and Tax Competition,” RSIT Working Paper 02-2019, University of
Tübingen.
Mardan, M. (2018): “Corporate Taxation, Tax Administration and Develop-
ment,” Working paper, presented at the IIPF Annual Congress 2018, Tampere.
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik (2006): “Institutions and the Re-
source Curse,” The Economic Journal, 116, 1–20.
Rachter, L., R. Rocha, and G. Ulyssea (2018): “Do Lower Taxes Reduce
Informality? Evidence from Brazil,” Journal of Development Economics, 134,
28–49.
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner (2001): “The Curse of Natural Resources,”
European Economic Review, 45, 827–838.
Sanyal, A., I. N. Gang, and O. Goswami (2000): “Corruption, Tax Evasion
and the Laffer Curve,” Public Choice, 105, 61–78.
Schneider, F. and B. Torgler (2007): “Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Gov-
ernance and Institutional Quality: a Panel Analysis,” CESifo Working Paper
No. 1923, CESifo Group Munich.
Slemrod, J., B. Collins, J. L. Hoopes, D. Reck, and M. Sebastiani
(2017): “Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax
Compliance?” Journal of Public Economics, 149, 1–19.
Steinmüller, E., G. U. Thunecke, and G. Wamser (2019): “Corporate
Income Taxes Around the World: A Survey on Forward-looking Tax Measures
and Two Applications,” International Tax and Public Finance, 26, 418–456.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 149
Tanzi, V. M. and H. H. Zee (2000): “Tax Policy for Emerging Markets:
Developing Countries,” National Tax Journal, 53, 299–322.
van der Ploeg, F. (2011): “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” Journal
of Economic Literature, 49, 366–420.
Waseem, M. (2018): “Taxes, Informality and Income Shifting: Evidence from a
Recent Pakistani Tax Reform,” Journal of Public Economics, 157, 41–77.
150 CHAPTER 4.
4.A Appendix
Table 4.A.1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition and Source
TAX REV ENUEc,t Corporate income tax revenue in % of GDP of country c in period t;
Source: IMF; World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD)
TAXc,t Statutory corporate income tax rate of country c in period t;
Source: Steinmüller et al. (2019)
TORSc,t Total natural resource rents in % of GDP of country c in period t;
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator (WDI) database
NDTTc,t Number of double taxation treaties concluded by country c in period t;
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
∆NDTTc,t Change in the number of double taxation treaties concluded by country c in period t;
Source: UNCTAD database
HIGH TORSc,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if TORSc,t is above median, and 0 otherwise;
Source: World Bank, WDI database
HIGH ∆NDTTc,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if ∆NDTTc,t is above the 85th percentile, and 0 otherwise
Source: UNCTAD database
BIGPUSHc,t Interaction between HIGH TORSc,t and HIGH ∆NDTTc,t
Source:World Bank, WDI database and UNCTAD database
GROWTHc,t GDP growth (in %) per capita of country c in period t;
Source: World Bank, WDI database
log GDPc,t (log of) GDP of country c in period t;
Source: World Bank, WDI database
log GDPPCc,t (log) GDP per capita of country c in period t;
Source: World Bank, WDI database
PUBLICEXPc,t Total public expenditure in % of GDP of country c in period t;
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database
DEBTRATIOc,t Government debt in % of GDP of country c in period t;
Source: IMF WEO database
Chapter 5
The Effect of Investing Abroad
on Investment at Home: On the
Role of Technology, Tax Savings,
and Internal Capital Markets1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between foreign and domestic investment activity
of multinational enterprises. The empirical analysis is based on micro data of German
firms and their operations at home and abroad, including information on investment
in fixed assets. The empirical approach, which rests upon extensive and intensive
margin variation, is shown to produce very robust results. These suggest a positive
relationship between foreign and home investment in real capital. This positive effect
seems to be mainly related to additional opportunities for tax planning and better access
to financing capital. In contrast, we do not find evidence that improved production
processes and technology upgrading cause the positive effect on investment at home.
Our empirical approach allows us to distinguish between an extensive and intensive
margin effect: setting up a new foreign affiliate leads to an immediate positive effect
of about EUR 460,000 additional investment; the investment elasticity at the intensive
margin is estimated to be approximately 0.13.
1This paper is joint work with Stefan Goldbach, Arne J. Nagengast, and Georg Wamser.
The corresponding paper is published in Journal of International Economics.
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5.1 Introduction
The broad consensus among economists in favor of increased international inte-
gration through trade and investment openness has always been based on the
assumption that the gains thereof are sufficiently large to compensate the losers
of increasingly globalized economies. Especially the foreign activities of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) have raised the concern that, at the end of the day,
home countries lose, owing to a shift of production and employment abroad. A re-
cent contribution to the literature on the consequences of MNE expansion abroad
on home activity is that of Desai et al. (2009). Their study concludes that foreign
operations of US firms between 1982 and 2004 have, on average, led to greater
domestic investment and employee compensation. In contrast to this, other stud-
ies come to the opposite conclusion by providing evidence for a negative effect of
foreign investment on home activities of MNEs.1
Our paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between foreign and
domestic investment of MNEs in three ways. First, we use a unique dataset that
allows us to observe home and foreign investment activity of German MNEs, in
addition to yearly balance-sheet information.2 Second, our econometric approach
is based on propensity score methods and exploits variation at the extensive as
well as intensive margin of foreign activity. Note that the extensive margin of
foreign activity in our paper refers to the decision of setting up a new foreign
entity. Hence, an extensive-margin estimate quantifies the treatment effect of
foreign activity on investment activity at home. The intensive margin refers to
the volume of foreign activity (measured in terms of fixed assets or in equity cap-
ital invested abroad). Hence, an intensive-margin estimate quantifies the effect
of 1 percent more foreign activity on investment activity at home. One central
advantage of our empirical approach is that it allows us to provide reliable es-
timates on intensive margin elasticities by explicitly modeling and conditioning
1We provide a brief survey on this literature in Section 5.2.
2Our data, which is provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), includes
firm-level information on investment activity over time and we do not rely on changes in the
stock of fixed assets. The latter is used to proxy for investment activity in most studies. Note as
well that we also observe employment in our data. We provide additional results for alternative
outcomes in Section 5.5.6, but mainly focus on investment.
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on the extensive margin. The latter point, i.e., modeling the extensive margin,
appears to be crucial as it determines observability and timing of foreign activ-
ity and the correlation thereof with endogenous firm characteristics. In numerous
tests, we show that our estimation approach appropriately accounts for the simul-
taneous nature of foreign and domestic operations and other endogeneity issues.
Third, and most importantly, we can identify the channels through which foreign
activity affects domestic investment. In particular, we focus on three potential
sources: technology, tax savings and profit shifting, and internal capital markets.
Our results presented in Section 5.5 of this paper indicate that establishing a
new foreign affiliate is associated with more domestic investment activity. The
effect is substantial, as our estimates imply a change in real investment activity at
home of about EUR 460,000. As for the intensive margin, we estimate elasticities
which lie in the range of 0.13 to 0.23, depending on the measure of foreign invest-
ment activity. The effect is smaller than the one found by Desai et al. (2009),
who estimate that 1 percent greater foreign investment is associated with 0.26
percent greater domestic investment. Using our data, unconditional estimates
suggest significantly higher elasticities in the range of 0.38 to 0.44.
Furthermore, we show that the basic effect of foreign activity on home invest-
ment is robust against a large number of sensitivity tests. These tests include
(i) alternative measures of the outcome variable, (ii) tests for prior trends and
lagged effects, (iii) alternative specifications of propensity score estimates, (iv)
variations in treatment-control comparisons, and (v) the calculation of placebo
effects.
Our findings indicate that the main channel through which the positive rela-
tionship can be explained is first and foremost related to issues of tax planning
and profit shifting, as well as improved access to financing capital. The former
allows firms to reduce their cost of capital by avoiding tax payments. The lat-
ter finding suggests that newly established foreign affiliates facilitate access to
financial capital, which is then provided via an internal capital market to the
home location. It is difficult, however, to clearly distinguish these two channels –
profit shifting and internal financing –, as they harness the same vehicle: internal
debt. Quantifications show that the effect of establishing a new affiliate abroad
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becomes about twice as large if the tax differential between Germany and the
foreign country is 10.5 percentage points higher than the average tax differential.
A surprising new result is that foreign activity does not boost total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) or similar measures of productivity at home. Additional tests
indicate that the effect is also not related to vertical foreign direct investment
(FDI), which is usually associated with production substitution, outsourcing,
and productivity gains from technology upgrading through vertical integration
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Navaretti et al., 2010). While we cannot
clearly distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI, many of our results seem
to be consistent with the notion of horizontal FDI as a provider of intra-firm
services (including financing and tax planning).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
an overview of the related literature. Section 5.3 contains a concise introduction
to the econometric methodology. Thereafter, we provide information on the panel
dataset used for the empirical investigation and present descriptive statistics. The
basic results from our empirical analysis are discussed in Section 5.5, including
a comprehensive assessment of their robustness. In the subsequent section, we
present three channels through which the observed effects might be explained.
The last section serves as a conclusion: it summarizes the major findings and
discusses some policy implications.
5.2 Related literature
Previous contributions to the literature do not provide clear evidence on whether
domestic investment and FDI are substitutes or complements.3 The majority of
empirical studies rely on country-level or sectoral data. Macroeconomic contribu-
tions predominantly point to a positive relationship (Desai et al., 2005), although
Herzer and Schrooten (2008) suggest a substitution effect for German MNEs in
the long run. Hejazi and Pauly (2003) as well as Arndt et al. (2010) use sectoral
3A different strand of the literature deals with the impact of FDI on the labor market
in home countries. Even though the results vary substantially across studies, the majority
of contributions suggest that FDI has negative employment effects in home countries (Becker
et al., 2005; Federico and Minerva, 2008; Buch and Lipponer, 2010; Debaere et al., 2010; Jäckle
and Wamser, 2010). In contrast to this, Kovak et al. (2018) find that greater offshore activity
modestly increases net employment.
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panel data to provide a more nuanced picture on the relationship between FDI
and the domestic capital stock: Hejazi and Pauly (2003) argue that the desti-
nation country of FDI is crucial when analyzing domestic effects, while Arndt
et al. (2010) highlight that the effect varies with the production structure of in-
dustries. To the best of our knowledge, aside from Desai et al. (2009), only few
studies are based on firm-level data. Monarch et al. (2017) use US microdata
to analyze the short- and long-run effects of offshoring on several key indicators
of domestic activity: employment, wages, output, and productivity. They find a
substantial decline in domestic employment and output, yet no significant impact
of offshoring events on productivity and wages.4
The literature on the channels through which FDI may affect domestic in-
vestment can be broadly grouped into domestic capital market imperfections on
the one hand, and the organization of production within the MNE on the other
hand. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) argue that, in the presence of financial frictions,
an increase of investment in a foreign location, ceteris paribus, raises the cost
of capital for domestic investment. In accordance with the theoretical model in
Stevens and Lipsey (1992), empirical contributions such as Feldstein (1995) find
a substitution effect for home-market and foreign investment. In contrast, Desai
et al. (2005) and Desai et al. (2009) argue that MNEs mainly finance investment
projects via world and internal capital markets so that financial resources at home
are not necessarily a major constraint.
Predictions from models on the organization of production are similarly am-
biguous. While horizontal FDI may affect domestic investment, the net effect
depends on whether FDI displaces exports or not (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003; Desai
et al., 2005). In general, the extent to which cross-border production sharing
occurs – as vertical FDI or outside the boundaries of the firm – is determined
by the characteristics of the various locations, such as relative factor prices and
economies of scale (Helpman, 1984, 1985; Markusen, 2002). The resulting effi-
ciency gains suggest a positive effect on an MNE’s productivity (Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Navaretti et al., 2010), with possibly positive consequences
4A recent study by Bösenberg et al. (2018) examines the interdependence of firms’ invest-
ments in fixed and intangible assets within MNEs’ networks of foreign affiliates using a spatial
econometrics approach. In contrast to this paper, it focuses on marginal investment decisions
and the foreign affiliate network, while the effects on home activity are not analyzed.
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for domestic investment activity (Desai et al., 2005; Arndt et al., 2010). Alterna-
tively, other authors have emphasized the negative effect on home-market invest-
ment resulting from the shift of domestic activities to foreign countries (Hejazi
and Pauly, 2003).
A rarely discussed perspective on the domestic effects of FDI relates to cor-
porate taxation and profit shifting.5 The link between corporate taxation and
profit-shifting incentives has been extensively discussed in the literature. Previous
studies provide evidence that MNEs’ tax-planning strategies exploit international
tax rate differentials to shift corporate profits from high-tax to low-tax countries
(Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Weichenrieder, 2009; Heckemeyer and Overesch,
2017). To the best of our knowledge, only Overesch (2009) has directly inves-
tigated the implications of profit-shifting opportunities for MNEs’ investment
decisions. Using a firm-level panel of German inbound FDI, Overesch (2009) an-
alyzes the investment behavior of MNEs in a high-tax country (Germany) as a
function of the tax rate applicable to the parent firm. Empirical results confirm
the hypothesis that German inbound FDI increases in the tax differential between
Germany and the investor’s home country. Overesch (2009) explains this result
arguing that profit shifting by MNEs from one location to another can reduce the
MNEs’ cost of capital. This, in turn, facilitates investment in high-tax countries
like Germany.6 Thus, profit shifting can be interpreted as a competitive advan-
tage for a firm because comparatively high tax rates do not affect investment to
the same extent as they would in the absence of profit-shifting opportunities (we
explain the mechanisms at play in more detail in Section 5.6.2).7
5For an overview of profit-shifting channels and techniques, see Huizinga and Laeven (2008)
and Dharmapala (2014).
6From a very general perspective, this argument relates to the literature on the theory of
investment (Jorgenson, 1963; Jorgenson and Hall, 1967; Jorgenson, 1971; Chirinko, 1993).
7Egger et al. (2014b) provide evidence that MNEs vastly differ with respect to their ability
to shift profits and, thus, their potential to avoid taxes. Using a panel of German MNEs, they
find that investments of successful tax avoiders do not respond to taxation in high-tax countries,
while investments of non-tax avoiding firms do.
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5.3 Methodology
Let us define the indicator variable NAi,t, which equals 1 if we observe in our
data that firm i has established a foreign entity in period t. If this is not the case,
NAi,t equals 0. The central objective of our paper is to estimate the treatment
effect of NAi,t on outcome yi,t. We are particularly interested in the outcome
∆INVi,t, the first difference of gross investment, but we also analyze a number
of alternative outcomes.
A naive comparison of yi,t between the groups of treated firms, where NAi,t =
1, and untreated firms, where NAi,t = 0, may lead to biased estimates, as se-
lection into foreign activity is not random. Another source of endogeneity is the
simultaneous nature of home and foreign investment. To account for variables
that determine selection into foreign activity, we first estimate propensity scores,
for which we specify the following linear index:
NAi,t = αXi,t−1 + βCk,t−1 + γM`,t−1 + δIs,t−1 + φt + ψs + εi,t. (5.3.1)
Equation (5.3.1) may be estimated by way of a standard probability model,
such as probit. The specification suggests that NAi,t depends on variables mea-
sured at the level of firm i, variables measured at the level of counties k and
municipalities `, as well as variables measured at the industry-level s;8 φt and
ψs denote time- and sector-specific effects. Note that in our preferred speci-
fication, we apply a Mundlak-Chamberlain-type approach (see Mundlak, 1978;
Chamberlain, 1982)9 and additionally condition on averages of the time-varying
explanatory variables (which we may denote by X i, Ck, M `, and Is).
As a first and central effect, we estimate an average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT), i.e. the impact of NAi,t = 1 on outcome yi,t, by matching on
the propensity score. The latter is obtained from estimating (5.3.1) by way of
8Section 5.4 provides more details on the variables used.
9Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) show that if firm-specific unobserved effects are
correlated with the observed explanatory variables in one period, then this correlation also
persists in all other periods. Hence, in order to consistently estimate the coefficients in Equation
(5.3.1), one should include firm-specific fixed effects. Chamberlain (1982) includes a full set of
leads and lags of all explanatory variables to explicitly allow for correlation between the latter
and the unobserved effects. We follow Mundlak (1978), who suggests a more parsimonious
approach employing the time means of all explanatory variables as additional regressors.
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a probit model. Denoting the sets of treatment and control units by N and J ,
respectively, we calculate
ÂTT |NA=1 =
1
N
∑
i∈N
yi − 1Ji
∑
j∈Ji
ωjyj
 , (5.3.2)
where N and Ji denote the numbers of treated and non-treated units, respec-
tively, and ωj denotes the weight attached to the respective control unit.10 Thus,
expression (5.3.2) implies that matching is basically a weighting scheme, as from
the set of comparison units (non-treated units) Ji, we match observations to the
treated unit i using specific weights (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
We usually determine 1Ji
∑
j∈Ji ωjyj based on caliper or radius matching, where
comparison units within a given propensity-score radius are matched.11 Ji is
therefore associated with all matched units, where each unit receives a weight
ωj equal to 1. It is important to notice that the propensity score matching ap-
proach relies on two fundamental assumptions. First, unconfoundedness needs to
hold. This requires that, conditional on observable characteristics, the outcome
is independent of treatment. For this purpose, we aim at conditioning on a set
of covariates as outlined in (5.3.1). Second, given that assignment to treatment
is random, if two firms have the same propensity score, the distribution of vari-
ables used in the estimation of the propensity score should also be the same for
these two firms. This second feature is referred to as the balancing property of
the propensity score and can be tested. Results in this regard are presented in
Table 5.A.6 in the Appendix.
5.4 Data and descriptive statistics
5.4.1 Data
To analyze the relationship between domestic investment and FDI, we mainly
use two datasets, both provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bun-
10Note that we drop the time index t as we always enforce exact year matching.
11Apart from some robustness checks, where we apply nearest neighbor and kernel matching
techniques.
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desbank). The micro data is confidential and only accessible in anonymized form
at the headquarters of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, Germany. Information on
the foreign activity of German firms is obtained from MiDi (Microdatabase Di-
rect Investment; for detailed information, see Lipponer, 2011), a comprehensive
annual database of German FDI positions. MiDi provides information on each
foreign affiliate’s balance sheet, ownership structure and additional information
such as an industry classification. A particular advantage of MiDi is that report-
ing by firms is mandatory by German Federal Law.12 We use parent-affiliate-year
observations in order to identify whether a new foreign affiliate was established by
the parent company in a given year.13 In addition, we supplement affiliate-level
variables with information on the country where the newly established affiliate is
located.14 Information on domestic investment and other parent-level variables
is taken from the Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet database for Germany,
Ustan (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik). The data are primarily extracted from an-
nual accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss accounts) and financial statements.
Most notably for our purpose, the database includes information on firms’ do-
mestic investment. This feature is unique, as most studies define investment as
the change in fixed assets reported in the balance sheet, which is a proxy for net
12German Federal Law (Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation) states that a parent com-
pany is obliged to report its FDI to Deutsche Bundesbank if both of the following criteria are
fulfilled: (i) the parent company controls at least 10 percent directly or 50 percent indirectly
of a foreign company’s voting rights; (ii) the balance-sheet total of the foreign affiliate exceeds
EUR 3 million. Indirect ownership of 50 percent or more means that the parent company
together with at least another company in the multinational group holds at least 50 percent
of the affiliate’s shares. The dataset features a structural break in 2002 when the thresholds
for the voting shares and the foreign affiliate’s balance sheet total were adjusted. Observations
prior to 2002 that do not satisfy these requirements are excluded from the analysis. Moreover,
we do not consider associated branches in order to ensure that only independent affiliates are
part of our sample.
13Note that a new entry in the MiDi database can be due to greenfield investments or
mergers and acquisitions. In addition, a new observation may also indicate that an existing
affiliate exceeded the voting rights limit or the balance-sheet threshold for the first time. In
order to make sure that the latter group of affiliates does not severely distort the clear distinction
between firms with and without new affiliates, we have produced additional results excluding
observations prior to 2002 (the year of the change in the threshold level; see above). The results
remain fully robust, indicating that the uniform threshold assumption we make throughout the
empirical analysis in this paper does not bias our estimates.
14In case more than one new affiliate was established in a given year, we compute sums or
weighted averages across newly established affiliates using fixed-asset weights.
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investment.15 In addition, we make use of firm-specific information on total as-
sets, fixed assets, value added and employment at the domestic parent company’s
location.
We match Ustan with MiDi and keep matched observations as well as un-
matched observations from Ustan.16 These unmatched units serve as additional
control units in the subsequent analysis. Finally, we complement the two firm-
level datasets with regional information. These data are merged using a cor-
respondence between firms’ German postal codes and a municipality identifier.
Most of the variables vary at the county level, while municipality information
is used if available.17 All in all, we end up with an unbalanced panel for the
time period between 2000 and 2013, with 2,234 MNEs, 37,299 purely domestic
companies, and 197,761 firm-year observations (Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix).
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.4.1 provides summary statistics of all explanatory variables used to esti-
mate the probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate (as suggested by Equa-
tion (5.3.1)). These can be categorized into variables at the firm level, denoted
by i (log of total assets, TAi,t−1, value added per employee, V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1,
fixed assets per employee, FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1, log of total assets of an MNE’s
affiliates, TAi,t−1(Affiliates), an MNE dummy indicating whether firm i was an
MNE in the year before entry, MNEi,t−1),18 sector-level variables denoted by
s (Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1), and regional-level variables denoted by k or `
(CountyGDPk,t−1, CountyGDP perWorkerk,t−1, CountyIncomeperCapitak,t−1,
all measured in logs, CountyShareHighSkilledk,t−1,MunicipalityPopulation`,t−1
15Using gross investment avoids problems related to the reporting of book values of fixed
assets and depreciations, which may in part be related to tax considerations.
16For more details regarding the matching methodology and the quality of the match, see
Schild et al. (2017).
17While the match between MiDi and Ustan datasets has been used in two previous studies –
Becker and Muendler (2010) and Jäckle and Wamser (2010)–, many of the outcomes employed
in this paper (e.g., investment, corporate financial variables, effective tax measures) have never
been considered before. Moreover, we add three additional datasets to this data, and all parts
of the matched datasets are crucial for our analysis. Therefore, our dataset can be considered
novel.
18Note that TAi,t−1(Affiliates) and MNEi,t−1 are set equal to zero in case no such activity
is observed, which is naturally the case when firm i is a domestic one.
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measured in logs, Municipality Business Tax`,t−1). For a comprehensive list of
definitions and data sources, see Table 5.A.1 in the Appendix.
Table 5.4.1: Determinants of establishing a new foreign affiliate
All Firms Treatment Group Control Group
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
TAi,t−1 9.441 1.946 12.355 1.879 9.387 1.906
V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1 4.616 0.754 5.047 0.918 4.608 0.748
FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1 3.246 1.864 3.468 1.494 3.242 1.870
TAi,t−1 (Affiliates) 0.648 2.568 9.608 5.103 0.483 2.175
MNEi,t−1 0.062 0.241 0.809 0.393 0.048 0.214
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1 -0.425 20.042 -0.720 21.266 -0.420 20.018
County GDPk,t−1 8.857 0.943 9.222 1.075 8.850 0.939
County GDP per Workerk,t−1 4.056 0.192 4.143 0.210 4.055 0.192
County Income per Capitak,t−1 3.062 0.197 3.133 0.196 3.060 0.197
County Share High Skilledk,t−1 0.087 0.042 0.103 0.051 0.086 0.042
Municipality Population`,t−1 10.578 1.793 11.165 1.889 10.567 1.789
Municipality Business Tax`,t−1 0.134 0.019 0.138 0.020 0.134 0.019
Figure 5.4.1 suggests that including regional variables might be important. It
documents the number of parent companies per county with at least one foreign
affiliate established in the time period between 2000 and 2013.19 The figure
clearly shows that agglomeration effects play a role as most firms establishing
foreign affiliates are located in large metropolitan areas such as Munich city,
Munich county, Frankfurt, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Berlin and Hamburg (from south
to north). Another salient feature is the obvious east-west divide. In short, the
geographic distribution of the extensive margin of FDI (setting up a new foreign
entity) reflects differences in economic fundamentals at home which we aim at
capturing by including a range of regional variables.
19Note that for illustration purposes we use all information (not just the matched data) from
MiDi in Figure 5.4.1, but for reasons of confidentiality, regions with fewer than three parent
companies cannot be displayed.
162 CHAPTER 5.
Figure 5.4.1: Geographic distribution of German firms establishing new foreign
affiliates
Table 5.4.2 provides an overview of the main outcome variables used. It presents
statistics on the whole sample, distinguishing between treatment (NAi,t = 1) and
control group (NAi,t = 0). A simple comparison between both groups without
controlling for other variables shows that, on average, gross investment seems
to be substantially larger for firms with new affiliates. This holds for the level,
INVi,t, and the change in gross investment, ∆INVi,t. Both variables are mea-
sured in 1,000 EUR. For net investment, NINVi,t,20 we cannot confirm the clear
pattern, which could be due to differences in the application of depreciation rules
or the composition of fixed assets.
Table 5.4.3 provides information on the characteristics of the new foreign
affiliates and their host countries. In total, 9,844 new foreign affiliates were
20Changes in fixed assets equal fixed assets in the previous period plus investment expendi-
tures and other additions, less depreciations and other withdrawals.
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established between 2000 and 2013.21 The majority of new affiliates were set up in
Western Europe, followed by Eastern Europe, Asia and North America. For each
region, we provide average values of the foreign affiliates’ (denoted by a) sales,
SALESa,t, employment, EMPa,t, fixed tangible and intangible assets, FAa,t, and
total assets, TAa,t (all these variables are measured in levels, in 1,000 EUR). There
is substantial variation in the characteristics of host countries (denoted by c) such
as GDP per capita (GDPPCc,t), the statutory tax rate (STRc,t), and a variable
measuring the depth of the local capital market, domestic credit provided to the
private sector relative to country c’s GDP (DCPc,t). The variables are potentially
correlated with the motives of the parent company for investing abroad, and we
exploit variation therein when studying the channels of the effect on domestic
investment in Section 5.6.
Table 5.4.2: Descriptive statistics (outcome variables)
All Firms Treatment Group Control Group
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
INVi,t 3333.748 10599.811 195784 12878.203 21687.560 3352 3167.492 10222.915 192432
∆INVi,t 10.077 3308.505 193808 337.972 6529.722 3202 4.569 3226.796 190606
INVi,t/FAi,t−1 0.384 0.529 193808 0.369 0.464 3520 0.384 0.530 190288
NINVi,t -489.983 4190.902 192857 -1657.708 8476.977 3156 -470.556 4078.930 189701
∆NINVi,t -42.608 4879.730 191954 -1.697 10144.162 3168 -43.295 4741.838 188786
NINVi,t/FAi,t−1 -0.072 0.431 192857 -0.071 0.449 3502 -0.072 0.431 189355
Table 5.4.3: Characteristics of new foreign affiliates and their host countries
Number of new SALESa,t EMPa,t FAa,t TAa,t GDPPCc,t STRc,t DCPc,t
foreign affiliates Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Western Europe 4168 49515.595 116.883 16081.102 115159.827 10.587 0.305 133.788
Eastern Europe 1738 27173.188 155.930 11546.246 26655.468 9.832 0.218 38.905
Africa 203 23024.631 187.729 5047.212 20626.823 9.009 0.301 95.425
Middle East 178 12735.955 70.376 4132.506 16559.247 10.485 0.144 54.641
North America 1390 113551.079 193.509 52216.710 221143.018 10.649 0.363 161.159
Caribbean 30 10833.333 108.233 9855.800 31762.033 9.477 0.101 35.377
Central/South America 408 28620.098 148.868 11826.199 39108.284 9.447 0.317 42.399
Asia 1558 55212.452 173.497 20563.657 59620.666 9.444 0.292 115.832
Oceania 171 26497.076 80.667 11303.877 39233.561 10.506 0.313 109.725
21The number of MNEs is lower since some parent companies establish more than one new
foreign affiliate in a given year. The data in Table 5.4.3 correspond to the respective years in
which the new foreign affiliates were established.
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5.5 Basic results
This section presents the findings of our empirical analysis using the propensity
score matching method as outlined above. The structure follows the steps of
the practical implementation. First, we present the results from estimating the
probabilities of establishing a new affiliate. Thereafter, we estimate an ATT
associated with establishing a new foreign affiliate on domestic investment. We
make sure that neither prior trends nor (potentially negative) longer-term effects
on the change in investment exist, which could bias our results. Following these
extensive margin considerations, we also present intensive margin elasticities.
Then, we provide a thorough sensitivity analysis of our main results, estimate
ATTs for alternative outcomes and consider potential heterogeneity in treatment
effects with respect to characteristics specific to firms or destination countries.
5.5.1 The probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate
We estimate the probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate based on Equa-
tion (5.3.1), including Mundlak-Chamberlain means of the time-varying explana-
tory variables as well as time and sector effects. All subsequent estimates of the
domestic investment effects are based on this specification.22 Table 5.5.1 presents
the results of the probit estimate for all time-varying explanatory variables.23
We employ lagged variables (i.e., in the year before foreign market entry) as re-
gressors, and observe a high level of significance for most factors. The positive
coefficients for total assets and fixed assets per employee indicate that large and
capital-intensive firms are more likely to expand abroad, which is consistent with
previous findings (Tomiura, 2007). We do not find an additional effect of labor
productivity on the probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate after control-
ling for size and capital intensity. This is in line with the theoretical predictions
22Tables 5.A.3 and 5.A.4 in the Appendix provide estimation results for alternative probit
specifications.
23An F-test indicates joint significance of the Mundlak-Chamberlain means, which are in-
cluded as regressors to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity.
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in Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), and Helpman (2006).24 Furthermore, the
results reveal that greater foreign activity in the preceding year (measured by the
sum of total assets of existing affiliates) is associated with a higher probability of
setting up another foreign affiliate. If the firm is already an MNE with foreign
affiliates, it is less likely that we observe further foreign activity after controlling
for the size of existing affiliates. While the latter finding is conditional on many
covariates, it indicates that our data include both existing MNEs expanding their
foreign affiliates networks and domestic firms becoming new MNEs.
Turning the focus to potential determinants on a regional level, we find that
most variables are insignificant in the probability model, although there is sub-
stantial variation across the approximately 400 counties and 12,000 municipali-
ties. Only for (i) GDP and (ii) the share of high-skilled labor in the (German)
county where the firm is located, we observe a negative (and significant) effect.
In contrast to this, there is no evidence that per capita measures of economic
wealth such as county GDP per worker and county income per capita have a
distinct impact on the propensity to expand abroad. Moreover, variables mea-
sured at the municipality level are not found to be significant either. The lack
of significant evidence for factors at the county and municipality level is surpris-
ing, as these characteristics are usually expected to affect an MNE’s decision of
whether to expand or not (and also exhibit substantial time variation). Overall,
our results suggest that firm-specific characteristics are the driving force behind
the investment decision in question.
24However, note that our results are not directly comparable to these models, since they
focus on selection into foreign activity, while we consider the extensive margin of FDI in a
somewhat broader sense.
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Table 5.5.1: Probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate
(1)
TAi,t−1 0.361∗∗∗
(0.056)
V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1 -0.056
(0.041)
FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1 0.064∗∗
(0.027)
TAi,t−1 (Affiliates) 0.069∗∗
(0.034)
MNEi,t−1 -1.216∗∗∗
(0.321)
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1 0.083
(0.106)
County GDPk,t−1 -1.339∗∗
(0.591)
County GDP per Workerk,t−1 0.976
(0.635)
County Income per Capitak,t−1 0.557
(0.463)
County Share High Skilledk,t−1 -3.748∗
(2.262)
Municipality Population`,t−1 -0.004
(0.084)
Municipality Business Tax`,t−1 -0.372
(2.732)
Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in paren-
theses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively. A Wald test indi-
cates joint significance of the Mundlak-Chamberlain
means, which are included, but not reported here.
5.5.2 The effects of investing abroad
Using the propensity scores obtained from above, we estimate an average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT), as in Equation (5.3.2), associated with estab-
lishing a new foreign affiliate on domestic investment. We employ radius matching
with a caliper of 0.01 and match observations exactly by year in order to ensure
that we only compare firm-year observations of the same year.25 We then apply
weighted regressions (with weights obtained from the propensity score matching)
to estimate ATTs. In these regressions, we additionally condition on year-specific
effects and imbalanced covariates, in case conditioning on the propensity score
25The choice of the caliper is consistent with the rule of thumb suggested by Austin (2011).
According to the latter paper, a caliper width of about 20% of the standard deviation of the
propensity score is optimal. This would suggest a caliper of 0.014 for the estimated propensity
scores. In any case, our results prove to be very robust to the use of different calipers (see
Table 5.A.5 in the Appendix).
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does not fully remove significant differences in the means of pre-treatment char-
acteristics.26
Table 5.5.2: ATT of establishing a new foreign affiliate
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
INVi,t 1274.485∗∗ 521.994 2998 188429
∆INVi,t 458.126∗∗∗ 145.101 3021 188740
INVi,t/FAi,t−1 0.044∗∗∗ 0.010 2979 185053
NINVi,t 669.878∗∗∗ 205.790 2880 186413
∆NINVi,t -72.639 203.181 2900 185796
NINVi,t/FAi,t−1 0.030∗∗∗ 0.010 2955 184112
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and
conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Table 5.5.2 presents the results of the ATT estimates for six different measures
of domestic investment.27 We find that establishing a new affiliate in a foreign
country has a highly significant and positive effect on domestic investment of
the parent company. Our preferred estimate is the ATT for ∆INVi,t, since (i)
gross investment is unaffected by the application of depreciation rules as argued
above, and (ii) focusing on changes in outcome variables effectively combines
propensity score matching with a difference-in-differences approach (Heckman
et al., 1998; Blundell et al., 2004). The results suggest that a newly established
foreign affiliate is associated with an increase in domestic investment activity
of EUR 458,126. This is a substantial effect, given that the average firm in the
treatment group invests EUR 12,878,000 per year. Similarly, domestic investment
relative to fixed assets in the previous period is 4.4 percentage points higher as
a result of increased foreign activity. For the level of domestic investment we
obtain a larger ATT of EUR 1,275,000. The results for net investment, defined
as changes in fixed assets, with the exception of the ATT for changes in net
investment, ∆NINVi,t, are similar to those of gross investment. The level of
26The common support condition is guaranteed to hold for treated and non-treated firms
in each year. Moreover, as shown in Table 5.A.6 in the Appendix, all variables except
County Income per Capitak,t−1 are well balanced between the treatment and control group
in our main specification. Hence, we usually condition only on the latter variable.
27We should highlight that all estimates shown here have to be interpreted as short-run
effects. Producing long-run estimates on the consequences of foreign activity requires additional
years of data. Some results in this regard are presented in Section 5.5.3, yet only relying on a
substantially lower number of observations.
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net investment is EUR 670,000 larger and the growth rate of the capital stock
(NINVi,t/FAi,t−1) 3 percentage points higher as a consequence of establishing a
new foreign affiliate. Altogether, we can draw the preliminary conclusion that the
impact of FDI on domestic investment is positive and substantial, irrespective of
the particular measure of domestic investment under consideration.28
5.5.3 Timing of effects
An important issue which is rather difficult to address with our data is the ques-
tion of whether investing abroad leads to long-run effects on home investment.
What we observe is whether an existing MNE is establishing a new foreign affili-
ate in year t or whether a domestic firm (yet to become an MNE) is investing in a
foreign country for the first time. In the following, we make sure that MNEs are
not setting up new foreign affiliates twice within a window of five years around the
treatment (i.e., in periods t− 2 to t+ 2, we allow for only one treatment). How-
ever, it might be that MNEs invest several times over the whole sample period.
In any case, including leads and lags of the indicator variable NAi,t to capture
long-run as well as anticipation effects relative to the treatment year will lead
to a substantial loss of observations. The latter relates to the fact that (i) our
firm-year panel is unbalanced and (ii) we observe many firms setting up foreign
affiliates at the beginning or the end of the 13-year panel period. Moreover, as
mentioned above, we need to impose the restriction that firms are not investing
multiple times as this would blur our estimates.
Table 5.5.3 provides estimates where the indicator variable NAi,t is included
in leads (t + 1 and t + 2) as well as in lags (t − 1 and t − 2). In column 1,
compared to our benchmark estimate, we lose 2,645 treated observations.29 The
results suggest that there is a one-time increase in investment activity. The two
indicators measuring long-run responses are obviously insignificant.
28We provide additional tests concerned with two issues. First, we account for outliers
(Table 5.A.7 in the Appendix), where we remove the most extreme values of the dependent
variable as these might drive our estimates. The tests show that the findings are very robust, and
outliers do not seem to be an issue. Second, we check whether the effects are more pronounced
if an MNE does not yet maintain affiliates in the country where the new affiliate is set up (this is
the case for 80% of the investing firms). We provide the results in Table 5.A.8 in the Appendix.
29Note that we keep the weights from the propensity score constant. The latter is required
to ensure consistency in making the comparison between treated and non-treated firms.
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Table 5.5.3: Timing of effects
new affiliate new MNE
NAi,t+2 -43.617 -12.311
(555.011) (563.654)
NAi,t+1 59.748 52.342
(180.940) (180.665)
NAi,t 532.116∗∗∗ 466.692∗
(199.693) (264.369)
NAi,t−1 -220.587 81.306
(234.919) (363.332)
NAi,t−2 -550.315 199.539
(522.924) (384.223)
No. treated 376 239
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively.
This is exactly what we would expect as an ever increasing effect on the
outcome ∆INVi,t would not lead to an equilibrium. The coefficients on the lagged
variables indicate that there are no anticipation effects. This suggests that there
is no differential prior trend which could bias our difference-in-differences results.
Column 2 focuses on new MNEs which helps us to make sure that multiple foreign
(previously established) affiliates are not an issue. This leads to an additional
loss of observations. However, the only significant effect is the one estimated for
NAi,t.30
In an additional specification, we check whether there is a long-term effect
by using the difference between INVt+3 and INVi,t−1 as outcome. This effect is
positive and quantitatively very similar to the baseline effect on ∆INVi,t, but in-
significant. This indicates that there is only a one-time positive effect in period t,
and even if the impact on ∆INVi,t+3 is positive, too much noise (post treatment)
renders the coefficient insignificant.
In summary, we do not find any long-term effect on ∆INVi,t, which is what
30Note that we provide additional tests using alternative outcomes in the Appendix (Ta-
bles 5.A.9 and 5.A.10). See also Section 5.5.6, where we introduce these alternative outcomes
and provide estimates for them.
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we would expect. We can also refute the hypothesis of prior trends and any kind
of anticipation effects.31
5.5.4 Intensive margin elasticities
While our basic results mainly focus on the effects at the extensive margin of FDI,
we are also interested in comparing our estimates to the ones of previous studies.
To a large extent, existing research has provided estimates on elasticities at the
intensive margin. As in Section 5.5.2, we run a weighted regression of outcome yi,t
on NAi,t, based on the weights obtained from the matched sample. To this parsi-
monious regression, we now add an interaction term between NAi,t and FDIa,t.
The latter variable denotes demeaned measures of foreign activity. To be precise,
we define FDIa,t = FDIa,t−MFDI, where MFDI denotes the sample mean of
FDIa,t. By doing so, we guarantee that the coefficient on the uninteracted new-
affiliate-indicator still provides an estimate of the ATT (Wooldridge, 2010; Egger
et al., 2015). The index a indicates that we measure the latter at the level of the
foreign affiliate. We use three variables to capture foreign activity: fixed tangible
and intangible assets (FAa,t), equity capital of FDI (EFDIa,t), and the consoli-
dated sum (equity capital plus internal debt) of FDI (CFDIa,t). The estimated
coefficient on NAi,t×FDIa,t provides an estimate of the intensive margin effect of
investing abroad. For the sake of comparability, in Table 5.5.4, we report elastici-
ties rather than the coefficients on NAi,t×FDIa,t. The respective elasticities are
defined as εFDI = ∆INV
INV
/∆FDI
FDI
, for FDI = {FA,EFDI,CFDI}.32 The findings
suggest that 1 percent more foreign activity (measured by fixed and intangible
assets) leads to about 0.13 percent more investment at home. The elasticities for
31Another approach to address the concern of prior trends is to condition on firm-specific
trends in the outcome equation. Estimates including such a trend on ∆INVi,t suggest a sig-
nificant treatment effect of 459.328 (224.302), which is very close to the benchmark estimates.
Note that we guarantee in this additional test that treated firms are observed in the data for
at least 5 years, as this firm-specific approach relies on sufficient variation over time.
32Note that the elasticities reported are based on specifications in which we define the out-
come in levels and the volume of FDI in logs. We have chosen this specification to ensure
comparability with our benchmark results on the ATT. Slightly different specifications where
the outcome is defined in logs as well, or where FDI is defined as log(FDI + 1) (as FAa,t is
equal to zero in some cases, while EFDIa,t and CFDIa,t can also be negative), yield very
similar results. Note also that εF A is our preferred estimate as taking logs of FAa,t implies the
smallest loss of observations.
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equity capital of FDI and the consolidated sum of FDI are somewhat bigger but
go in the same direction. Since investment at home is measured in fixed assets,
our preferred estimate is the one on εFA.
Table 5.5.4: Intensive margin elasticities
(1) (2) (3)
INVi,t INVi,t INVi,t
εFA 0.127∗∗∗
(0.025)
εEFDI 0.183∗∗∗
(0.040)
εCFDI 0.228∗∗∗
(0.039)
Estimates are obtained from running
weighted regressions including year effects
and conditioning on imbalanced covariates.
Standard errors clustered at the firm level
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level re-
spectively.
Compared to previous studies, the estimated elasticities presented in Ta-
ble 5.5.4 are lower. For example, Desai et al. (2009) find an elasticity of about
0.26.33 We believe, however, that our approach has some advantages compared
to previous work. First, we specifically account for selection into foreign activity.
We do this not only by conditioning on the vector of observables as shown in
Equation (5.3.1), but also by explicitly modeling selection into treatment. This
also allows us to separate the extensive effect from the intensive one and provide
estimates for both. Second, the robustness tests in Section 5.5.5 show that firm,
regional, industry, and time effects fully capture that specific types of firms in-
vest in a given period for specific reasons (selection into treatment). Then, the
estimates on FDI should also be consistent under the same assumptions (which
are fairly weak compared to a linear regression model) as imposed above (see Sec-
tion 5.3). Third, and related to the first point, the approach generally solves the
problem of not observing foreign activity in t−1, i.e. before treatment, neither for
33Note, however, that these values cannot be compared directly, as we are only considering
intensive margin elasticities for newly established affiliates. We provide additional results in
Table 5.A.11 in the Appendix, which replicate the approach of Desai et al. (2009).
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the treated, nor for the untreated. This leads to bias in a linear regression model
– as the extensive margin is not modeled explicitly and a linear relationship is
assumed.
5.5.5 Sensitivity analysis
5.5.5.1 Propensity score estimation and matching algorithm
We assess the robustness of our main result by using a range of different specifica-
tions for estimating the propensity score and by varying the matching algorithm.
The goal of estimating Equation (5.3.1) is to obtain the best estimate for the
selection into treatment. In principle, propensity score models including higher-
order terms of the covariates can be used, although over-parameterization remains
a concern (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001; Bryson, 2002). Hence, as a robustness
test, we include quadratic and cubic terms of all the explanatory variables in the
estimation of the propensity score model in order to account for potential nonlin-
ear relationships (Table 5.5.5, (1) and (2)). Moreover, the results in Table 5.5.5,
(3), indicate robustness to the inclusion of second order lags in the propensity
score estimation. Our baseline estimate captures the influence of changes in time-
varying covariates on treatment assignment, while controlling for time-invariant
characteristics of the firm by employing the Chamberlain-Mundlak device. Alter-
natively, we could ignore the panel dimension of our data and directly estimate a
pooled probit for selection into treatment (Table 5.5.5, (4)). Similarly, propensity
scores can be estimated on a yearly basis, which implies that estimated scores are
based on smaller samples, in which unobserved heterogeneity as in our benchmark
specification cannot be accounted for (Table 5.5.5, (5)).
In order to test the sensitivity of the results with regard to our choice of the
matching algorithm, we also apply nearest neighbor matching with replacement,
allowing for a maximum of 100 neighbors and using a caliper of 0.01 (Table 5.5.5,
(6)). Moreover, we also apply kernel matching with a caliper of 0.01 (Table 5.5.5,
(7)). In our baseline specification, we compare firms from different geographic
locations in Germany as well as different sectors with each other. As far as there
are systematic differences in the effect between these groups – for example, states
at the border versus states in the interior, or manufacturing firms versus services
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firms – this could be a potential point of concern. To address this issue, we also
exactly match firms by state and sector (Table 5.5.5, (8) and (9)). Hence, by
insisting on an exact match, we only compare those firms with each other that
are in the same state and sector (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). Although the
latter approach seems to be quite restrictive, the estimated ATTs remain almost
unaffected.
While the balancing property of the propensity score holds for all variables
with the exception of county income per capita, we also provide estimates where
we control for all explanatory variables used in the first stage when calculating
the ATT (Table 5.5.5, (10)). We finally provide estimates where we additionally
condition on four firm-specific variables (Table 5.A.12 in the Appendix). This
leaves the baseline effect of setting up a new foreign affiliate virtually unaffected,
and it seems that, once we condition on the variables in the propensity score
estimation, these variables are almost orthogonal to NAi,t.
Table 5.5.5: Additional sensitivity checks (outcome: ∆INVi,t)
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
(1) Probit: 2nd order polynomial 453.453∗∗∗ 143.897 3005 188764
(2) Probit: 3rd order polynomial 465.018∗∗∗ 135.042 2966 188737
(3) Probit: 2nd order lags 438.259∗∗∗ 165.621 2406 143470
(4) Probit: Pooled estimation 468.465∗∗∗ 146.928 3010 188585
(5) Probit: Estimated year-by-year 312.118∗∗ 157.720 2987 166817
(6) Nearest neighbor matching 466.693∗∗∗ 145.198 3021 28769
(7) Kernel matching 390.086∗∗∗ 122.534 3189 188806
(8) Exact matching by state 495.628∗∗∗ 153.445 2443 144022
(9) Exact matching by sector 366.926∗∗ 153.493 2687 160842
(10) Condition on all first stage variables 459.837∗∗∗ 147.665 3021 188740
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and conditioning on imbal-
anced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Table 5.5.5 illustrates that all alternative specifications leave the ATT by and
large unchanged in terms of significance and sign. Hence, this indicates that we
maintain a highly significant and positive effect of FDI on domestic investment.
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5.5.5.2 Placebo and permutation tests
In the following, we present further results using placebo treatments and a per-
mutation test. A placebo test can shed light on the question of whether changes
in domestic activity in the treatment year can actually be interpreted as the effect
of establishing a new affiliate abroad. Similar tests are also frequently used in
the treatment literature to evaluate the common trends assumption in difference-
in-differences models. In our case, the common trends assumption requires that
treated and control firms would have evolved similarly in the absence of treat-
ment. We address both points by (i) considering changes in domestic investment
in the year before establishing a new foreign affiliate and (ii) analyzing the effects
of new domestic affiliates as placebo treatments.
Table 5.5.6 reports estimates of the ATT for the year prior to treatment as well
as the ATT for the actual treatment year for the same sample of firms.34 The ATT
in the year of treatment is estimated to be positive and strongly significant, which
is consistent with Table 5.5.2. The placebo ATT in the year prior to treatment
clearly suggests the absence of a placebo effect, indicating that the increase in
investment coincides precisely with the establishment of a new affiliate abroad.
Table 5.5.6: Placebo treatments in year t-1
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
∆INVi,t−1 86.764 177.940 1704 155799
∆INVi,t 501.834∗∗∗ 133.348 1704 155799
Standard errors clustered at the firm level are obtained from running weighted
regressions including year effects and conditioning on imbalanced covariates.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
A second endogeneity concern could be that some foreign and some domes-
tic investments are undertaken simultaneously, making it difficult to establish a
causal link between FDI and domestic investment. We use the establishment of
a new domestic, German affiliate as a placebo treatment and find that there is
34This is done for the sake of comparability of placebo and actual-year-of-treatment effects.
The sample of firms considered in the placebo test is smaller than for the baseline ATT due to
the requirement of three consecutive observations and the absence of successive treatments.
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no significant effect on domestic investment (Table 5.A.13 in the Appendix).35 If
we contrast this finding to the substantial and highly significant effect of estab-
lishing a new foreign affiliate, this is strong evidence that there is a fundamental
difference between a new domestic and a new foreign affiliate.36
A further concern pertains to the calculation of standard errors for our difference-
in-differences estimates, which may be biased downward in the presence of serial
correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004). We address this issue by implementing two
nonparametric permutation tests for the ATT (Fisher, 1922; Chetty et al., 2009).
That is, we simulate an empirical distribution of placebo estimates to which our
actual ATT can be compared. There are several possible ways of re-shuffling
treatment across firms. First, we randomly select 3,021 firm-year observations37
from the subset of MNEs in our dataset.38 Second, we keep the structure of
treatment timing and randomly select 332 firm-year observations for the year
2000, 314 for 2001, and so on (cf. Table 5.A.2). We then reestimate selection into
treatment as well as the ATT, and we repeat this procedure 1,000 times. Fig-
ure 5.5.1 provides the empirical distribution of the placebo ATTs for ∆INVi,t and
both permutation alternatives. The vertical lines indicate the treatment effect as
reported in Table 5.5.2. In both cases they are clearly located to the right of the
1,000 simulated ATTs and suggest significance at the 1% level.
35Unfortunately, the original dataset used for our analysis does not allow us to check whether
there is a significant effect of opening a German affiliate on investment in the rest of the firm.
However, to overcome this, we have matched our data with Orbis, a commercial dataset in-
cluding, inter alia, firm-level balance-sheet data, ownership information and location details.
Admittedly, this leads to a substantial loss of treated observations (140-150 treated firms com-
pared to 3,021 in the original estimation), as the Orbis data is only available for the period
2006 to 2013.
36In addition to the latter results, we also examine whether establishing a new domestic
affiliate affects other outcomes such as the tax bill, which is one of the alternative outcomes we
analyze below. The results suggest that no significant impact on the tax bill is observed when
a new domestic affiliate is set up (see Table 5.A.13 in the Appendix). This is not surprising, as
then, there is no tax differential between the home location and the new affiliate’s destination
to be exploited. In the spirit of Simon (2016), we moreover check whether some other lump-sum
German investment has a significant effect on (i) investment and (ii) the tax bill (Table 5.A.14 in
the Appendix). In this approach, a firm is considered to be ‘treated’ if the growth of (domestic)
fixed assets is above the median in a given year (rows 1 and 2) or in the top decile (rows 3 and
4). The results indicate that also these lump-sum German investments do not have a significant
effect on neither investment nor the tax bill.
37This corresponds to the number of firm-year observations with newly established foreign
affiliates (Table 5.5.2).
38MNEs are more likely to establish new foreign affiliates than purely domestic firms. Re-
peating both permutation tests for the full dataset yields qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 5.5.1: Distribution of placebo estimates
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Thus, the permutation tests confirm that the establishment of new foreign affili-
ates treatment is related to a significant increase in domestic investment.
5.5.6 Alternative outcomes
Our identification strategy also allows us to shed light on the effect that the estab-
lishment of new foreign affiliates has on other domestic activities. We therefore
provide estimates for three different measures of firm size, as well as compensation
per employee. To be consistent with the preferred outcome from above, ∆INVi,t,
we use the first differences in total assets (∆TAi,t), total sales (∆SALESi,t),
employees (∆EMPi,t) and wages (∆WAGESi,t).39 Table 5.5.7 shows that total
assets (EUR 4.8 million), and labor demand (6 employees) both become greater
in response to an increase in foreign activity. Our results are broadly in line with
Desai et al. (2009) who find that foreign and domestic asset, sales and employ-
ment growth are complementary. We do not find evidence that firms establishing
new foreign affiliates pay higher wages. This, however, is perfectly consistent with
the results below, where we show that an additional foreign investment does not
lead to an increase in productivity. Note that the focus of our paper is mainly
on investment in real capital, and therefore we do not provide a more detailed
discussion and tests on the alternative outcomes.
39In particular, with respect to employment effects, one could think of firms taking time to
react, hence firm responses may be delayed. However, results in this regard, analogously to
those presented in Section 5.5.3, show that this is not the case here (see Table 5.A.9 in the
Appendix).
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Table 5.5.7: Alternative outcomes
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
∆TAi,t 4752.288∗∗∗ 927.211 2721 186834
∆SALESi,t 1638.517 1057.054 2814 186554
∆EMPi,t 6.247∗∗∗ 1.907 2817 183956
∆WAGEi,t 0.221 0.176 2797 182510
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects
and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
5.5.7 Heterogeneity in treatment effects
In Table 5.5.8 we test whether the domestic effect varies in variables usually
employed in gravity-type models of trade. In particular, we interact the treat-
ment indicator NAi,t with the following three variables: DIST c, GDP c,t, and
GDPPCc,t, where the bar indicates that all variables are demeaned in the same
manner as described in Section 5.5.4.
DISTc measures the log distance between Germany and host country c,
GDPc,t is the log of the host country’s GDP, and GDPPCc,t the log of the host
country’s GDP per capita. In separate specifications, including these interaction
terms one by one, only NAi,t × GDPPCc,t turns out to be statistically signifi-
cant. The positive coefficient implies that the treatment effect becomes larger in
the per capita income of the host country. This could be interpreted as evidence
against the hypothesis that the positive treatment effect is in any form related to
firms’ outsourcing to low-wage or low-productivity countries. We come back to
this issue below, as this finding is consistent with the interpretations concerning
the potential drivers behind the positive effect of NAi,t. In the last column, where
we include all interaction terms, also NAi,t ×DIST c is significant. This means
that the longer the distance between Germany and the host country, the more
pronounced is the positive effect on domestic investment.
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Table 5.5.8: Heterogeneity in treatment effects
∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t
NAi,t 444.467∗∗∗ 447.368∗∗∗ 447.547∗∗∗ 448.960∗∗∗
(143.806) (144.364) (144.123) (144.033)
NAi,t × DISTc 86.652 249.687∗∗
(88.251) (102.817)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t -20.801 -96.175
(80.919) (88.097)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 364.814∗∗ 517.579∗∗∗
(164.074) (176.879)
Standard errors are obtained from running weighted regressions including year
effects, and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at
the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
5.6 What explains the positive relationship be-
tween foreign and domestic investment?
So far, our empirical analysis has mainly been concerned with estimating ATTs
associated with setting up a new foreign affiliate. In the following sections, we
complement these basic results by identifying the potential channels that may
explain the finding of a positive domestic investment effect. First, we examine
productivity gains linked to the re-organization of production. Second, we analyze
tax savings and profit-shifting opportunities. Finally, we shed light on financing
aspects and internal capital markets.
We present empirical results with respect to these three channels in a con-
densed way in Table 5.6.1, which is structured as follows: in addition to the
baseline effect of establishing a new foreign affiliate, we include (i) a series of
interactions of NAi,t with variables concerned with the three channels, and (ii)
estimate the effects of a new foreign affiliate not only on investment, but also
on other outcome variables (total factor productivity, tax payments, and internal
debt). Moreover, in all specifications, we control for the country characteristics
(DISTc,GDPc,t,GDPPCc,t) discussed above to rule out omitted variable bias.40
40Table 5.A.15 in the Appendix provides estimation results in which standard errors are
clustered at the level of host countries instead of the firm level.
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The interactions specific to each channel as well as the additional outcome vari-
ables are discussed in the next sections (5.6.1, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3).
Table 5.6.1: Three channels to explain the domestic effects of FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆INVi,t ∆TFPi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆INVi,t ∆IDi,t ∆INVi,t
NAi,t 450.647∗∗∗ -0.257 433.917∗∗∗ -109.110∗∗ 432.573∗∗∗ -109.556∗∗ 414.216∗∗∗ 469.819∗∗ 384.147∗∗
(144.208) (0.158) (143.846) (53.882) (143.205) (53.816) (152.265) (192.855) (151.389)
NAi,t × VERTa,t -187.787 0.108 59.835
(227.227) (0.279) (245.970)
NAi,t × IGCAa,t -421.864 -0.805 -731.254
(834.751) (1.380) (926.344)
NAi,t × CESEEa,t 19.833 -0.003 -204.894
(307.721) (0.384) (483.182)
NAi,t ×DSTRc,t 4142.748∗∗∗ -367.522 4159.319∗∗ -359.932 6321.722∗∗∗
(1602.983) (670.881) (1617.915) (675.531) (2120.986)
NAi,t ×DCEc,t -8.490 -13.454 67.526
(239.132) (100.771) (286.963)
NAi,t × IGLa,t -1801.543 -1754.405∗∗ -2040.559
(1914.829) (826.131) (2030.040)
NAi,t × DCPc,t 768.156 1147.915 307.229
(702.595) (806.375) (797.560)
NAi,t × DCPBc,t -725.415 -875.282 -91.445
(667.421) (783.019) (825.145)
NAi,t × SMCc,t 90.589 -116.748 0.105
(270.879) (320.954) (305.099)
NAi,t × DISTc 255.859∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 238.267∗∗ 12.715 236.869∗∗ 12.214 243.637∗ 266.937 238.021∗
(105.791) (0.141) (102.054) (43.983) (102.096) (43.926) (124.416) (164.037) (127.117)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t -95.395 0.019 38.656 -60.504 39.623 -59.739 -126.687 -171.285 23.322
(93.114) (0.128) (103.258) (42.076) (104.224) (42.230) (111.900) (131.318) (127.006)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 549.051∗∗∗ 0.074 569.602∗∗∗ -55.437 574.393∗∗∗ -49.157 360.621 533.992∗ 488.510∗
(189.744) (0.230) (179.018) (80.068) (181.132) (80.035) (265.497) (305.277) (293.744)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at the firm
level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
5.6.1 Production and technology channel
We start by examining whether the positive relationship between FDI and do-
mestic investment can be explained by changes in the organization of production
of the MNE. In particular, the existing literature has emphasized potential differ-
ences in the home market effects of FDI, depending on the specific type of FDI.
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Efficiency-seeking or vertical FDI is expected to have positive effects if efficiency
gains prevail over the direct losses from offshoring parts of the production process
(Hejazi and Pauly, 2003; Desai et al., 2005; Arndt et al., 2010). The net effect of
market-seeking or horizontal FDI is assumed to depend on whether FDI displaces
exports or not (Desai et al., 2005; Hejazi and Pauly, 2003). In the following, we
focus on potential productivity gains from vertical FDI. We use the approach
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to obtain value-added-based estimates
of total factor productivity, TFPi,t. Based on these estimates, we estimate ATTs
on TFP.41 In addition, we interact three proxies of vertical/horizontal FDI with
the treatment indicator. First, we construct a proxy for vertical FDI, V ERTa,t,
which equals one if the parent company operates in a different sector than the new
foreign affiliate, and is zero otherwise (Arndt et al., 2010). Second, we interact the
treatment indicator with the share of current claims on affiliated enterprises rela-
tive to total assets of the newly established affiliate, IGCAa,t, which is expected
to be larger in the presence of intermediates trade with an affiliate a. Third,
we use a dummy for new foreign affiliates in Central, Eastern and Southeastern
Europe (CESEE), CESEEa,t, which has been a popular offshoring destination
for German MNEs. All proxies for vertical FDI are demeaned, as above.
Column (1) in Table 5.6.1 presents regressions where ∆INVi,t is the outcome
and the interactions between the proxies for vertical FDI and NAi,t are included.
The interactions of the vertical FDI proxies with NAi,t are all insignificant. Col-
umn (2) suggests that the ATT for ∆TFPi,t is highly insignificant. The absence
of a productivity effect is consistent with the observation that establishing a new
foreign affiliate does not make MNEs pay higher wages (c.f. Section 5.5.6). From
this relatively clear picture, we conclude that the re-organization of production,
in particular regarding productivity gains from vertical FDI, does not seem to
be a relevant channel for explaining the positive link between FDI and domestic
investment.
41Using revenue-based measures of TFP (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) or labor productivity
(value added per employee) yields similar results.
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5.6.2 Tax savings and profit shifting channel
In this subsection, we provide evidence that the domestic investment effects of
foreign investment are heterogeneous in corporate tax differentials. Moreover, we
analyze changes in tax payments as an additional outcome. The findings leave
scope for a profit-shifting interpretation, which we discuss in the following.
A substantial literature has argued that international investment decisions
of MNEs are not only related to production, trade and the opening up of new
markets, but moreover represent a strategic location choice crucially influenced
by tax-planning and profit-shifting opportunities (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008;
Büttner and Wamser, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014). Common practices in this regard
include the manipulation of intra-firm transfer pricing schemes (Davies et al.,
2018) and the use of internal capital markets (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017).
While transfer pricing is hard to detect and is not discussed in more detail here,
we are able to establish an empirical link between MNEs’ foreign and domestic
activities, intra-company loans and tax savings.
To better understand the mechanisms at work, let us assume a simple in-
vestment model and a distortive tax τi on business profits implemented at the
location of the MNE (Germany). Thus, we start from a setting in which the
tax on corporate profits drives a wedge between marginal product of capital and
marginal return.
Our argument is based on a very simple model of a profit-maximizing firm.
From the maximization problem, we obtain the following marginal condition:42
F ′(Ki) =
r
1− τi(1− ϕi)
(5.6.1)
In this expression, F ′(Ki) denotes the marginal product of capital Ki, r is
the opportunity cost of capital, and ϕi denotes the share of profits that can
be shifted to other countries by MNE i, with ϕi ∈ [0, 1]. The tax τi drives a
wedge between the opportunity cost r and the marginal product of capital and
42The simple maximization problem may be formulated as in Egger et al. (2014b). Firms
maximize profits πi = Fi(Ki)−τiKi(1−ϕi)−rKi by optimally choosing capital input Ki, with
Ki(1 − ϕi) denoting the tax base and r the normal (benchmark) rate of return. The model
makes standard assumptions about the production technology, with F ′(Ki) > 0, F ′′(Ki) < 0.
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thereby increases the required rate of return on investment. At the margin, in
order to account for the increase in the required rate of return, the firm reduces
investment. If, however, the firm can fully avoid the tax, the user cost of capital
remains undistorted as under a cash-flow or allowance for corporate equity (ACE)
tax. More generally, in the above marginal condition, if ϕi = 1, the first-order
condition equals F ′(Ki) = r. The term (1− ϕi) denotes the extent to which the
tax base can be reduced and τi(1 − ϕi) can be understood as the effective tax
burden of firm i. If the latter is equal to zero, there is no distortion.
When denoting those MNEs setting up a new foreign affiliate by superscript
NA = 1 and those not setting up a new affiliate by NA = 0, the key argument
we make is that ϕNA=1i > ϕNA=0i , i.e., there is a discrete jump in the opportu-
nities to avoid taxes for those MNEs setting up a new affiliate, compared to the
counterfactual of not setting up a new affiliate. This argument is particularly
relevant if the new foreign entity is located in a low-tax or tax haven country
(relative to the German parent). Thus, we allow the basic effect of setting up
a foreign affiliate to be heterogeneous (by using interactions) in the tax differ-
entials between Germany and the host countries where new foreign affiliates are
established. Thus, additional profit-shifting opportunities are associated with a
vanishing role of the tax, a reduction in the cost of capital, and more investment.
By the same token, we may argue that restrictions on ϕi (many countries have
implemented restrictions on profit shifting such as transfer-pricing rules) lead to
adverse investment consequences.43
Columns (3) to (6) in Table 5.6.1 present evidence on treatment effects being
heterogeneous with respect to corporate tax differentials.44 In the specifications
in columns (3) and (5), we estimate ATTs on ∆INVi,t, explicitly controlling
for corporate tax rate differentials (DSTRc,t), transfer pricing documentation
requirements (DCEc,t), and intra-group loans (IGLa,t) provided by the newly
established affiliate a. DSTRc,t is defined as the German statutory tax rate plus
the business tax rate at the municipality level minus the statutory tax rate of the
country where the newly established foreign affiliate is located.45
43This argument is presented in Büttner et al. (2017), for example.
44In addition to the data utilized so far, we employ corporate taxes taken from Steinmüller
et al. (2019). For a detailed overview of all data sources, see Table 5.A.1 in the Appendix.
45Note that Germany follows a territorial tax system.
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We would expect that ∆INV is positively related to low taxes abroad. The
firm may particularly use the newly established entity to shift profits and save
taxes, which gives rise to the positive domestic investment effect via a reduction
in the cost of capital at home. For the interaction term with the transfer pricing
indicator, which is equal to 1 if the host country has implemented transfer pricing
documentation requirements, and zero otherwise, we expect a negative estimate
as countries use documentation requirements to prevent abusive use of transfer
pricing for the purpose of profit shifting. The intra-group loans variable is defined
as the balance-sheet position ‘lending to affiliated entities’ relative to the total
assets of affiliate a at time t. If internal loans are used to shift profits, rather than
the manipulation of transfer pricing or other means of profit shifting, we would
expect the positive treatment effect to be positively related to IGLa,t.
All specifications have in common that the main effect of setting up a for-
eign affiliate on domestic investments remains very stable in terms of size and
significance. Moreover, our results suggest that the treatment effect is in fact
heterogeneous with respect to the corporate tax rate. The larger the tax differ-
ential between Germany and the destination country, the larger is the positive
and significant impact of foreign activity on domestic investments as measured by
∆INVi,t. In contrast to these significant factors, the existence of transfer pricing
documentation requirements as well as a higher share of intra-group loans do not
seem to be associated with a significant deviation from the ATT.46
In order to get more detailed insights into the interplay of MNEs’ investment
behavior and tax incentives, we depict the heterogeneity of the treatment effect in
Figure 5.6.1. Displaying the treatment effect on ∆INVi,t on the vertical axis as a
function of the demeaned tax differential confirms our findings from Table 5.6.1.
The solid horizontal line illustrates the ATT. The positively sloped solid line
shows the treatment effect on the treated as increasing in the tax differential. The
two solid lines cross at a treatment effect value of EUR 434,000 and a demeaned
46Note that we include three further refinements in the Appendix (Tables 5.A.16, 5.A.17
and 5.A.18): (i) we use effective average tax rates (EATRs) instead of STR (results remain
qualitatively the same), (ii) we exclude tax haven countries as destination countries (results
remain robust in this case as well), (iii) we produce separate results for manufacturing and
services affiliates. Also in this regard, we do not observe any differences, and all core results
prevail.
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Figure 5.6.1: Heterogeneous tax effects
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tax differential of zero. This is of course no coincidence, but merely follows from
the definition of the ATT and the demeaned tax differential. The treatment
effect of EUR 434,000 is the same as the ATT measured in Table 5.6.1, which is
associated with an average tax differential, hence a value of zero on the horizontal
axis. To the right of this intersection, the tax differential between Germany and
the respective destination country is larger than the average. This is associated
with an effect on domestic investment which is larger than the ATT. Vice versa,
to the left of the intersection, the effect is comparatively smaller. For a tax
differential only slightly below average, the ATT is still positive and significant;
however, for demeaned tax differentials smaller than around -0.05, the effect on
investments becomes insignificant. On the one hand, this finding is consistent
with the tax incentives suggested above. On the other hand, we see that in
both tails of the tax differential distribution, the confidence bands as depicted
by the dotted lines in Figure 5.6.1 are broadening. Particularly for high values
of the demeaned tax differential, this can be explained by a lower support of
observations. As a consequence, the larger the deviation from the average tax
differential, the more difficult it is to precisely estimate the heterogeneous effect
of taxes.
The findings in this section so far have shown that domestic investment behav-
ior is sensitive towards tax incentives through the establishment of new foreign
affiliates. An obvious goal of choosing affiliate locations for tax optimization rea-
5.6. THREE CHANNELS 185
sons is to reduce the overall tax burden of the firm. Hence, an additional way
to analyze how tax incentives affect investment behavior is to take a closer look
at how FDI affects domestic tax payments. To this end, we estimate ATTs on
∆TAXi,t, which is the change in taxes paid by the German parent company. The
results are shown in columns (4) and (6) in Table 5.6.1. All explanatory variables
and the way they are defined are the same as above.47
In both specifications, we observe a robust, negative ATT on ∆TAXi,t, signifi-
cant at the 5% level. According to our estimation results, setting up a new foreign
affiliate is associated with a decrease in domestic tax payments of EUR 109,000.
Analogous to above, we include interaction terms with (DSTRc,t), (DCEc,t) and
(IGLi,t). The empirical findings suggest that the treatment effect neither varies
significantly with the demeaned tax rate differential, nor do documentation re-
quirements alter the treatment effect.
In contrast to this, the absolute magnitude of the negative treatment effect
strongly increases in the share of intra-group loans to total assets of the newly
established affiliate. The estimated coefficient in column (6) of Table 5.6.1 indi-
cates that if the new affiliate’s intra-group loans increase by 10 percentage points
relative to total assets, the decline in ∆TAXi,t amounts to EUR 175,000.
To sum up, our empirical analysis has shown that MNEs’ investment activities
are strongly influenced by tax incentives.48 A common vehicle to exploit tax
differentials is internal borrowing and lending. The next subsection discusses the
characteristics of internal capital markets, tests whether the prospect of better
access to financial capital is a driver of the treatment effect and highlights the
interdependencies between this ‘financing channel’ and the ‘profit shifting and
tax savings channel’.
47In addition to the ATTs on ∆TAXi,t, we also estimate the effect of a new foreign affiliate
on domestic profits. These results are presented in Table 5.A.19 in the Appendix and show that
profits do indeed decline when a new foreign affiliate is established, reinforcing the hypothesis
that parts of domestic profits are shifted abroad.
48In order to reinforce the previous results, we estimate the ATT on domestic investments
and the tax bill with a refined definition of the treatment group: we only include MNEs with
affiliates in countries for which the demeaned tax differential exceeds the 75th and 90th per-
centile, respectively. Table 5.A.20 in the Appendix presents the estimated ATTs in this regard,
suggesting that the ATTs are larger if new affiliates are set up in low-tax countries. We should
note, however, that for reasons of data availability (taxes paid), the number of treated units
becomes relatively small.
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5.6.3 Financing channel
One of the distinguishing features of large firms in general and MNEs in par-
ticular is that they can borrow and lend on an internal capital market (Gertner
et al., 1994; Stein, 1997; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein,
2000). Egger et al. (2014a) argue that internal capital markets are established
for reasons which can be broadly grouped into two categories: (i) profit shifting
via debt shifting and tax savings; (ii) frictions in economic fundamentals and
efficient resource allocation. Their model suggests that differences in economic
fundamentals – such as weak institutional quality, underdeveloped financial mar-
kets, or high productivity – produce different levels of excess returns at host
locations. Capital should be allocated to those entities where this excess return
is highest. In our context, establishing a new foreign entity may facilitate access
to financial capital (at host locations). Through a firm’s internal capital market,
internal financing then becomes available for operations at home and more in-
vestment projects may be realized there. Thus, we hypothesize that the positive
domestic investment effect found in the basic results may reflect better access to
financial capital.
To understand why we cannot really distinguish between the profit-shifting ar-
gument and the financial development argument, it is important to recognize that
MNEs often use internal capital markets for tax reasons (Büttner and Wamser,
2013). There, the entity in a tax haven provides internal debt to affiliates or
the parent located in a high-tax country (Germany). In the optimality condition
in (5.6.1), this is equivalent to an increase in ϕi as interest payments are tax
deductible at the parent i and interest income is not taxed in the new foreign
affiliate (in the tax haven). There are many cases of MNEs where exactly this tax-
planning strategy has been applied. Hines (1999) highlights the consequences of
restricting interest deduction, stating that countries which limit the deductibility
of interest payments (lower ϕi) might reduce domestic investment and encourage
MNEs to raise funds through foreign affiliates. However, internal debt is often
provided from countries where not only taxes are low but also where capital mar-
ket access and financing is facilitated (Egger et al., 2014a). To summarize, the
new affiliate allows the German firm to increase ϕi, which means that additional
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investment projects can be realized in Germany.
Our tests of the financing channel hypothesis focus on two aspects. First,
we use variables on the development of the local capital market and interact
these measures with NAi,t. That is, we allow the effect of NAi,t on ∆INVi,t to
vary with the quality of the capital market at host country c. The variables we
use are all taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
and the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), and are often used in
the literature to measure financial market depth.49 The results are presented in
column (7) in Table 5.6.1. They show that neither stock market capitalization
nor the variables measuring credit to the private sector are statistically significant
at conventional levels.
A second way to test the financing channel hypothesis is to look at alternative
outcomes. We do so by using information on (internal) loans from affiliated
enterprises, i.e. internal debt IDi,t. If newly established affiliates increase the
scope for intra-group borrowing of the parent company, this should be reflected
in IDi,t. We find that ∆IDi,t is positively related to NAi,t, as expected.50 Using
the same interactions with the variables measuring the quality of the local capital
market, we do not find any positive and statistically significant coefficients.
All findings together support the hypothesis that the financing channel is im-
portant and contributes to the positive treatment effect for domestic investment.
In particular, the estimates on the alternative outcomes suggest that foreign ac-
tivity allows firms to allocate capital more efficiently on their internal capital
markets. Hence, in view of the contribution by Egger et al. (2014a), it seems that
firms are able to make use of potential excess returns at home. However, these
49The three variables are (a) Domestic Credit to the Private Sector (DCPc,t), (b) Domes-
tic Credit to the Private Sector by Banks (DCPBc,t), and (c) Stock Market Capitalization
(SMCc,t). The first two are taken from the World Bank’s WDI database, while the latter
comes from the GFDD; (a) and (b) measure domestic credit provided to the private sector (in
% of GDP), where (b) accounts only for credit provided by banks; (c) measures the total value
of all listed shares in the stock market (in % of GDP). Larger values of all three variables are
associated with a higher degree of financial depth and a more favorable (local) capital market.
50As an additional outcome, we use ∆IDi,t/TAi,t, which measures the change in the share of
internal borrowing in total assets, i.e., the internal-debt-to-asset ratio. Note that the total assets
in this case refer to total capital (as the sum of nominal capital, capital reserves, profit reserves
and total debt), such that the internal-debt-to-capital ratio, the external-debt-to-capital ratio
and the equity-to-capital ratio add up to one. The alternative definition, using the total assets
in the denominator, does not change the results (Table 5.A.21 in the Appendix).
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empirical findings and the interaction terms should only be interpreted together
with the findings of the tax and profit-shifting channel (Section 5.6.2), as internal
debt is the vehicle through which (i) profits are shifted (ii) and capital is allocated
more efficiently.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper has provided new empirical results on the relationship between foreign
and domestic activity of MNEs. While previous contributions have presented
ambiguous evidence on whether home-market investment and FDI can be seen
as substitutes or complements, our basic results suggest that FDI complements
domestic investment at the firm level. The distinct contribution of our paper can
be subdivided into three aspects. First, we employ a unique dataset enabling us
to observe domestic and foreign investment of German MNEs. Second, we cope
with the simultaneous nature of these two investment activities and associated
endogeneity concerns by estimating ATTs based on propensity scores. This allows
us to control for variables that determine the selection into foreign acticvity.
Third, we present three specific channels through which foreign activity may
affect domestic investment.
As a baseline result, we have estimated an average treatment effect on the
treated which suggests that setting up a new foreign affiliate is associated with
about EUR 460,000 additional investment in fixed assets. In addition to this ex-
tensive margin estimate, we also exploit variation at the intensive margin of for-
eign activity and estimate an elasticity between foreign and domestic investment
in the range of 0.13 and 0.23, depending on the measure of foreign investment
activity. The basic effect of foreign activity on home investment proves to be ro-
bust against a large number of sensitivity tests. The latter include (i) alternative
measures of outcome, (ii) tests for prior trends and lagged effects, (iii) alternative
specifications of propensity score estimates, (iv) variations in treatment-control
comparisons, and (v) the calculation of placebo effects.
Trying to explain the observed outcomes, we investigate three channels through
which domestic activity might be affected by foreign investment: first, technology
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and productivity gains; second, tax savings and profit shifting; and third, financ-
ing and internal capital markets. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
relate empirical findings from firm-level data in this field to such comprehensive
explanatory approaches.
In contrast to previous studies both in theoretical and empirical economics,
our empirical results suggest that foreign activity does not enhance total factor
productivity at home. Thus, while productivity gains are commonly named as a
driver of the positive link between foreign and home activity, this is not reflected
in our data.
Instead, our empirical results suggest that the crucial channel determining the
positive relation between domestic and foreign investment is mainly associated
with MNEs’ tax planning and profit-shifting opportunities, as well as improved
access to financing capital. On the one hand, MNEs strategically locate affiliates
as a response to tax incentives. The larger the tax differential between Germany
and the destination country of FDI, the more pronounced is the domestic effect of
a new foreign affiliate. On the other hand, we find evidence that newly established
affiliates are lending to firm entities in the home countries. Hence, expanding
abroad is associated with improved access to financing capital and allows MNEs
to allocate capital more efficiently via an internal capital market. These two
channels are closely linked to each other as internal debt is the common vehicle
for both profit shifting and a more efficient allocation of capital.
Turning the focus to the policy implications of our findings, we can argue
that investing abroad allows MNEs to avoid financial imperfections and hence
implies an efficiency gain. In addition to that, however, public policy should
recognize as well that tax savings and profit shifting account for some portion
of the positive effect associated with investing abroad. If MNEs can exploit
differences in taxes across countries, this provides an advantage of MNEs against
their domestic competitors. Thus, thoroughly designed policies against profit
shifting are needed to guarantee a level playing field. In the end, policymakers
face a trade-off between preventing profit shifting and tax avoidance on the one
hand and the risk of distorting the optimal allocation of investment capital on
the other hand.
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5.A Appendix
Description of variables and data sources
Table 5.A.1: Description of variables and data sources
Variable Definition and source Variable level
TAi,t Log of total assets of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan

Domestic firm i
FAi,t/EMPi,t Log of fixed assets over number of employees of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
V Ai,t/EMPi,t Log of value added over number of employees of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
EMPi,t Number of employees of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
INVi,t Gross investment in 1,000 EUR of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
NINVi,t Net investment in 1,000 EUR of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
SALESi,t Total sales in 1,000 EUR of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
WAGEi,t Labor costs in 1,000 EUR over number of employees of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
CFi,t Cash flow relative to total assets of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
Qi,t Lagged sales growth of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
INTANGi,t Intangible assets relative to total assets of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
LEVi,t Debt-to-equity-ratio of domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
TFPi,t Total factor productivity of domestic firm i, based on value added in period t; Source: Ustan
TAXi,t Taxes in 1,000 EUR paid by domestic firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
IDi,t Internal debt in 1,000 EUR provided by affiliated entities to parent (domestic) firm i in period t; Source: Ustan
MNEi,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the domestic firm i has been an MNE in period t− 1, and 0 otherwise; Source: MiDi
TAi,t(Affiliates) Log of the sum of total assets across all affiliates in period t; Source: MiDi
SALESa,t Sales in 1,000 EUR of affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi

Foreign affiliate a
EMPa,t Number of employees of affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi
FAa,t Fixed and intangible assets in 1,000 EUR of affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi
TAa,t Total assets in 1,000 EUR at affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi
EFDIa,t Equity capital of FDI in 1,000 EUR at affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi
CFDIa,t Consolidated sum (equity capital plus internal debt) of FDI in 1,000 EUR at affiliate a in period t; Source: MiDi
V ERTa,t Dummy equal to 1 if the parent firm operates in a different sector than the new foreign affiliate in period t, and 0 otherwise; Source: MiDi
CESEEa,t Dummy equal to 1 if new affiliate in period t is located in Central, Eastern or Southeastern Europe, and 0 otherwise; Source: MiDi
IGLa,t Intra-group loans over total assets of affiliate a in period t ; Source: MiDi
IGCAa,t Intra-group current claims over total assets of affiliate a in period t ; Source: MiDi
Sectoral Sales Growths,t Sales growth in sector s in period t; Source: MiDi

Sectoral or regional level
County GDPk,t Log of GDP in county k in period t; Source: Regional Database, German Statistical Office
County GDP per Workerk,t Log of GDP per worker in county k in period t; Source: Regional Database, German Statistical Office
County Income per Capitak,t Log of income per capita in county k in period t; Source: Regional Database, German Statistical Office
County Share High Skilledk,t Share of high-skilled workers in county k in period t ; Source: Federal Employment Agency
Municipality Population`,t Log of population in municipality ` in period t; Source: German Statistical Office
Municipality Trade Tax`,t Trade tax applicable in municipality ` in period t; Source: German Statistical Office
GDPc,t Log of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) (constant 2011 international $) of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database

Host Country c
GDPPCc,t Log of GDP at PPP (constant 2011 international $) per capita of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
DISTc Log of the geodesic distance between Germany and country c; Source: CEPII, GeoDist Database
DCPc,t Log of domestic credit provided to the private sector in % of GDP of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
DCPBc,t Log of domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks in % of GDP of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, WDI database
SMCc,t Log of the total value of all listed shares in the stock market in % of GDP of country c in period t; Source: World Bank, GFDD
DCEc,t Dummy indicating whether transfer pricing documentation requirements exist; if not, the dummy equals 0; Source: Lohse and Riedel (2013)
STRc,t Statutory corporate tax rate in country c in period t; Source: Steinmüller et al. (2019)
DSTRc,t German statutory tax rate plus the business tax rate at the municipality level minus the statutory tax rate in country c in period t; Source:
German Statistical Office; Steinmüller et al. (2019)
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Additional descriptive statistics
Table 5.A.2: Number of observations in different datasets
Ustan MiDi Ext. Margin Match Ext. Margin
2000 15564 5732 2196 803 332
2001 14661 5966 1977 852 314
2002 12954 5632 1512 789 199
2003 12065 5433 1293 761 170
2004 12086 5337 1239 771 197
2005 12038 5381 1358 754 230
2006 12693 5503 1590 792 249
2007 13519 5682 1648 872 274
2008 14607 5805 1537 941 292
2009 15718 5897 1388 975 230
2010 16586 6097 1526 1058 297
2011 16664 6286 1523 1093 310
2012 16799 6475 1501 1110 286
2013 11807 6467 1120 884 204
Firm 39533 12636 10022 2234 1496
Firm-Year 197761 86946 21408 12455 3584
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Additional results
The probability of establishing a new foreign affiliate
Table 5.A.3: Probit specification with second-order lags
(1)
TAi,t−2 0.219∗∗∗
(0.063)
V Ai,t−2/EMPi,t−2 -0.016
(0.044)
FAi,t−2/EMPi,t−2 0.047
(0.032)
TAi,t−2 (Affiliates) 0.035
(0.036)
MNEi,t−2 -0.897∗∗∗
(0.341)
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−2 -0.205∗
(0.117)
County GDPk,t−2 -1.156∗
(0.657)
County GDP per Workerk,t−2 0.491
(0.702)
County Income per Capitak,t−2 0.639
(0.497)
County Share High Skilledk,t−2 -2.964
(3.059)
Municipality Population`,t−2 -0.009
(0.104)
Municipality Business Tax`,t−2 2.335
(3.288)
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. A Wald test indicates joint significance
of the Mundlak-Chamberlain means, which are not shown.
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Table 5.A.4: Alternative probit specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TAi,t−1 0.155∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗ 2.612∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.122) (0.634)
V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.111 0.598∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.076) (0.247)
FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.028 0.060
(0.010) (0.010) (0.032) (0.041)
TAi,t−1 (Affiliates) 0.214∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.284
(0.013) (0.013) (0.125) (0.361)
MNEi,t−1 -0.734∗∗∗ -0.744∗∗∗ 2.307∗∗∗ 1.046
(0.132) (0.133) (0.718) (1.342)
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1 -0.084 -0.086 0.238∗ 0.152
(0.086) (0.087) (0.134) (0.172)
County GDPk,t−1 -0.029 -0.008 -1.286∗∗ -0.676
(0.032) (0.025) (0.655) (2.905)
County GDP per Workerk,t−1 0.481∗∗∗ -0.031 3.842 -42.081
(0.130) (0.133) (2.765) (40.725)
County Income per Capitak,t−1 0.264∗∗ 0.129 0.246 20.189
(0.107) (0.102) (2.100) (23.206)
County Share High Skilledk,t−1 0.610 -0.216 -5.355∗ 2.572
(0.482) (0.459) (3.068) (4.946)
Municipality Population`,t−1 0.068∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.226∗ -0.439
(0.016) (0.014) (0.116) (0.489)
Municipality Business Tax`,t−1 -1.861 -0.813 13.912 52.182
(1.241) (1.059) (12.284) (87.412)
(TAi,t−1)2 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.054)
(V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1)2 -0.015∗∗ -0.086∗∗
(0.006) (0.034)
(FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1)2 0.006∗ -0.008
(0.003) (0.008)
(TAi,t−1 (Affiliates))2 0.033∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.033)
(Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1)2 0.609∗∗ 1.044∗
(0.287) (0.628)
(County GDPk,t−1)2 -0.003 -0.077
(0.016) (0.314)
(County GDP per Workerk,t−1)2 -0.340 10.397
(0.327) (9.692)
(County Income per Capitak,t−1)2 0.046 -6.196
(0.334) (7.450)
(County Share High Skilledk,t−1)2 9.642 -64.646∗
(6.394) (36.236)
(Municipality Population`,t−1)2 0.013∗∗ 0.034
(0.005) (0.051)
(Municipality Business Tax`,t−1)2 -49.515 -351.836
(43.245) (662.901)
(TAi,t−1)3 0.002
(0.002)
(V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1)3 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
(FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1)3 0.001∗∗
(0.001)
(TAi,t−1 (Affiliates))3 0.001
(0.001)
(Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1)3 0.858
(1.120)
(County GDPk,t−1)3 0.003
(0.011)
(County GDP per Workerk,t−1)3 -0.833
(0.766)
(County Income per Capitak,t−1)3 0.649
(0.796)
(County Share High Skilledk,t−1)3 188.557∗∗
(92.638)
(Municipality Population`,t−1)3 -0.001
(0.002)
(Municipality Business Tax`,t−1)3 776.068
(1657.172)
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively. A Wald test indicates joint significance of the Mundlak-Chamberlain
means in specification (4) and (5), which are not shown.
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The effects of investing abroad
Table 5.A.5: Robustness to caliper choice (caliper width in brackets)
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
∆INVi,t [0.01] 458.126∗∗∗ 145.101 3021 188740
∆INVi,t [0.005] 427.675∗∗∗ 138.159 2917 188348
∆INVi,t [0.001] 544.439∗∗∗ 144.925 2392 101706
∆INVi,t [0.0005] 429.675∗∗∗ 151.191 1949 79009
∆INVi,t [0.0001] 533.060∗∗∗ 192.308 905 27762
∆INVi,t [0.00005] 629.884∗∗∗ 225.786 627 15630
∆INVi,t [0.00001] 1307.033∗∗∗ 334.026 327 3549
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and
conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Table 5.A.6: Balancing property (∆INVi,t)
Mean t-test
Treated (NA = 1) Control (NA = 0) %bias t p>|t| V(T)/V(C)
TAi,t−1 11.842 11.831 0.6 0.28 0.780 0.70*
V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1 4.990 5.011 -2.6 -0.87 0.382 0.72*
FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1 3.351 3.333 1.0 0.46 0.643 1.06
TAi,t−1 (Affiliates) 8.789 8.652 3.5 1.11 0.268 1.05
MNEi,t−1 0.784 0.787 -1.1 -0.33 0.741 .
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1 -0.009 -0.013 2.0 0.73 0.467 0.99
County GDPk,t−1 9.142 9.131 1.1 0.42 0.676 1.07
County GDP per Workerk,t−1 4.122 4.118 2.1 0.79 0.427 1.00
County Income per Capitak,t−1 3.123 3.113 5.0 1.99 0.047 0.98
County Share High Skilledk,t−1 0.098 0.097 3.9 1.45 0.147 1.06
Municipality Population`,t−1 11.017 11.004 0.7 0.27 0.784 1.08*
Municipality Business Tax`,t−1 0.137 0.137 0.8 0.30 0.768 1.02
Table 5.A.7: Robustness to outlier treatment
ATT SE No. treated (NA = 1) No. untreated (NA = 0)
∆INVi,t [1%] 458.126∗∗∗ 145.101 3021 188740
∆INVi,t [2%] 297.240∗∗∗ 80.473 2777 185101
∆INVi,t [3%] 127.474∗∗ 61.751 2566 181478
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and conditioning on
imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.8: MNEs establishing their first foreign affiliate in a country
∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t
NAi,t 458.224∗∗∗ -108.906∗∗
(145.101) (53.401)
NAi,t ×NEW i,t -146.194 -59.336
(380.380) (130.133)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted re-
gressions including year effects, and conditioning on
imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at
the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
NEWi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the parent
firm establishes its first foreign affiliate in a country
in period t, and 0 otherwise.
Timing of effects
Table 5.A.9: Timing of effects: Alternative outcomes (∆EMP )
new affiliate new MNE
NAi,t+2 6.025 12.640
(3.906) (11.921)
NAi,t+1 1.363 0.114
(2.879) (3.105)
NAi,t 2.206 2.280
(2.590) (2.902)
NAi,t−1 2.754 1.262
(2.782) (2.844)
NAi,t−2 3.281 -1.206
(3.127) (5.751)
No. treated 369 230
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in
parentheses.***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.10: Timing of effects: Alternative outcomes (∆TFP )
new affiliate new MNE
NAi,t+2 0.427 -0.661
(0.571) (1.933)
NAi,t+1 0.445 0.275
(0.366) (0.388)
NAi,t 0.046 0.078
(0.324) (0.412)
NAi,t−1 -0.144 -0.488
(0.340) (0.464)
NAi,t−2 0.122 0.043
(0.726) (0.618)
No. treated 346 223
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in
parentheses.***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Intensive margin elasticities
Table 5.A.11: Comparison to Desai, Foley and Hines (2009)
1% 1% 5% 5% 10% 10%
FA Growtha,t 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
TAi,t−1 (Affiliates) 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TAi,t−1 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
V Ai,t−1/EMPi,t−1 0.023∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.006∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
FAi,t−1/EMPi,t−1 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Sectoral Sales Growths,t−1 0.054 0.042∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.033) (0.018) (0.013)
County GDPk,t−1 0.010 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
County GDP per Workerk,t−1 -0.020 -0.022 -0.017
(0.033) (0.019) (0.014)
County Income per Capitak,t−1 -0.018 0.008 0.016
(0.028) (0.016) (0.013)
County Share High Skilledk,t−1 0.136 0.002 -0.032
(0.122) (0.071) (0.054)
Municipality Population`,t−1 -0.008∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality Business Tax`,t−1 -0.307 -0.282∗ -0.124
(0.285) (0.171) (0.136)
Estimates are obtained from running regressions including sector and year effects. Standard errors clustered
at the firm level in parentheses. Percentages refer to different outlier treatments. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Sensitivity analysis
We further evaluate the robustness of our main result by estimating a series of
regressions with additional covariates. The literature suggests several firm-i-level
characteristics that are considered important for domestic investment decisions.
We use lagged sales growth, Qi,t, which is a commonly used proxy for Tobin’s
Q of unlisted firms (Whited, 2006; Bloom et al., 2007). In addition, we include
measures of financing constraints such as cash flow relative to total assets (Faz-
zari et al., 1988), CFi,t, intangible assets relative to total assets (Almeida and
Campello, 2007), INTANGi,t, and firm leverage (Whited, 1992), LEVi,t. Ta-
ble 5.A.12 presents the results from a set of weighted regressions, additionally
conditioning on these four variables. In all specifications, the ATT remains pos-
itive and highly significant. Column (1) indicates that a one percentage point
increase in cash flow relative to total assets is associated with an increase in do-
mestic investment of around EUR 30,000. Tobin’s Q, the ratio of intangible to
total assets and the debt-to-equity ratio have no significant effect on changes in
domestic investment for the firms in our sample (columns (2) to (4)). Simulta-
neously including all variables in one regression leaves the ATT fully unaffected
(see column (5)).
Table 5.A.12: Weighted regressions conditioning on firm-specific variables
Dependent variable: ∆INVi,t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NAi,t 449.636∗∗∗ 451.922∗∗∗ 457.356∗∗∗ 481.402∗∗∗ 474.630∗∗∗
(143.985) (162.494) (146.177) (148.508) (166.844)
CFi,t 2980.256∗∗∗ 3214.630∗∗∗
(590.921) (725.199)
Qi,t -248.142 -505.553
(521.084) (555.830)
INTANGi,t -1755.949 -2472.489
(4421.941) (4665.499)
LEVi,t -6.166 -8.524
(8.250) (9.728)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and conditioning on imbalanced
covariates. Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.13: Domestic investment as placebo: new affiliates
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
INVi,t 1678.980 1777.726 147 77785
∆INVi,t 381.396 549.183 151 77961
INVi,t/FAi,t−1 -0.013 0.039 149 76209
NINVi,t -560.413 831.804 140 76995
∆NINVi,t 256.676 763.440 139 76855
NINVi,t/FAi,t−1 -0.043 0.037 150 76257
∆TAXi,t -244.990 237.334 123 78401
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects
and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively.
Table 5.A.14: Domestic investment as placebo: lump-sum investments
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
(1) ∆INVi,t (fixed assets growth of domestic affiliates > 50%) 214.809 161.881 1105 98581
(2) ∆TAXi,t (fixed assets growth of domestic affiliates > 50%) 50.034 65.769 979 97378
(3) ∆INVi,t (fixed assets growth of domestic affiliates > 90%) 181.487 230.652 618 98875
(4) ∆TAXi,t (fixed assets growth of domestic affiliates > 90%) 90.220 80.149 526 97669
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
5.A. APPENDIX 207
What explains the positive relationship between foreign and domestic
investment?
Table 5.A.15: Standard errors clustered at the country level
∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t
NAi,t 450.647∗∗∗ 433.917∗∗∗ 432.573∗∗∗ 414.216∗∗∗ 384.147∗∗∗
(109.796) (99.424) (100.857) (119.546) (109.037)
NAi,t × VERTa,t -187.787 59.835
(223.132) (230.561)
NAi,t × IGCAa,t -421.864 -731.254
(846.264) (1069.162)
NAi,t × CESEEa,t 19.833 -204.894
(249.825) (435.834)
NAi,t ×DSTRc,t 4142.748∗∗∗ 4159.319∗∗∗ 6321.722∗∗∗
(1308.025) (1297.237) (1838.654)
NAi,t ×DCEc,t -8.490 67.526
(200.303) (259.129)
NAi,t × IGLa,t -1801.543 -2040.559
(2100.832) (2195.664)
NAi,t × DCPc,t 768.156 307.229
(814.596) (820.876)
NAi,t × DCPBc,t -725.415 -91.445
(685.823) (818.441)
NAi,t × SMCc,t 90.589 0.105
(281.047) (307.423)
NAi,t × DISTc 255.859∗∗ 238.267∗∗ 236.869∗∗ 243.637∗∗ 238.021∗∗
(113.437) (104.499) (103.842) (121.561) (114.075)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t -95.395 38.656 39.623 -126.687 23.322
(85.350) (98.246) (99.553) (88.091) (103.210)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 549.051∗∗ 569.602∗∗∗ 574.393∗∗∗ 360.621 488.510∗
(244.117) (186.100) (186.107) (299.292) (289.538)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and conditioning on
imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.16: Tax savings and profit-shifting channel: Effective average tax rates
∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆TAXi,t
NAi,t 437.672∗∗∗ 436.944∗∗∗ -111.346∗∗ -112.065∗∗
(143.730) (143.039) (53.898) (53.825)
NAi,t ×DEATRc,t 3981.858∗ 3962.123∗ 377.726 384.587
(2225.811) (2230.050) (888.692) (899.815)
NAi,t ×DCEc,t -26.459 -0.849
(236.821) (100.986)
NAi,t × IGLa,t -1733.316 -1762.796∗∗
(1897.272) (826.695)
NAi,t × DISTc 243.377∗∗ 242.777∗∗ 11.222 10.241
(102.211) (102.205) (43.937) (43.864)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t 18.134 18.960 -37.762 -37.695
(107.758) (108.662) (44.803) (44.946)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 573.641∗∗∗ 579.051∗∗∗ -44.837 -39.405
(183.615) (185.412) (81.717) (81.649)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and
conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at the firm level
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. DEATRc,t is defined as the German effective average tax rate minus the
effective average tax rate in country c in period t.
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Table 5.A.17: Excluding tax haven countries
∆INVi,t ∆TFPi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆INVi,t ∆IDi,t ∆INVi,t
NAi,t 351.346∗∗ -0.286∗ 336.561∗∗ -97.638∗ 335.007∗∗ -99.614∗ 321.148∗∗ 461.209∗∗ 294.173∗
(143.141) (0.161) (142.416) (55.639) (141.857) (55.749) (154.521) (180.434) (155.255)
NAi,t × VERTa,t -167.286 -0.099 37.461
(230.190) (0.279) (247.715)
NAi,t × IGCAa,t -408.694 -1.397 -710.341
(947.992) (1.283) (1077.017)
NAi,t × CESEEa,t -61.711 -0.008 -329.597
(311.246) (0.383) (505.079)
NAi,t ×DSTRc,t 3968.042∗∗ -298.615 3965.054∗∗ -303.839 6330.806∗∗∗
(1726.700) (709.456) (1731.676) (715.536) (2282.395)
NAi,t ×DCEc,t 16.156 25.676 83.374
(251.547) (102.938) (301.125)
NAi,t × IGLa,t -1422.136 -2245.903∗∗ -1627.041
(2098.781) (1012.142) (2251.503)
NAi,t × DCPc,t 778.222 1705.432∗∗ 413.315
(747.863) (732.136) (827.793)
NAi,t × DCPBc,t -601.176 -1413.945∗∗ -143.755
(709.760) (649.218) (853.628)
NAi,t × SMCc,t 74.078 -88.146 -13.506
(304.695) (324.257) (334.806)
NAi,t × DISTc 171.235 0.296∗∗ 179.576 13.728 176.725 10.139 195.131 263.167 208.286
(119.273) (0.145) (116.707) (48.994) (117.910) (49.139) (146.380) (188.714) (153.548)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t -71.683 0.055 56.571 -60.262 56.541 -60.735 -151.957 -117.391 -7.500
(106.992) (0.135) (114.394) (44.325) (114.816) (44.253) (132.663) (148.470) (143.225)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 469.357∗∗ 0.073 529.401∗∗∗ -8.869 530.365∗∗∗ -6.742 315.124 649.541∗∗ 480.797
(199.664) (0.239) (189.847) (87.483) (192.064) (87.632) (276.647) (313.649) (307.774)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.18: New manufacturing vs. new services foreign affiliates
∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆INVi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆TAXi,t ∆INVi,t ∆IDi,t
NAi,t 457.751∗∗∗ 442.226∗∗∗ 454.894∗∗∗ -108.864∗∗ -111.458∗∗ -112.776∗∗ 437.512∗∗∗ 526.594∗∗∗
(145.103) (144.686) (145.423) (53.348) (53.758) (53.819) (156.457) (197.089)
NAi,t × SERV a,t -348.330 -453.984∗∗ -460.273∗∗ 82.590 119.857 122.428 -333.973 -108.424
(220.468) (228.106) (228.719) (87.095) (94.755) (95.167) (248.694) (308.478)
NAi,t ×DSTRc,t 4170.369∗∗∗ -351.428
(1610.620) (668.074)
NAi,t × SERV a,t ×DSTRc,t -1634.554 -174.028
(2564.462) (980.446)
NAi,t × IGLa,t -2028.416 -1668.389∗
(2792.352) (877.421)
NAi,t × SERV a,t × IGLa,t 2209.776 -610.935
(5793.180) (1797.653)
NAi,t × DCPc,t 331.579 920.369
(694.808) (828.191)
NAi,t × SERV a,t × DCPc,t -3321.366∗∗ -1513.424
(1330.388) (1636.153)
NAi,t × DCPBc,t -292.438 -676.317
(657.419) (794.592)
NAi,t × SERV a,t × DCPBc,t 2233.849∗ 787.818
(1254.636) (1588.124)
NAi,t × SMCc,t 136.057 -83.807
(267.477) (323.856)
NAi,t × SERV a,t × SMCc,t 901.467∗ -172.195
(509.468) (618.573)
NAi,t × DISTc 234.795∗∗ 242.274∗∗ 15.403 12.823 223.838∗ 257.317
(102.013) (102.853) (43.837) (43.790) (123.862) (163.451)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t 36.083 -98.319 -59.838 -48.576 -141.614 -190.641
(103.284) (88.094) (41.966) (33.479) (111.963) (131.339)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 653.563∗∗∗ 601.480∗∗∗ -77.454 -68.115 435.530 551.033∗
(190.381) (188.847) (84.876) (84.307) (271.554) (312.153)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. SERVa,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the new
foreign affiliate a operates primarily in the services sector in period t, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5.A.19: Treatment effects on different profit measures
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(NA = 1) (NA = 0)
∆OIi,t -327.830 211.542 2736 186729
∆EBTi,t -656.713∗∗ 297.891 2669 186683
∆NPi,t -408.359∗ 214.796 2680 186653
∆OIi,t/SALESi,t -0.002∗ 0.001 2575 183055
∆EBTi,t/SALESi,t 0.001 0.002 2515 183124
∆NPi,t/SALESi,t 0.002 0.002 2525 183118
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects and
conditioning on County Income per Capitak,t−1. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively. OIi,t denotes operating income, EBTi,t denotes earnings before taxes, NPi,t
denotes net profits, OIi,t/CFi,t denotes operating income relative to cash flow in pe-
riod t, EBTi,t/CFi,t denotes earning before taxes relative to cash flow in period t,
and NPi,t/CFi,t denotes net profits relative to cash flow in period t.
Table 5.A.20: Tax savings and profit-shifting channel - Top quartile/decile of the
tax differential distribution
ATT SE No. treated No. untreated
(DSTR > P75)∆INVi,t 668.052∗∗∗ 246.808 756 185711
(DSTR > P90)∆INVi,t 754.181∗∗ 359.096 303 134372
Estimates are obtained from running weighted regressions including year effects, and
conditioning on imbalanced covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.A.21: Financing channel – internal-debt-to-total-assets-ratio
∆IDi,t/TAi,t
NAi,t 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
NAi,t × DCPc,t -0.009
(0.006)
NAi,t × DCPBc,t 0.003
(0.005)
NAi,t × SMCc,t 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003)
NAi,t × DISTc,t 0.000
(0.001)
NAi,t ×GDPc,t 0.000
(0.001)
NAi,t ×GDPPCc,t 0.000
(0.002)
Estimates are obtained from running weighted re-
gressions including year effects and conditioning on
imbalanced covariates. Standard errors clustered at
the firm level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.
